Com. v. Jones
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
| Writing for the Court | GREANEY; BROWN |
| Citation | Com. v. Jones, 399 N.E.2d 1087, 9 Mass.App.Ct. 103 (Mass. App. 1980) |
| Decision Date | 04 February 1980 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Robert K. JONES. |
Edward F. Fitzgerald, East Bridgewater (Daniel Del Vecchio, Jr., North Attleboro, with him), for defendant.
Don L. Carpenter, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
Before BROWN, GREANEY and PERRETTA, JJ.
On July 16, 1977, at approximately 5:30 A.M. the defendant, an off duty Mansfield police officer, while driving his car on the mid-Cape highway in Barnstable, travelled in the wrong direction in the eastbound lane and collided head-on with an approaching van. As a result of the collision, two people in the van were instantly killed and a third died on July 31, 1977. Subsequent indictments charged the defendant with three counts of involuntary manslaughter (G.L. c. 265, § 13), three counts of vehicular homicide (G.L. c. 90, § 24G), and operating to endanger (G.L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a)). Prior to trial the defendant filed several motions to dismiss the manslaughter and vehicular homicide indictments on multiple grounds. All the motions were denied. At the trial the Commonwealth contended that the defendant was acutely intoxicated at the time of the accident. The defendant presented evidence that he was not criminally responsible because he was suffering from stage four dyssomnia (sleepwalking) at the time of the accident. He was convicted by a jury on all the counts of all the indictments and was sentenced to concurrent terms in a house of correction. 1 His assignments of error concern the denial of the motions to dismiss and raise questions about the relationship between the statutory crime of homicide by motor vehicle and the crime of involuntary manslaughter predicated on the reckless operation of a motor vehicle. Other assignments concern the procedures leading up to the indictments and events that occurred at the trial. We affirm the convictions.
A. Implied repeal of the manslaughter statute. The defendant first contends that the Legislature's insertion of G.L. c. 90, § 24G, by St.1976, c. 227 () 2 impliedly repealed the crime of involuntary manslaughter 3 arising out of reckless operation of a motor vehicle. In addressing this issue, both the Commonwealth and the defendant have provided us with pertinent portions of the statute's legislative history and brought to our attention appellate decisions from several other States dealing with the relationship between their respective vehicular homicide and manslaughter statutes. 4 However, in the view we take of this case, we need not decide the broader question whether those portions of G.L. c. 90, § 24G, which impose criminal responsibility for recklessly operating to endanger or operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor are so inconsistent with the gravamen of motor vehicle manslaughter as to effectively repeal the latter in part.
Under G.L. c. 90, § 24G, homicide by motor vehicle may be committed in any one of three ways. Two involve negligent or reckless operation of a motor vehicle; the third concerns operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The three ways are stated disjunctively and create separate and independent grounds for prosecution. The indictment returned in this case was framed exclusively under that portion of the statute which makes negligently operating to endanger culpable, and the defendant was prosecuted only on that theory. See Commonwealth v. Burke, --- Mass.App. ---, --- - --- a, 383 N.E.2d 76 (1978) (). The defendant's prosecution on the manslaughter indictment was predicated on his wanton or reckless operation of a motor vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 352 Mass. 387, 397, 226 N.E.2d 211 (1967) (). It is apparent without extensive discussion that the portion of § 24G making negligently operating to endanger criminal is not inconsistent with or repugnant to the crime of involuntary manslaughter arising out of reckless operation of a motor vehicle. We accordingly hold that that portion of § 24G just described does not impliedly repeal G.L. c. 265, § 13, or otherwise bar simultaneous indictments under § 24G for dangerous driving causing death and under G.L. c. 265, § 13, for manslaughter predicated on reckless operation.
