Com. v. King

Decision Date03 May 1984
Citation17 Mass.App.Ct. 602,460 N.E.2d 1299
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Gary KING.
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts

Susan G. Kauffman, Cambridge, for defendant.

Robert S. Sinsheimer, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before GREANEY, CUTTER and WARNER, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

In the early morning hours of May 18, 1980, a young woman was brutally assaulted and raped while walking home from a nightclub in Hull. The victim, who had a good opportunity to observe her assailant, subsequently examined between 200 and 300 photographs shown to her by the police and positively identified the defendant, a sixteen year old juvenile, as the individual who had attacked her. The Hull police obtained a warrant and arrested the defendant for the crimes. After a hearing in a juvenile session of a District Court, the defendant's case was transferred to the Superior Court, where he was indicted for rape, the commission of unnatural acts, and assault and battery. A jury found him guilty of all three offenses, and sentences were imposed. 1 On appeal, the defendant alleges error concerning (1) the decision to transfer his case from juvenile proceedings to adult proceedings; and (2) the denial of his motion to suppress certain incriminating statements made to the Hull police. We affirm the convictions before us.

1. The transfer decision. In deciding that the defendant should be treated as an adult through transfer of his case to the Superior Court, the District Court judge reached the following conclusions. "[The defendant] is before the court charged with a very vicious and brutal rape of a young woman; a woman who was continuously beaten and kept in a state of absolute terror for nearly two hours in an isolated area of Hull. [The defendant] has been involved with this court since he was 11 1/2 and despite extensive efforts by the court's juvenile probation staff, the Office of Social Services to which he was committed as a truant, Longview Farms and the Reach School, he has failed to meet any of the goals set for him solely due to his own lack of cooperation. He has had CORE evaluations, psychiatric counseling, resident and non-resident school placements, all for naught. When asked if he would do it again (rape a woman) if he were drunk, he admitted that he probably would and volunteered that he might even kill someone. Hence, there is a real danger to the public if [the defendant] were released. At age 17, 3 months there is less than a year as a practical matter before [the defendant] would be released from the juvenile system. Indications are that if retained in the juvenile system it would probably be a month or more before his trial could be completed and if committed to DYS it could take up to nine months before he could be placed in a secure setting. The minimum residential plan proposed for [the defendant] is four additional months. It should be added that at [the defendant's] age there is absolutely no guarantee that he would be placed at Westborough or any other secure DYS setting. Others have been rejected. The overriding factor, however, is that [the defendant] has never cooperated with any programs previously set up for him and there is absolutely no reason to believe that he would cooperate now. He remains hostile and rejects all authority. Therefore, I find that realistically speaking, there is little, if any, likelihood of his rehabilitation. While I regard the transfer of a juvenile to the adult system as a drastic course of action to be chosen reluctantly and only under exceptional circumstances, I find that these circumstances exist in this case and that adequate protection of the public requires that he be treated as an adult."

The defendant makes various arguments that the findings that led to these conclusions are not supported by the evidence. He claims in particular that the judge erred by finding it likely that he would be released from the juvenile system within a year, referring to evidence that he could have been admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of the Division of Youth Services at Westborough within four months, and that he could be kept at that facility for treatment, by court order if necessary, beyond his eighteenth birthday.

We are not persuaded that the judge erred. The seriousness of the offense is admitted, and the judge could well find that the defendant posed a very serious danger to the public in view of his statements that he would probably commit another rape and that "he might even kill someone." The material summarized in the margin 2 indicates that the judge focused his attention on the central concern in any of these cases: whether the juvenile is a likely candidate for rehabilitation on the basis of the statutory factors set forth in G.L. c. 119, § 61. We think that the judge's findings are expressed "in fair detail and with logical cohesion," A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 380 Mass. 552, 563, 405 N.E.2d 143 (1980), and comply with the statute. See A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272, 282 n. 14, 347 N.E.2d 677 (1976); Two Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 736, 744, 412 N.E.2d 344 (1981). Any errors in the findings are inconsequential and do not affect the ultimate determination that the Commonwealth satisfied its burden by proving clearly and convincingly that the defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation as a juvenile. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 387 Mass. 619, 622, 442 N.E.2d 24 (1982).

2. The defendant's statements. We summarize the Superior Court judge's findings of fact (with some supplementation from the record) in connection with the defendant's motion to suppress.

