Com. v. Kappler

• Citation: 625 N.E.2d 513,416 Mass. 574
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. John F. KAPPLER, Jr.
• Decision Date: 15 December 1993
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 513

625 N.E.2d 513

416 Mass. 574

COMMONWEALTH v. John F. KAPPLER, Jr.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Middlesex.

Argued May 5, 1993.

Decided Dec. 15, 1993.

Jonathan Shapiro, Boston, for defendant.

David R. Marks, Asst. Dist. Atty. (Marcia E. Jackson, Boston, with him on the brief), for Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

Convicted of murder in the second degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, the defendant, John F. Kappler, Jr., appeals. The trial focused on the issue of criminal responsibility. After the verdicts, the defendant moved to set aside the verdicts and for required findings of not guilty or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The motions were denied. The defendant alleges error in the denial of his motion for required findings of not guilty, in the allowance of the Commonwealth's rebuttal testimony, in the jury instructions, and in the denial of his motion for a new trial. We transferred this case from the Appeals Court on our own motion. We affirm.

We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 379 Mass. 810, 815, 401 N.E.2d 342 (1980). The defendant, a sixty year old retired anesthesiologist from California, and his wife were visiting their daughter in Medford. On the morning of April 14, 1990, the defendant was to leave Boston and drive to New York City to meet his son. The wife was to fly home to California that day. The defendant awoke at 6 A.M. and spent time packing the car, rearranging things. He had a brief conversation about California with an elderly man who happened to walk by the automobile. The defendant's daughter's fiance arrived. A friend of his daughter drew him a map of the route to New York. The defendant then ate breakfast with his wife, his daughter, her fiance, and her friend. The defendant said that he had to get going because he wanted to be on his way by 10 A.M. No one noticed anything unusual about the defendant.

The defendant drove through a red light on Alewife Brook Parkway. He was staring straight ahead. He then drove his car onto the footpath adjacent to Alewife Brook Parkway and proceeded to strike two individuals, killing one. The defendant followed the contours of the path, did not sound his horn, did not swerve, and did not stop. After striking the second victim, as he drove away he accelerated his automobile and returned to the road. The defendant left his automobile behind a house in a driveway. The automobile was not visible from the street.

According to the defendant, he wandered around the vicinity. He also said that he returned to the area of the incident. Further, he called his daughter's home and left a message saying, "Oh, I thought I might catch you there. Maybe you could pick me up." He then took a bus to New York City and checked into a hotel. The next day he called his wife and told her he thought he had killed someone. She told him to go to the Payne-Whitney Psychiatric Clinic, a part of New York Hospital. The defendant did so. The defendant's son met him at the emergency room there, where, according to the defendant's son, the defendant appeared confused. According to the son, the defendant attacked him and attempted to strangle him.

Prior to trial, the defendant notified the Commonwealth that, at trial, he would claim that he lacked criminal responsibility. The judge ordered the defendant to be evaluated for his competency and his criminal responsibility. Dr. Prudence Baxter, who conducted the evaluation, concluded that the defendant was competent to stand trial, but determined that he was suffering the symptoms of mental illness and therefore recommended further evaluation in order to determine whether he was criminally responsible.

The defendant, through his wife and medical history, presented evidence of his long but sporadic history of mental illness and auditory hallucinations. ¹ One defense expert, Dr. Martin Kelly, testified that the defendant suffered from atypical psychosis and, although able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Another expert, Dr. Ronald Ebert, testified that, in his opinion, the defendant was unable either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law. He diagnosed the defendant as suffering either from atypical psychosis with paranoid features or schizo-affective disorder.

Two additional experts who testified for the defense did not state opinions as to whether the defendant was criminally responsible. Dr. Robert Aranow testified as an expert in psychiatry. He stated that, in his opinion, the defendant suffered from a mental disease he called atypical psychosis on the date of the incident. Dr. Aranow characterized the defendant's psychosis as "extremely" unusual. He also acknowledged that the defendant made a number of inconsistent and contradictory statements about the events occurring on the date of the incident. Then Dr. Lloyd Price testified that on the date of the incident, the defendant was suffering from psychosis. He categorized the defendant's mental disease as atypical psychosis with affective features. Neither Dr. Aranow nor Dr. Price expressed an opinion whether the defendant was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. See Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546-547, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967).

The Commonwealth called three witnesses in rebuttal. None of these witnesses stated a conclusion as to whether the defendant was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, although each offered testimony that supported the Commonwealth's position that the defendant was sane as part of the testimony.

1. The motion for required findings of not guilty. The defendant moved for required findings of not guilty, both at the close of the Commonwealth's case ² and at the close of all the evidence. The motions were denied. The defendant appeals, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support jury verdict, finding him sane beyond a reasonable doubt.

In reviewing the denial of a motion for a required finding, we "must determine whether the Commonwealth's evidence, 'considered in its light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to permit the jury to infer the existence of [criminal responsibility].' " Commonwealth v. Shelley, 381 Mass. 340, 346, 409 N.E.2d 732 (1980). In addition, "the evidence and the inferences permitted to be drawn therefrom must be 'of sufficient force to bring minds of ordinary intelligence and sagacity to the persuasion of [sanity] beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979), quoting Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373, 162 N.E. 729 (1928).

The defendant stipulated to the fact that he drove the car that struck two victims, killing one of them. In its case in chief, the Commonwealth presented evidence linking the defendant's car to the injuries and showing that one victim died as a result of injuries received when he was struck by the car. There was no error in denying the motion for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case.

"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Commonwealth v. McHoul, supra, 352 Mass. at 546-547, 226 N.E.2d 556. When a defendant claims that he is not criminally responsible for his acts, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is sane. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 526, 350 N.E.2d 444 (1976). The defendant acknowledges that the jury is not required to accept the uncontroverted testimony of experts. Commonwealth v. Shelley, supra, 381 Mass. at 347, 409 N.E.2d 732. We have also held that the Commonwealth need not present expert evidence to prove that a defendant is sane beyond a reasonable doubt, Commonwealth v. Brennan, 399 Mass. 358, 364, 504 N.E.2d 612 (1987), and that the fact finder may infer sanity from the "facts underlying the crime and evidence of [the defendant's] actions before and after the crime." Commonwealth v. Cullen, 395 Mass. 225, 229, 479 N.E.2d 179 (1985).

The defendant argues that the events before the incident, the incident itself, and his actions afterwards indicate that he was not sane when he committed the crime. The defendant then asserts that he could not have formed the intent to do the act until just before he committed the crime because he did not know the victims or the area. He also states that there is no rational explanation for the commission of the crime. Finally, the defendant claims that his departure from the scene, abandonment of the automobile, and flight to New York City indicate that he did not appreciate the nature of his conduct. He points to his son's description of the defendant's disheveled appearance and the defendant's attempt to strangle his son as further evidence that the defendant was acting under the compulsion of psychosis. ³ We do not agree. The question of what inferences to draw from this evidence is for the jurors, not the trial judge and not this court. ⁴

After the defendant presented his case, the Commonwealth produced experts to rebut the testimony of the defendant's experts. One of the court-appointed experts Dr. Baxter, found no evidence of psychosis or thought disorder when she examined the defendant. The defendant told her that he had heard voices in the past, telling him to act. She testified that the defendant was able to resist these voices at times. She stated that the...