B. Duplicitous charges. One of the defendant's pretrial motions sought to dismiss the vehicular homicide indictment on the basis that it was duplicitous of the manslaughter indictment. The judge ruled that the c. 90, § 24G, offense was not a "lesser included" crime within the manslaughter charge and denied the motion. The motion was correctly denied but not for the reason stated. The crimes differ in degree and are not mutually exclusive. The Commonwealth in advance of trial could not have been compelled to choose between the two charges unless it was necessary for the protection of the substantial rights of the defendant. Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 411-413, 140 N.E. 465 (1923). The record reveals that the defendant made no such showing in support of his motion. As a consequence, the judge's exercise of discretion in declining to force an election was proper and supported by a long line of cases permitting, in the absence of a firm demonstration of prejudice, the combination of several offenses for trial which can be proved by the same evidence or which arise from what is essentially one transaction. See Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 211 Mass. 50, 54, 97 N.E. 609 (1912); Commonwealth v. Maloney, 348 Mass. 610, 613, 204 N.E.2d 891 (1965); Commonwealth v. Blow, 362 Mass. 196, 200, 285 N.E.2d 400 (1972); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 373 Mass. 676, --- - --- b, 369 N.E.2d 996 (1977). See now Mass.R.Crim.P. 9(d)(1), (2), --- Mass. --- (1979), and Reporter's notes thereto.
The defendant now argues, however, that he was exposed to "jeopardy" in the way the offenses were handled at trial by the judge's allowing both offenses to go to the jury under instructions which in substance permitted conviction on both if the elements of each were established beyond a reasonable doubt. The offenses at that stage of the trial were duplicitous. The realities of the offenses and the circumstances under which they occurred, involving a single accident leading to three deaths, were such that the manslaughter indictment in effect charged an aggravated form of vehicular homicide. See Kulkis v. Commonwealth, 361 Mass. 302, 306-309, 280 N.E.2d 155 (1972); Costarelli v. Commonwealth, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- c, 373 N.E.2d 1183 (1978); Fadden v. Commonwealth, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- d, 382 N.E.2d 1054 (1978). Commonwealth v. Xiarhos, 2 Mass.App. 225, 226-228, 310 N.E.2d 616 (1974). Compare Commonwealth v. Maguire, 313 Mass. 669, 672, 48 N.E.2d 665 (1943). As a consequence the judge should have treated the c. 90, § 24G, charge as a lesser included offense within the perimeters of the manslaughter charge and handled it accordingly. 5 However, the defendant's requested instructions did not raise the subject, no objections were made to the instructions given, and the motion concerning duplicity was not renewed at the close of the evidence. Furthermore, it is conceded that the defendant was only tried once and that he was sentenced to concurrent terms on all the offenses. The record does not support the defendant's speculative assertion that the jury might have been confused by possible overlap in the charges. In these circumstances, it has been consistently held that the jeopardy clause is implicated only where multiple consecutive punishments are imposed. Kuklis v. Commonwealth, supra 361 Mass. at 307, 280 N.E.2d 155. Commonwealth v. Tabor, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- e, 384 N.E.2d 190 (1978). See also Green v. United States, 274 F.2d 59, 61 (1st Cir. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 301, 306, 81 S.Ct. 653, 656, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2227 n. 7, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). The imposition of concurrent sentences on all the convictions effectively rendered the duplicity issue moot. See Fadden v. Commonwealth, supra --- Mass. at --- f, 382 N.E.2d 1054, and cases cited.
C. Procedural preliminaries to the c. 90, § 24G, indictment. On July 17, 1977, the day after the accident, the defendant was given a citation in the hospital which indicated that he would be charged with homicide by motor vehicle and driving to endanger for a double fatality caused by driving his car "west in the eastbound lane." On July 18, 1977, a complaint issued from the First District Court of Barnstable pursuant to that citation charging the defendant with a violation of c. 90, § 24G, in causing "the death of other persons." The third victim died approximately two weeks after the accident. On August 25, 1977, three new complaints, one for each death, were issued by the District Court for motor vehicle homicide. On December 12, 1977, over the defendant's objection, the original complaint was nol-prossed. 6 On March 21, 1978, a single indictment containing three counts for motor vehicle homicide was returned by the grand jury. In a series of attenuated arguments, the defendant claims that the vehicular homicide indictment should have been dismissed because (1) the original traffic citation and the first complaint were too vague to afford him adequate notice of the offense; (2) he received no traffic citation after the third death; (3) the nolle prosequi of the first complaint barred his...
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