On May 21, 1980, about 2:00 P.M. Detective Yanizzi and Officer Borland of the Hull police went to the defendant's home with a warrant for his arrest. 3 The defendant, who was known to the police from previous encounters, answered the door. He was shown the warrant, immediately placed under arrest, and given Miranda warnings. The defendant stated that he understood his rights. His widowed mother was not at home. The defendant after a permitted change of clothes was transported by police cruiser to the Hull police station. On the way to the station no inquiry was made about the incident.

When the defendant arrived at the station about 2:15 P.M. he was taken to an office shared by Detective Yanizzi and Officer Borland. Detective Yanizzi stayed with the defendant for about five minutes before Captain Card entered the room to complete booking procedures. Captain Card again furnished the defendant with Miranda warnings. Upon completion of the booking procedures the defendant asked Detective Yanizzi to see the arrest warrant again. After examining the warrant for several seconds the defendant exclaimed, "I did it. I did it. I raped that girl and I need help." The judge found no evidence that the police had said anything prior to this time which would have elicited these statements. Detective Yanizzi immediately instructed the defendant to say nothing further until his mother arrived. 4 While awaiting the arrival of the defendant's mother, the police provided the defendant with a soft drink and a cigarette. He was allowed the use of the telephone and made two or three telephone calls. In this interim period, the incident was not discussed.

The defendant's mother arrived at the station between 3:15 and 3:30 P.M. She was advised by Detective Yanizzi that her son had been arrested for rape and that he had admitted committing the offense. She was promptly taken to the room where the defendant was being held, where Detective Yanizzi advised the defendant, in his mother's presence, of his Miranda rights for a third time and asked the defendant if he had anything to say. The defendant stated that he "wanted to clear up this matter and he wanted some help from the courts before he killed somebody." Detective Yanizzi asked the defendant if he had assaulted and raped a woman on May 18, 1980, after 1:00 A.M. The defendant replied, "Yes, I did it. I was at a party that night and I got drunk. I was at Anastos Corner at about 1:00 A.M., and I grabbed that girl and dragged her up onto the hill and raped her." Yanizzi next asked why he committed the crime and beat the victim so badly, and the defendant replied, "I don't know. I just did it." The defendant was then asked if he thought he might kill a girl sometime and he answered, "Yes." The defendant's mother asked her son what was wrong with him and he said, "I don't know. I was drunk." She then asked him where he got the liquor, and he answered, "Come on, Ma." 5 The defendant declined to discuss the matter further. While the defendant was at the station, he was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained except for being confined to Detective Yanizzi's office.

The judge found that the defendant was familiar with his constitutional rights as a result of other contacts with the police and his representation by a lawyer on another charge brought about two weeks prior to this arrest. The judge expressly rejected the testimony of the defendant and his mother claiming a denial of his rights as either not credible or the product of "a selective memory." The judge also found that the police had not engaged in any coercive conduct, either physical or psychological; that the atmosphere in Detective Yanizzi's office was not imposing; that the police conscientiously sought to protect the defendant's rights; and that, although the defendant appeared at times to be emotional and nervous, he was able to make intelligent, voluntary, and rational decisions. After considering the facts in light of the legal principles applicable to the waiver of Miranda rights in general and the then prevailing standards on that subject relating to juveniles, see Commonwealth v. Cain, 361 Mass. 224, 228, 279 N.E.2d 706 (1972); Commonwealth v. Andrade, 8 Mass.App.Ct. 653, 655-656, 396 N.E.2d 713 (1979),...

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  • Commonwealth v. Ray
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • February 12, 2014
    ...criminal justice system, was sufficient to establish that his waiver was knowing and voluntary. See Commonwealth v. King, 17 Mass.App.Ct. 602, 602, 603, 610–611, 460 N.E.2d 1299 (1984) (sixteen year old defendant capable of waiving Miranda rights because of prior involvement with court syst......
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    ...also cites the police officers' testimony that the juvenile appeared calm. 17. The Guyton court also contrasted Commonwealth v. King, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 603, 610-611 (1984), a case relied on by the Commonwealth. In King, the defendant had been involved with the court system since the ag......
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    ...contact with the police in April 1998, and his assertion of his rights to counsel and to remain silent at that time. See Commonwealth v. King, 17 Mass.App.Ct. 602, 607, review denied, 391 Mass. 1105 In determining the voluntariness of the defendant's statement, however, it is also necessary......
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