Com. v. Jones
| Citation | 452 Pa. 299,304 A.2d 684 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Ronald JONES, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 04 May 1973 |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Page 684
v.
Ronald JONES, Appellant.
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[452 Pa. 301] Harold L. Randolph, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Stephen J. McEwen, Jr. Dist. Atty., Ralph B. D'Iorio, Anna I. Vadino, Asst. Dist. Attys., Media, for appellee.
[452 Pa. 300] Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERION, JJ.
[452 Pa. 301] OPINION
EAGEN, Justice.
About 8:30 p.m. on April 7, 1969, three young men attempted to rob John Courtney and Joseph O'Brien as they walked along a public street in Media, Delaware County, Pennsylvania. Courtney was shot by the felons and suffered wounds which caused his death on May 18th. O'Brien was stabbed and shot but survived.
As a result of information uncovered by the police, Ronald Jones, the appellant herein, Alan Pierce and Wesley Groce, three young black males, were arrested for the crimes. After a jury trial Jones was convicted of murder in the first degree, robbery, aggravated assault and battery, assault with intent to kill and conspiracy. 1 On the murder conviction he was sentenced [452 Pa. 302] to life imprisonment as the jury's verdict directed. 2 From this judgment the instant appeal was filed.
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It is asserted certain errors occurred in the prosecution process which require a new trial. These claims of error will be discussed seriatim. 3
At trial a .38 calibre revolver, which expert testimony established fired a bullet recovered from Courtney's body after the occurrence, was introduced in evidence. It is claimed the trial court erred in refusing a motion to suppress this evidence, because it was the product of a search based on an illegally issued warrant. The pertinent facts in the record are these.
During the investigation of the crimes, the Chief of Police of Media, Thomas Bruton, questioned three boys, Roger Carter, James Carter and David Willard Day, who informed him they passed the crime site in an automobile at or about the time of the occurrence involved and someone yelled, 'Hey Roger'; that subsequently they talked with Pierce who said he, Groce and Jones committed the attempted robbery; that he (Pierce) fired the shots which injured Courtney and O'Brien and he was the one who yelled 'Hey Roger' to Roger Carter. A search warrant was then obtained for the residence of an uncle of Jones (with whom he resided) and the revolver was uncovered and seized in the search.
[452 Pa. 303] In support of the issuance of the search warrant, the Chief of Police of Media, Thomas Bruton, submitted a written affidavit to the magistrate which stated Jones was a participant in the holdup and assault of Courtney and O'Brien. It also included a detailed description of the premises to be searched, plus the following:
'He (Bruton) has reason to believe and which he had relied upon making this affidavit, that Ronald Jones lives at the said address and he was a participant in the foregoing holdup in which a gun was used according to the witnesses as well as other testimony given by Chief Bruton and Rocco P. Urello.'
The foregoing affidavit did not meet constitutional standards (Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964)), however, at the suppression hearing it was established that before the warrant issued, Chief of Police Bruton, while under oath, also supplied the magistrate with the background of the crimes and also told him of the information he received from Roger Carter, James Carter and David Willard Day, all of whom he knew for years and considered 'honest.' The officer also gave the magistrate a description of the three felons as supplied by witnesses who saw them fleeing from the scene.
The sufficiency of the combined oral and written information supplied to the magistrate to sustain a finding of probable cause is not challenged. 4 Jones' [452 Pa. 304] Sole
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contention is that the magistrate erred in considering the oral testimony in determining if probable cause existed. We have reviewed this issue in Commonwealth v. Milliken, Pa., 300 A.2d 78 (1973), and what we said therein controls here. This assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.The next claim of error maintains Jones' constitutional right to due process was violated at trial by the admission in evidence of a written incriminating statement he gave the police following his arrest. This contention is basically premised on the fact that at the time Jones was eighteen years of age and without the assistance of legal counsel.
This court has previously decided a minor who has attained the age of at least fifteen years may knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel without having the assistance of counsel and if a valid waiver occurs a subsequent confession given in the absence of counsel is not constitutionally proscribed as trial evidence. See generally Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971); Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 557 (1970). It is clear, therefore, that if an eighteen-year-old knowingly and intelligently makes the decision to answer the questions of the police without the assistance of counsel, the police are not under a duty to provide him with counsel contrary to his wishes.
In the present case the record reveals Jones was warned of his constitutional rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) at least three times before he made the challenged statement and he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to have counsel present during the [452 Pa. 305] police questioning. The uncontradicted testimony of the police officers shows Jones understood each of the warnings and readily manifested a willingness to cooperate and answer the questions of the police. There were no threats, promises or tricks employed by the authorities, and the two periods of interrogation were relatively short in duration. Moreover, Jones was well fed during the time of his custody and he was not in a state of fatigue. Furthermore, his uncle (his legal guardian) William Jones, was present during the time Jones was given the 'Miranda' warnings and throughout the interrogation period. Another member of his family, a Mrs. Bennett, an aunt, was also present during the interrogation. The testimony of the police establishes that not only was the uncle present during the reading of the warnings, but the police also explained Jones' rights to his uncle. On this record, it is clear this assignment of error is devoid of merit.
As a corollary to the contention the statement was inadmissible as evidence at trial, Jones asserts the police never informed him he 'was suspected of murder.' Under the circumstances, this did not render the statement inadmissible. For an understanding of the basis of our ruling a brief factual summary is necessary. The shooting of the victim Courtney occurred on April 7, 1969, but the man did not die until one month and eleven days later on May 18, 1969. Jones was taken into custody on April 13, 1969, and his confession was completed in the early morning hours of April 14, 1969. Thus, at the time of the confession the victim of the murder was alive, and apparently recovering from his wounds. When Jones was arrested and before he confessed, he was informed he was suspected of assault with intent to kill, aggravated assault and battery, robbery and conspiracy. Hence, when he was questioned he was told of the crimes he was [452 Pa. 306] with. Under these facts, since the victims of the crimes were alive and recovering from their were alive and recoverning from their wounds, it is unreasonable to say the police should have also told Jones he could possibly be charged with murder--for the simple reason he was not suspected of murder at the time he confessed.
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Jones next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to...
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