Com. v. Korenkiewicz

• Decision Date: 22 December 1999
• Citation: 1999 PA Super 326,743 A.2d 958
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. William KORENKIEWICZ, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

743 A.2d 958

1999 PA Super 326

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. William KORENKIEWICZ, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted June 14, 1999.

Filed December 22, 1999.

W. Russell Carmichael, Media, for appellant.

Nicholas J. Casenta, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., West Chester, for Com., appellee.

Before McEWEN, President Judge, and CAVANAUGH, KELLY, POPOVICH, JOHNSON, FORD ELLIOTT, STEVENS, SCHILLER and LALLY-GREEN, JJ.

KELLY, J.

¶ 1 Appellant asks us to determine whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence. Appellant challenges the legal basis for the investigative stop of his vehicle and the propriety of the evidence obtained from the stop. We hold that the information provided by the identified informant was sufficient to support the stop. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence.

¶ 2 The trial court aptly relayed the relevant facts underlying this appeal as follows:

On the evening of August 4, 1997, one Kenneth Pingerton ("Pingerton"), the night manager of an Amoco service station located on 1301 Paoli Pike, West Goshen Township, Chester County, Pennsylvania, first observed [Appellant]'s vehicle (N.T. 4-7). Pingerton described [Appellant]'s vehicle as a "dark colored convertible" which entered the service station and parked (N.T. 7). Pingerton kept his eye on the parked car and eventually, Pingerton went outside and asked [Appellant] if he was "okay" (N.T. 8-9). [Appellant] did not respond to Pingerton's inquiry and at that time, Pingerton noticed that [Appellant]'s head was wobbling and that [Appellant]'s eyes were very wide open (N.T. 9-10). Pingerton suspected that [Appellant] was intoxicated and called 911 relaying to the dispatcher that he "... had a person in the parking lot that was either ill or intoxicated..." (N.T. 10). Pingerton testified that after he called 911 [Appellant] backed his vehicle up and looked at Pingerton through the window and then pulled the vehicle forward. [Appellant] repeated this movement and Pingerton again called 911 because he felt threatened (N.T. 11). While Pingerton was on the phone [Appellant] moved his car to exit the service station on Airport Road.

Police Officer Steven Wassell ("Wassell") was on patrol that evening and testified that he was dispatched to the Amoco station for a suspicious vehicle and person complaint. While en route, Wassell received additional information that the operator may be intoxicated and was preparing to leave (N.T. 14). Wassell testified that when he arrived at the Amoco he observed "a vehicle matching the description given to the Chester County Police Radio as a dark colored convertible." Wassell testified that the vehicle had its [headlights] on and was preparing to pull out of the service station onto Airport Road (N.T. 14). Wassell pulled up behind [Appellant] and activated his overhead lights (N.T. 15). At that time, [Appellant]'s vehicle was running, its headlights were on and it was facing Airport Road (N.T. 15). Wassell approached the driver who[m] he described as "very confused." Wassell testified that [Appellant]'s eyes were bloodshot and glassy and that he detected a strong odor of alcohol on [Appellant] (N.T. 16). Wassell attempted to obtain [Appellant]'s name, but [Appellant]'s speech was slurred and he could not understand him (N.T. 16-17). Wassell also attempted to obtain [Appellant]'s license and registration, but [Appellant] was unable to produce these documents (N.T. 16-17). Wassell asked [Appellant] to get out of his car and described how [Appellant] could barely stand up without leaning on the car (N.T. 17). Based on his experience in previous DUI arrests, as well as his observations of [Appellant], Wassell testified that in his opinion [Appellant] was intoxicated that evening and incapable of operating a motor vehicle (N.T. 18-19). Wassell arrested [Appellant] and had him transported to Chester County Hospital (N.T. 19).

(Trial Court Opinion, dated June 16, 1998, at 1-3).

¶ 3 Appellant filed a motion to suppress Officer Wassell's observations of Appellant's intoxication. Appellant claimed that the stop was illegal, as it was unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. On June 16, 1998, the suppression court denied Appellant's motion, finding that the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to support the investigative stop of Appellant's vehicle.

¶ 4 Following a bench trial on February 11, 1998, Appellant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol¹ and driving under suspension (DUI related).² For the first offense, the court sentenced Appellant to one to two years' incarceration. For driving under suspension, Appellant received ninety days' incarceration, to be served consecutively to the DUI sentence. Appellant appealed his judgment of sentence. A divided panel of this Court filed a memorandum opinion on October 30, 1998, reversing and remanding for a new trial. On November 12, 1998, the Commonwealth filed an application for reargument en banc. This Court granted the Commonwealth's motion for reargument en banc on January 7, 1999, and withdrew the panel memorandum opinion.

¶ 5 Appellant raises this issue for our review:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS, WHERE A POLICE OFFICER STOPPED A VEHICLE UPON UNSUBSTANTIATED REPORTS THAT THE VEHICLE WAS BEING OPERATED BY A DRIVER THAT COULD/MAY BE INTOXICATED?

Appellant's Brief at 3 (emphasis in original). ¶ 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth the standard and scope of review for a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion as follows:

Our standard [of] review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When reviewing rulings of a suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 549 Pa. 352, 377, 701 A.2d 492, 504-05 (1997), cert, denied, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S.Ct. 1535, 140 L.Ed.2d 685, (1998) (citation omitted). If there is sufficient evidence of record to support the suppression court's ruling and that court has not misapplied the law, then we will not disturb the court's decision, particularly with respect to credibility determinations. Commonwealth v. Queen, 536 Pa. 315, 639 A.2d 443 (1994).

¶ 7 The parties do not dispute that Appellant was "seized" by Officer Wassell when he activated his signal lights and delayed Appellant's departure from the gas station parking lot onto Airport Road. Appellant's sole issue on appeal is whether Officer Wassell had a legal basis to stop Appellant's vehicle and investigate his condition. Appellant contends that an unconfirmed report of a driver that "could" or "may" be operating a vehicle while intoxicated is insufficient, without more, to supply a legal basis for stopping his vehicle. In support of his argument, Appellant relies primarily on our Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 543 Pa. 612, 673 A.2d 915 (1996).

¶ 8 In Hamilton, an officer observed persons gathered around a vehicle in a parking lot. A woman, who had been outside the car, speaking to the driver, approached the officer and told him that everything was okay and that she had taken the driver's keys. Without making any further observations regarding the driver, Hamilton, the officer drove across the street and parked in another lot. When the police officer noticed that the vehicle was leaving the parking lot, the officer followed. The officer continued to observe the car as it turned into a restaurant parking lot. During his observation, the officer saw no violations of the Motor Vehicle Code on the driver's part nor did he notice anything erratic, improper or unsafe about the driving. After Hamilton car had parked at the restaurant, the officer approached the vehicle and saw that Hamilton had been driving. The police officer promptly arrested Hamilton for DUI.

¶ 9 The Hamilton Court reasoned that the basis for the stop was deficient. The woman's statement to the officer that everything was okay and that she had taken the driver's keys was nonspecific and amounted to mere implication that Hamilton was intoxicated.³ Because the officer did nothing to verify the woman's statement, or observe anything on his own to substantiate her suggestion, the Court concluded that the officer did not possess articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that the driver was intoxicated. The Hamilton Court, therefore, held that the stop was illegal and any evidence gained as a result of the stop should have been suppressed.

¶ 10 Appellant contends that Hamilton is dispositive of the instant case. Appellant claims that the informant's report in the present case, as in Hamilton, was equivocal at best and mandated independent observation by Officer Wassell. Like the officer in Hamilton, Appellant asserts, Officer Wassell had observed nothing on his own to substantiate the Pingerton's report. Appellant asserts that the stop and ensuing investigation were improper, without Officer Wassell's independent knowledge, information or observations that a crime was being committed. Appellant concludes that the impropriety of the stop invalidated all evidence derived from the stop and warranted its suppression. We disagree.

¶ 11 Pennsylvania law recognizes two instances where police may "seize" an individual in compliance with the constitutional prohibitions against warrantless searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Melendez, 544 Pa. 323, 676 A.2d 226 (1996). One constitutionally permissible circumstance occurs when the police...