Com. v. Krum

Decision Date02 November 1987
Docket NumberNos. 208,s. 208
Citation367 Pa.Super. 511,533 A.2d 134
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Roy E. KRUM, Appellant. Phila. 1985 and 209 Phila. 1985.
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

William K. Sayer, Asst. Public Defender, Stroudsburg, for appellant.

E. David Christine, Asst. Dist. Atty., East Stroudsburg, for Com., appellee.

Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and BROSKY, ROWLEY, WIEAND,

MONTEMURO, BECK, TAMILIA, POPOVICH and JOHNSON, JJ.

WIEAND, Judge:

Roy Krum entered pleas of guilty to two charges of burglary. Although these were his first adult offenses, Krum had a lengthy juvenile record. The sentencing court imposed concurrent sentences of not less than four years nor more than eight years, which it refused to modify in response to a petition for reconsideration. On direct appeal, Krum argues (1) that the sentencing guidelines are "in violation of Pennsylvania case law and the Sentencing Code in that they fail to distinguish between the effect of a prior adjudication as a fifteen year old juvenile and a prior conviction as an adult"; and (2) that the sentences constituted an abuse of discretion because Krum did not have a prior adult record.

An examination of the record in the trial court discloses that only the second issue has been preserved for appellate review. The first issue was not raised in the trial court at the sentencing hearing or in the motion to reconsider and modify the sentence. It was raised for the first time after an appeal had been filed in this Court. Appellant's motion for reconsideration of sentence contained as reason therefor only the following:

Defendant requests your Honorable Court to reconsider the sentence in light of the fact that the Court failed to give sufficient consideration to the defendant's young age at the time these incidents occurred and to the defendant's status as a young juvenile at the time of his prior criminal activities as a juvenile. The Court was also not aware of the extent to which the defendant has cooperated with the authorities since his arrest on these charges.

Par. 3, Motion to Reconsider and Modify Sentence.

It is well established that sentencing issues which have not been raised in a motion to modify sentence are waived. See: Commonwealth v. Duffy, 341 Pa.Super. 217, 221, 491 A.2d 230, 231 (1985); Commonwealth v. Cottman, 327 Pa.Super. 453, 461, 476 A.2d 40, 44 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kuhn, 327 Pa.Super. 72, 83, 475 A.2d 103, 108 (1984). The sentencing guidelines issue which appellant has sought to raise in the instant appeal, even if meritorious, would not render the sentence illegal in the sense that it could not be waived. Compare: Commonwealth v. Reardon, 297 Pa.Super. 193, 443 A.2d 792 (1981). The sentence imposed upon appellant was authorized by the legislature, was within statutory limits, and was not an illegal sentence. The sentence recommended by the guidelines, as the opinion of the sentencing court makes clear, was only one of several factors considered in formulating an appropriate sentence to be imposed upon Roy Krum. If a sentencing court considers improper factors in imposing sentence upon a defendant, the court thereby abuses its discretion, but the sentence imposed is not rendered illegal. Otherwise, every erroneous consideration by a sentencing court will render the sentence illegal in a manner which cannot be waived by a defendant. This is not the law. See: Commonwealth v. Boone, 467 Pa. 168, 354 A.2d 898 (1975); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 349 Pa.Super. 358, 503 A.2d 39 (1986); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 344 Pa.Super. 380, 496 A.2d 1156 (1985); Commonwealth v. Sypin, 341 Pa.Super. 506, 491 A.2d 1371 (1985); Commonwealth v. Duden, 326 Pa.Super. 73, 473 A.2d 614 (1984); Commonwealth v. Garrison, 292 Pa.Super. 326, 437 A.2d 407 (1981); Commonwealth v. Graves, 275 Pa.Super. 557, 419 A.2d 41 (1980); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 265 Pa.Super. 474, 402 A.2d 536 (1979); Commonwealth v. Fields, 251 Pa.Super. 287, 380 A.2d 491 (1977); Commonwealth v. Walls, 248 Pa.Super. 335, 375 A.2d 125 (1977), aff'd, 481 Pa. 1, 391 A.2d 1064 (1978); Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 226 Pa.Super. 203, 313 A.2d 342 (1973), aff'd, 462 Pa. 342, 341 A.2d 111 (1975). Indeed, even issues of constitutional dimensions can be waived. See: Commonwealth v. Boone, supra (appellant's contention that she had been denied due process of law by imposition of minimum and maximum sentence was waived by failure to object at sentencing). See also: Commonwealth v. Sessoms, --- Pa. ----, ---- n. 2, 532 A.2d 775, 782 n. 2 (1987) (invalidity of sentencing guidelines can be waived if not preserved at all stages of adjudication).

