Com. v. Johnson
Decision Date | 14 December 2005 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Carl E. JOHNSON, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Frank S. Miceli, Lock Haven, for appellant.
Andrea F. McKenna, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, for Com., appellee.
¶ 1 This is an appeal from the denial of appellant Carl E. Johnson's first petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Because we determine that the procedural default of counsel effectively denied appellant a direct appeal, we find that counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, we vacate the PCRA court's order and remand.
¶ 2 Appellant pled guilty on January 24, 2003 to multiple counts of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, one count of conspiracy, and related charges. The trial court sentenced him to pay a fine, costs and restitution, and to serve an aggregate term of 12½ to 25 years in prison.
¶ 3 Appellant lodged a timely direct appeal challenging the discretionary aspects of the sentence. His sole claim was that the "trial court abused its discretion when it imposed upon him a sentence `vastly different' from the sentence imposed on one of his co-defendants." Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 1275 MDA 2003, slip. op. at 2, 850 A.2d 9 (Pa.Super. filed April 2, 2004). The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, finding that appellant's sentencing claim was waived because 1) appellant failed to cite any supporting authority under Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a),1 and 2) appellant failed to include a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief, a procedural deficiency to which the Commonwealth objected.2
¶ 4 Appellant filed his first timely PCRA petition on January 3, 2005, alleging the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel and seeking the reinstatement of his right to a direct appeal. The PCRA court denied appellant's petition on March 28, 2005. The PCRA court found "no question" that the brief submitted by counsel on direct appeal "was defective." PCRA Court Opinion, 3/28/05 at 3. The court denied PCRA relief because this Court had, in finding appellant's sentencing claim waived on direct appeal, noted that we would have denied relief on the merits in any event. See Johnson, No. 1275 MDA 2003, slip. op. at 3 n. 2. The PCRA court found that it would defy logic and the interests of judicial economy to reinstate appellant's direct appeal rights when the Superior Court has already determined that appellant would not be entitled to any relief.
¶ 5 Appellant counters that it was inappropriate for the PCRA court to consider the merits of the sentencing claim. He asserts that counsel's procedural failures effectively denied appellant his constitutional right to a direct appeal. Therefore, appellant argues, counsel was ineffective, and appellant is entitled to the reinstatement of his appellate rights without regard to his ability to establish the merit of the issues which counsel caused to be waived.
¶ 6 The Commonwealth, represented by the Attorney General's office, concedes that an accused who is deprived entirely of his right of direct appeal by counsel's failure to perfect an appeal is per se without the effective assistance of counsel, and is entitled to reinstatement of his direct appellate rights. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 795 (2005) ( ); Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999) ( ). The Commonwealth argues, however, that appellant was not denied the right to a direct appeal. The Commonwealth first points out that appellant's counsel did file an appeal and an appellate brief. Second, the Commonwealth emphasizes that there is no right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence.
¶ 7 The Commonwealth likens this to a case in which counsel perfected the appeal, but simply failed to raise a certain claim. As such, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court properly applied the traditional three-prong test for ineffectiveness of counsel, which requires appellant to establish that: "1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 2) counsel had no reasonable basis for the act or omission in question; and 3) but for counsel's act or omission, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different." Commonwealth v. Franklin, 823 A.2d 906, 908 (Pa.Super.2003) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). Since the Superior Court determined in dicta that appellant was not entitled to relief on the merits in his direct appeal, the Commonwealth finds that appellant has failed to satisfy the third, or "prejudice," prong of this inquiry.3
¶ 8 Appellant cites Franklin in support of his position that counsel's failures effectively denied him a direct appeal and thus, prejudice must be presumed. See Halley, 582 Pa. at 167, 870 A.2d at 798. Like this case, Franklin was a PCRA matter in which the appellant had filed a direct appeal and an appellate brief. As in this case, the Franklin appellant's brief on direct appeal was so deficient under Pa. R.A.P. 2119 that this Court had been unable to consider the merits of his claims. Counsel had not cited authorities or the record in support of the appellate argument; as a result, the direct appeal was quashed. On PCRA appeal, we noted that a brief containing such defective argument that appellate review is precluded "has the same result as filing no brief at all." 823 A.2d at 910. We found that "counsel's performance . . . was so ineffective as to have deprived appellant of his direct appeal." Id. The appellant's right to a direct appeal was reinstated without regard to his ability to establish that the claims he tried to bring had merit.
¶ 9 Instantly, we find that Franklin controls. Because appellate counsel failed to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) and (f), the Superior Court was unable to consider the merits of appellant's only claim, and found it waived. This case is not like one in which the appeal was perfected, but counsel failed to raise a particular issue. As in Franklin, the appellate brief in this case was so defective that the result was no different than if counsel had failed to file a brief at all. Significantly, counsel failed to take the steps necessary to ensure that this Court would consider the one argument which appellant sought to advance. See Halley, 582 Pa. at 172, 870 A.2d at 801 ( ); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 755 A.2d 1, 8-9 & n. 4 (Pa.Super.2000) (, )affirmed in part by 572 Pa. 477, 817 A.2d 479 (2003).
¶ 10 It makes no difference to our analysis that appellant's only claim involved the discretionary aspects of the sentence. It is true that there is no absolute right to challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence. See Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 511, 522 A.2d 17, 18 (1987). There is, however, a right to seek appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence by including a Pa. R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in the appellate brief. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). Counsel had a responsibility to protect this right. See Commonwealth v. Liebel, 573 Pa. 375, 380-81, 825 A.2d 630, 633 (2003) ( ). Thus, counsel's failure to include a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in the brief compromised appellant's direct appellate rights. See Hernandez, 755 A.2d at 11-12 & n. 6 (...
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