Com. v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 03 April 1974
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Thomas L. JACKSON, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 799

323 A.2d 799

227 Pa.Super. 1

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Thomas L. JACKSON, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

April 3, 1974.

Rehearing Denied May 9, 1974.

John W. Packel, Asst. Defender, Vincent J. Ziccardi, Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.

James Garrett, Milton M. Stein, James T. Ranney, Asst. Dist. Attys., and Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before WRIGHT, President Judge, and WATKINS, JACOBS, HOFFMAN, CERCONE and SPAETH, JJ.

CERCONE, Judge.

This is an appeal by Thomas L. Jackson from his conviction, after trial without jury, of the crimes of burglary and attempted burglary. The appellant urges this Court to grant him a new trial on the basis of alleged errors made at the suppression hearing. ¹ For the reasons enunciated below we deny appellant's motion on the burglary conviction, but grant it as to the attempted burglary conviction.

The facts of the case, simply stated, are these. Some time between December 24, 1971 and January 2, 1972, a Mr. Alexander Johnson told the police that he had observed the appellant break into a truck parked on Bellvue Street in Philadelphia and remove a tool box. This informant knew the appellant on sight from seeing him in that neighborhood where the informant operated a store. The owner of the auto mechanic's tools also reported that the theft occurred on December 24, 1971. The appellant lived near the scene of the crime and had previously been arrested for burglary. On the basis of this information the magistrate issued a warrant to search the appellant's residence on January 2, 1972.

When the police searched the appellant's room that same day, they failed to discover any tools other than an open-ended wrench of the type that can be found in most homes. The search of the appellant's dresser drawers which revealed the wrench also led to the discovery of a collection of proof-set coins, packaged in a distinctive manner, and a gold pocket watch, items which the officer knew to be the fruits of a previously reported burglary of the home of a Mr. Prather. Although the officer did not seize the wrench, he did seize the coins and the watch along with some stolen identification cards. This evidence of the gold watch and coins formed the basis for the appellant's conviction at trial in the instant case for the burglary of the residence of a Mr. Carl Prather.

While the appellant was in custody for the Prather burglary, a Mrs. Shirley Jackson chose his picture from an array of fifteen to twenty-five photographs shown to her at the police station as being that of the man she had confronted briefly after he broke in her door on the night of January 5, 1972. Although the record does not indicate, apparently, the charge of burglary of the Prather residence and the charge of attempted burglary of the Jackson residence were consolidated for trial. On Mrs. Jackson's testimony, her photographic identification and evidence that a burglary had occurred that same evening in that same building, the appellant was convicted of the crime of attempted burglary of the Jackson residence.

The appellant first argues that the evidence produced by the search of his premises must be suppressed either because the warrant was fatally defective, or because the search extended to an area where the articles sought could not reasonably be expected to be found. We disagree with both conclusions.

The probable cause section of the search warrant reads as follows: 'Above-named subject was seen by Alexander Johnson, 58 N/N Res. 2112 Bellvue Street, breaking into a 67 Ford truck, yellow, Philadelphia license 016843 and removing a tool box from this vehicle and walk toward 21st and Bellvue Street. Informant knows this male on sight from seeing him in the neighborhood where the informant operates a store. The tools which were taken were reported stolen to the police by Logan Walter, 53 N/N 2118 Bellvue Street who had parked the truck in front of 2111 Bellvue Street. The subject's home is about a block and 1/2 from where the theft occurred. The subject has prior arrest for burglary.'

Although the information concerning the date of the alleged crime and the date of the issuance of the warrant are not included in the probable cause section, they are set forth clearly and specifically on the face of the affidavit supporting the warrant. The affidavit states that the crime of burglary was committed on December 24, 1971 and that the warrant was issued on January 2, 1972.

The purpose of a warrant is to enable a magistrate to determine whether probable cause for the commission of a crime exists. The requisite information to be set forth in an affidavit for issuance of a warrant are:

(1) Name and address of accused,

(2) Nature of crime,

(3) Time the crime is alleged to have been committed,

(4) The type of information, concerning the crime, upon which the affidavit is predicated,

(5) The time such information was received,

(6) The date of issuance of the warrant.

All the requisites set forth above, with the exception of Item 5, were met specifically by the affidavit. The dispositive question is whether or not the time the information concerning the crime was received by the affiant, even though not specifically set forth in the affidavit, is sufficiently made out by clear implication. The crime was committed nine days before the issuance of the warrant. The information must necessarily have been received by the affiant within those nine days. If we suppose that the information was received on the day of the crime which is the remotest time from the issuance of the warrant, the question to be resolved is whether the warrant issued nine days later is defective because of staleness. The operative date for determining 'staleness' is the date on which the crime is alleged to have occurred. See, generally, Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 53 S.Ct. 138, 77 L.Ed. 260 (1932), Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 525, 68 Am.Jur.2d Searches and Seizures § 70 (1973). In determining whether the lapse in time between the alleged date of the occurrence and the date of the issuance of the warrant is so great that there no longer is probable cause to believe that the items to be seized are on the premises to be searched, the magistrate must examine the facts and circumstances of the particular case before him. Id. See also United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 579 at n. 2, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); People v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.3d 704, 100 Cal.Rptr. 319, 493 P.2d 1183 (1972); Franklin v. State, 437 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). There is nothing in the affidavit from which the magistrate, who is only obliged to exercise common sense, could determine that the tools were not at the place described in the affidavit. Nine days after the crime is alleged to have been committed, assuming the information was received on the day of the crime (at a later time in the nine-day period the time would of course be shorter) is not too long during which to issue a valid search and seizure warrant. We therefore find no merit to the appellant's contention that the information be considered stale because the warrant omitted the date on which Mr. Johnson reported the incident.

Neither were the police acting unreasonably when they searched the dresser drawers for the stolen tools. The police need not assume that the tools would not be taken from the tool box which admittedly could not fit in the drawers. The tool box itself was a relatively valueless wooden one, and not in itself significant as a repository of the tools. Once stolen they could be stored in various places, and the likelihood that tools might be found in the drawers is underscored by the fact that the police did indeed find a wrench therein. Generally, a search under a search warrant may extend to all parts of the premises described in the warrant where the items sought may reasonably be expected to be found. See L. Hall et al., Modern Criminal Procedure 261--62 (1969). '(I)n countless cases in which warrants described only the land and the buildings, a search of desks, cabinets, closets and similar items has been permitted.' 68 Am.Jur.2d Searches and Seizures § 111 (1973). In failing to seize a rather commonplace wrench, the police did not indicate that they were not in fact searching for the stolen tools. Had the police also discovered a set of ratchet wrenches and other auto mechanics tools, they may well have seized them all.

The appellant next argues that the police did not have sufficient probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify their seizure of the coins without first obtaining a warrant. Needless to say, the mere fact that the coins were in plain view did not, ipso facto, justify their seizure. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1968). See also Annot., 29 L.Ed.2d 1967, 1074--78. In the instant case the officer specifically recalled that a coin collection with similar distinguishing features had been reported stolen and thus had probable cause for believing they were the stolen items. Since the coins and the watch were items which are easily moved or disposed of, the exigent circumstance for their warrantless seizure was present. Furthermore, the officer could also properly consider the appellant's reputation in ddtermining probable cause and which added to the likelihood that the coin collection had been stolen. See, generally, note, the Role of Reputation in Establishing Probable Cause for Arrest and Search, 1969 Wash.U.L.Q. 339, 340--41 and 352.

The appellant also argues that showing Mrs. Jackson the photographic layout was illegal since, the appellant being in custody at the time, he was entitled to have counsel present. In support of his argument appellant cites United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (3rd Cir. 1970), and Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738, cert. denied 400 U.S. 919,...