In the instant case, appellant could waive and, in fact, did waive a challenge to the authority of the Sentencing Commission to require that prior juvenile adjudications be deemed equivalent to adult convictions for purposes of determining an offender's prior record score. 1 He waived this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court at sentencing or in his motion to reconsider and modify the same. 2

The second issue argued by appellant was adequately preserved in the trial court. Because it involves the discretionary aspects of sentencing, however, it is necessary that we determine whether there is a sufficiently substantial issue to require review.

The right of appeal from a final judgment of sentence is guaranteed by Article 5, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The exclusive jurisdiction to hear such appeals, except in capital cases, is vested in the Superior Court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 742. Such an appeal may generally be taken as of right by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the lower court within the time allowed for such appeal. Pa.R.App.P. 902. With respect to appeals challenging the discretionary aspects of sentencing, however, the legislature has provided at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b) as follows:

(b) Allowance of appeal.--The defendant or the Commonwealth may file a petition for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of a sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor to the appellate court that has initial jurisdiction for such appeals. Allowance of appeal may be granted at the discretion of the appellate court where it appears that there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under this chapter. (Emphasis added).

Pursuant to its authority to prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in the courts, the Supreme Court has promulgated rules to implement this statutory provision. By a note accompanying Pa.R.A.P. 902 the proper procedure to be followed in cases brought under Section 9781(b) has been explained as follows:

Section 9781 of the Sentencing Code (42 Pa.C.S. § 9781) provides that the defendant or the Commonwealth may file a "petition for allowance of appeal" of the discretionary aspects of a sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor. The notice of appeal under this chapter (see Rule 904) (content of the notice of appeal)) operates as the "petition for allowance of appeal" under the Sentencing Code. It automatically raises all possible questions under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781 and is available and appropriate even where no issue relating to guilt or the legality of the sentence (in the sense that the sentence falls outside of the range of discretion vested by law in the sentencing court) is presented. No additional wording is required or appropriate in the notice of appeal.

In effect, the filing of the "petition for allowance of appeal" contemplated by the statute is deferred by these rules until the briefing stage, where the question of the appropriateness of the discretionary aspects of the sentence may be briefed and argued in the usual manner.

The procedure for filing the "petition for allowance of appeal" at the briefing stage is set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) as follows:

[a]n appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence. The statement shall immediately precede the argument on the merits with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence.

In Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987), the defendant, who had been convicted of various violations of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (30), was sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to serve a five year term of probation. The Commonwealth appealed. This Court vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing on the ground that the sentence was outside the sentencing guidelines and unreasonable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it had been error for the Superior Court to consider the merits of the Commonwealth's appeal where the Commonwealth had failed to comply with the mandate of Rule 2119(f). The Court said:

It must first be observed that our rules make a careful distinction between "questions relating to the discretionary aspects of the sentence" and "the issue whether the appellate court should exercise its discretion to reach such question." Pa.R.A.P. 2116. Recognizing this distinction, the language from the Note to Pa.R.A.P. 902 ... speaks only to the fact that the appellant is to supply his brief, with argument on the merits of the question, at the same time as he provides his concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. It does not and cannot obviate the need for such a statement.

The procedure outlined in the Note accompanying Rule 902 was published in the interest of maintaining consistency between practice under this section of the Sentencing Code and typical appellate practice in Superior Court, which does not ordinarily have discretion as to the exercise of its jurisdiction....

So long as the Commonwealth is required at some point to demonstrate a "substantial question" in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
93 cases
  • Smith, Matter of
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 20 April 1990
    ...by the fact that they may be considered by a court in determining sentence in a subsequent adult criminal case. Commonwealth v. Krum, 367 Pa.Super. 511, 533 A.2d 134 (1987); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6354(b)(1). The effect a juvenile record may have upon one's later treatment in the criminal justice c......
  • Com. v. Mehalic
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 1 March 1989
    ...513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987). The defect, however, is procedural, and it may be waived by the Appellee. Commonwealth v. Krum, 367 Pa.Super. 511, 533 A.2d 134 (1987) (en banc ). In the case of waiver by the Appellee, we shall determine whether the Appellant has presented a substantial iss......
  • Abdul-Salaam v. Beard
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • 24 April 2014
    ...Woodward, 368 Pa.Superior Ct. 363, 534 A.2d 478 (1987) ; allocatur denied, 520 Pa. 575, 549 A.2d 135 (1988) ; Commonwealth v. Krum, 367 Pa.Superior Ct. 511, 533 A.2d 134 (1987) ; Commonwealth v. Morio, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 407, 448 A.2d 1106 (1982) ; and Commonwealth v. Allen, 287 Pa.Superio......
  • Com. v. Robinson
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 2 August 2007
    ...by a defendant. This is not the law. Indeed, even issues of constitutional dimensions can be waived." Commonwealth v. Krum, 367 Pa.Super. 511, 533 A.2d 134, 136 (1987) (en banc) (citations 6. In Jacobs, we wrote that the right of allocution "is not a statutory mandate." Jacobs, 900 A.2d at ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT