Com. v. Jenkins

• Decision Date: 30 January 1991
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Steven JENKINS, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1078

585 A.2d 1078

401 Pa.Super. 580

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Steven JENKINS, Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct. 17, 1990.

Filed Jan. 30, 1991.

Eric Schoenberg, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com.

Gerald A. Stein, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before DEL SOLE, POPOVICH and BROSKY, JJ.

POPOVICH, Judge:

This case involves an appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting a motion to suppress evidence filed by the defendant/appellee, Steven Jenkins, and appealed by the Commonwealth. ¹ We reverse.

In reviewing a suppression court's order suppressing evidence, we, as an appellate court, must consider only the evidence of the defendant's witnesses, and only so much of the evidence presented by the prosecution as remains uncontradicted by the record as a whole. Commonwealth v. Hamlin, 503 Pa. 210, 215-16, 469 A.2d 137, 139 (1983). When the evidence supports the factual findings of the suppression court, we may reverse only if there is an error of law. Commonwealth v. Reddix, 355 Pa.Super. 514, 518, 513 A.2d 1041, 1042 (1986). In the case at bar, the defendant/appellee presented no witnesses. Therefore, the Commonwealth's evidence remains uncontradicted in the record. Because there is no question that the factual findings are supported by the record, we would normally address ourselves only to the validity of the court's inferences and legal conclusions. See Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Pa.Super. 492, 496-97, 561 A.2d 783, 785 (1989). However, to appreciate our ruling, the facts need to be recounted; to-wit: At approximately 1:00 p.m. on the 12th of March, 1988, Philadelphia Police Officer Timothy King, in the company of his partner, was assigned to the narcotics strike-force and directed to survey the area at 8th and Butler Streets, "a source of many community complaints about drug traffic." As told by Officer King, as to the day and time in question, he saw:

... the Defendant Jenkins on the southeast corner of 8th and Butler with a couple of other males.

After a few minutes I observed the Defendant walk across the street with one male to the west side of the street to a car that was parked in front of 3744 North 8th. It was a tan Subaru, Pennsylvania License Plate GBX 226.

He then took a key out of his right pants pocket, opened up the trunk.

* * * * * *

He opened a large yellow bag and reached inside and pulled out a plastic bag with numerous green packets inside. Handed it to the male and then shut the trunk.

Suppression Hearing Transcript, 3/3/89 at 6 & 7. Continuing, the police officer testified that he observed the defendant pull a clear plastic bag containing numerous (green and blue plastic) packets containing a white substance (allegedly cocaine) from the larger yellow bag.

With nothing obstructing his view, the police officer's observations of a white powder inside the transparent bags were made at a distance of 60-70 yards with field glasses. He added that he had seen "on numerous occasions" similar packets and believed them to contain, "based on past experience and past contacts with this type of packaging", cocaine. The officer also saw the defendant remove a second "bundle" (containing 10-20 different size packets) and transfer it to a second unidentified male. Because no money was exchanging hands, the officer thought that the defendant was "passing out these bundles to his co-workers, more or less, for them to sell...."

Officer King returned to his vehicle and informed his partner of what he had seen. The two then drove to 8th and Butler and placed the defendant under arrest. Officer King removed a key from the defendant's pocket and opened the trunk of the Subaru. He found a large yellow plastic bag containing 44 clear "ziploc" bags, each of which contained 5 blue and green transparent packets with white powder. Additional bags were found bringing the total weight to 393 grams of cocaine found in the vehicle. ² Also found inside the trunk was an unloaded 12-gauge shotgun. The barrel and stock were sawed so that the over-all length was twenty-six inches.

After the evidence was removed and placed in a property-receipt bag # 156159, it was sent to headquarters for storage until trial. Thereafter, a preliminary hearing was conducted in which the jurist found that the Commonwealth had presented a prima facie case warranting the defendant be held for trial. Prior to trial, however, a suppression hearing was held in which the court determined that, albeit the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant, "the police had time to secure a search warrant for the vehicle and were simply not diligent in their constitutional duties." Lower Court Opinion at 10 (Citation omitted).

Because the court found that there were no exigent circumstances excusing the police's failure to obtain a search warrant, nor was the search conducted incident to a lawful arrest ³ given the defendant's removal from the vehicle and being restrained by the second officer, the absence of a warrant was fatal to the Commonwealth's case. An appeal was perfected by the Commonwealth challenging the suppression of the evidence as inconsistent with established case law dealing with automobile searches and seizures.

We find that the court below erred in suppressing the evidence seized by police, and we do so on the strength of United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

In Ross, a known informant advised police that Ross was selling narcotics out of the trunk of a vehicle parked at a specified address. Also, the informant gave police a description of the defendant, the color, model and license number of the automobile out of which the drugs were being sold. The police drove to the scene and confirmed the information about the defendant and his vehicle. When the defendant drove to a different location, the police followed and stopped him. The police directed the defendant to exit the vehicle.

While the defendant was searched, the interior of the vehicle was examined and found to contain a bullet on the front seat and a pistol in the glove compartment. The defendant then was arrested and handcuffed. One of the officers removed the defendant's keys and opened the trunk where he found a closed brown bag. He opened the bag and discovered a number of glassine bags containing a white powder. The officer replaced the bag, closed the trunk and drove the vehicle to headquarters.

At the police station, the vehicle was searched thoroughly and found to contain $3,200.00 in cash. Thereafter, a laboratory test of the powder determined it to be heroin. The defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin.

Ross' efforts to have the drugs and money suppressed proved fruitless. Following his conviction, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia reversed his conviction on the ground that, albeit the police lawfully could search the automobile--including the trunk--without a warrant, the case of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), validated the warrantless search of the paper bag but invalidated the seizure of the leather pouch where the money had been found. As a result, a new trial was required.

The Court of Appeals, this time sitting en banc, rejected the panel's conclusion. It held that the police should not have opened either container without first obtaining a warrant. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the matter was given in-depth analysis beginning with the seminal case of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), which permitted the warrantless search and seizure of an automobile driven by Carroll when federal agents received information ("probable cause existed") that Carroll and his passenger were "bootleggers" transporting liquor in violation of the now repealed National Prohibition Act.

The Carroll Court condoned the ripping of a seat cushion in the rumble-seat of the roadster and uncovering liquor bottles concealed therein. It did so using the following language:

On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.

Id. at 149, 45 S.Ct. at 283-84. Thus, it was the "impracticality" of obtaining a warrant to search an automobile in transit that provided the basis for the Carroll-automobile-exception, i.e., permitting a warrantless search provided the "officers ha[d] probable cause to believe that the vehicle contain[ed] contraband." Id. at 153-54, 45 S.Ct. at 285; Ross, 456 U.S. at 807-08, 102 S.Ct. at 2163-64; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981-82, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). If this were present, then an immediate search of the contents of a vehicle could take place. Id.

However, in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), the Court refused to permit the warrantless search of a footlocker placed in an automobile. Rather, the Court reaffirmed the general principle that closed packages and containers may not be searched without a warrant since "a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile." Id. at 13, 97 S.Ct. at 2484.

On facts similar to those in Chadwick, the Court in Sanders, supra, refused to uphold a warrantless search of a suitcase placed in the trunk of a taxi. As the then Chief Justice noted in his opinion concurring in...