Com. v. Kiessling

• Citation: 552 A.2d 270,380 Pa.Super. 442
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Gary W. KIESSLING, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 27 December 1988
• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Page 270

552 A.2d 270

380 Pa.Super. 442

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Gary W. KIESSLING, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Sept. 26, 1988.

Filed Dec. 27, 1988.

G. Scott Gardner, Williamsport, for appellant.

Kenneth A. Osokow, Asst. Dist. Atty., Williamsport, for Com., appellee.

Before ROWLEY, DEL SOLE, and BECK, JJ.

BECK, Judge:

The issue on appeal is whether a search warrant which misidentifies the location of the premises to be searched in a multi-dwelling building is invalid. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that the warrant was not invalid and affirm the trial court's denial of the appellant's suppression motion.

Gary Kiessling appeals a judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions for possession of cocaine, possession with intent to deliver cocaine, and possession of marijuana.

At the time of the search which led to his arrest, Kiessling lived in a house divided into a top floor and a bottom floor residence. Kiessling lived in the first floor residence. The search warrant issued in this case described the dwelling to be searched as follows:

The home is divided into two dwellings. The owner named Eisworth resides in the bottom, and Gary Kiessling resides in the top. Entrance is gained to the Kiessling dwelling by a door on the outside located on the north of the home ... After entering the door, a stairway leads up to the Kiessling dwelling.

Kiessling attempted to have the evidence seized from his residence suppressed based upon the fact that the warrant mistakenly stated that he lived on the second floor of the dwelling when in fact he resided on the first floor. The trial court held that despite the slight error, the warrant was sufficiently specific and therefore valid. Furthermore, the court noted that the execution of the warrant was constitutional as the officers, upon realizing the error, proceeded directly to the Kiessling residence on the first floor.

The Fourth Amendment standard under which we review the warrant is whether the officers' error in obtaining and executing the warrant was reasonable under the circumstance. On appeal, Kiessling does not address the reasonableness standard but urges that any warrant which incorrectly describes a premises is invalid. Citing Commonwealth v. Carlisle, 517 Pa. 36, 534 A.2d 469 (1987), appellant argues that a search warrant for a multiple-unit dwelling is invalid for lack of specificity where it fails to describe the particular room or sub-unit to be searched with sufficient definiteness to preclude the search of other units.

A recent United States Supreme Court case illuminates the standard to be used in reviewing the validity of a search warrant and the execution thereof in a multi-dwelling housing unit. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). In Garrison, police officers obtained a warrant to search the person of one McWebb and "the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment," for controlled substances and related paraphernalia. When police arrived at the door of the building, they encountered McWebb who escorted them to the third floor. Once there, they entered and began to search an apartment where they found controlled substances. As soon as police discovered that the apartment they were searching was not McWebb's but Garrison's they ceased their search. The information available to the officers at the time the warrant was issued indicated that McWebb alone occupied the third floor apartment, when in reality both McWebb and Garrison occupied separate dwellings on the third floor.

Before the United States Supreme Court Garrison argued that the items seized from his apartment should have been suppressed as the warrant was too broad and did not grant the officers the authority to search his apartment. First, the Court addressed the validity of the warrant itself. The Garrison Court instructed that the validity of the warrant as to the identification of the premises must be tested by the information that the officers disclosed, or should have disclosed, to the issuing magistrate when they applied for the warrant. The Garrison Court found that the warrant was valid when issued because it was based upon information the police could reasonably believe. Such information led police to the conclusion that there was only one apartment on the third floor. The court noted that the police had made a reasonable investigation, including verification of information obtained from a reliable informant, an exterior examination of the building and an inquiry from the utility company which serviced the building.

We point out that the Warrant Clause protection of the Fourth Amendment is aimed at preventing general searches which may be exploratory in nature. Traditional Fourth Amendment protections are not violated, however, where the error in the warrant is minimal and is based on information that the police after reasonable investigation reasonably believed to be accurate.

[w]e must judge the constitutionality of their [the police's] conduct in light of the information available to them at the time they acted. Those items of evidence that emerge after the warrant is issued have no bearing on whether or not a warrant was validly issued. Just as the discovery of contraband cannot validate a warrant invalid when...