Com. v. Lagana
| Decision Date | 07 May 1986 |
| Citation | 509 A.2d 863,510 Pa. 477 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Joseph LAGANA, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Eric B. Henson, Deputy Dist. Atty., Steven J. Cooperstein, Philadelphia, for appellant.
John W. Packel, Chief/Appeals Div., Asst. Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, J.J.
This appeal is from an order of the Superior Court, 334 Pa.Super 100, 482 A.2d 1101, affirming an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. The latter court had granted appellee's motion to suppress evidence on the basis of collateral estoppel.
The relevant history of this case is as follows. On the evening of May 11, 1981, a police officer stopped appellee while the latter was standing on a street corner in Philadelphia. At the time the officer was responding to a radio call which indicated that a man with a gun was present on the corner. Appellee fit the description which the officer had received, 1 and at the time of the stop appellee was engaged in what could have been considered suspicious activity, in that he was standing in the rain observing a sandwich shop through a pair of binoculars. Since the officer believed that the man was armed, he conducted a pat-down of the appellee, which revealed a .32 caliber revolver located in appellee's pants. Appellee was then arrested on suspicion of violating the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act. 2
Prior to appellee's actual arrest the police officer noticed two carrying cases which were on the ground nearby. When asked if the cases belonged to him, appellee responded in an ambiguous manner. The cases were seized and taken into custody along with appellee. Upon arrival at the police facility the two cases were examined without search warrant authority. This search revealed various articles, which later proved to be the fruits of a burglary. 3
Appellee was charged separately with a firearm violation and with burglary. For reasons which do not appear of record the Commonwealth did not consolidate these matters and they proceeded through the system separately. Consequently, defense counsel filed separate motions to suppress.
On August 28, 1981, a suppression hearing was held on the burglary matter before the Honorable Nelson Diaz. Judge Diaz held that the burglary evidence was to be suppressed because the initial contact between the officer and the appellee constituted an arrest, as opposed to a Terry stop; and that since there was no evidence regarding the reliability of the police radio information, the arrest was without probable cause. The Commonwealth chose not to appeal Judge Diaz' decision and instead elected to nolle pros the burglary charge.
On September 8, 1981, a suppression hearing was held on the firearms matter before the Honorable Eugene H. Clarke, Jr. No evidence was taken at this hearing. Rather, after receiving memoranda and hearing argument, Judge Clarke ruled that by operation of collateral estoppel Judge Diaz' findings of fact and conclusions of law were binding on him in this second prosecution. Consequently, he suppressed the physical evidence, i.e., the gun.
On appeal, a three judge panel of the Superior Court (Spaeth, P.J., Montemuro, and Popovich, JJ.) in an opinion by President Judge Spaeth, affirmed. 4 Upon petition for allowance of appeal we granted allocatur.
The issue which is now before us is whether collateral estoppel should apply to pre-trial suppression rulings where separate prosecutions arise from a single arrest. Both parties agree that this is an issue of first impression in this Court.
In Commonwealth v. Brown, 503 Pa. 514, 469 A.2d 1371 (1983), this Court discussed the concept of collateral estoppel as it relates to criminal prosecutions. See also, Commonwealth v. Hude, 492 Pa. 600, 425 A.2d 313 (1981). In Brown, we acknowledged that collateral estoppel has definitive constitutional status whenever one is twice put in jeopardy, essentially adopting the approach of the United States Supreme Court which considered collateral estoppel under the rubric of the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). Under that approach collateral estoppel is compelled in a second proceeding if jeopardy had attached in the first matter.
There is no question under the facts of this case that jeopardy had not attached in the first suppression hearing. Therefore, there certainly is no constitutional bar to relitigating a suppression motion during the course of a second prosecution. The question remains however, as to whether the application of collateral estoppel is advisable as a matter of sound judicial policy.
A variety of our sister state jurisdictions have wrestled with the instant problem. Their solutions range from the Illinois approach, wherein collateral estoppel is strictly applied in situations like the present; 5 to the Florida approach, wherein collateral estoppel has been held applicable only if jeopardy attaches, thus precluding the application of the principle to pre-trial suppression orders. 6 See also, State v. Doucet, 359 So.2d 1239 (La.1977) (on Rehearing); State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 380 A.2d 1128 (1977). Regardless of the approach taken, the basis for favoring one approach as compared with another has depended upon the jurisprudential policies sought to be furthered.
In this case the Superior Court bottomed its solution on its appraisal of such policy considerations. Those considerations included the possibility that a defendant may be tried with illegally seized evidence; that a defendant may be subjected to harassment by the Commonwealth; that judicial economy dictates that the Commonwealth should be required to present its entire position in one proceeding rather than bringing piecemeal prosecutions; and that fairness dictates that a defendant should be allowed to rely on a prior favorable decision. The court held that these concerns outweighed the Commonwealth's argument against perpetuating possibly erroneous rulings.
This Court is the ultimate arbiter of legal policy in this Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985), and we disagree with the Superior Court's weighing of the competing concerns present in this case.
Firstly, the expressed concern of risking a trial tainted by illegally seized evidence, merely because that evidence could be twice contested, seems frivolous at best. An assessment of the legality of the seizure of evidence is the very purpose of a suppression hearing. The mere fact that a defendant could be required to twice prove his assertion does not necessarily cast doubt upon the second determination if a record supports that decision. The decision is an independent judgment which must stand or fall on its own merit.
Secondly, the contention that a defendant may be subject to harassment by the Commonwealth also is baseless; for it ascribes to the Commonwealth a vindictiveness that is not borne out by this record.
The lower court also supposes that the absence of collateral estoppel will somehow be a temptation to the Commonwealth to bring piecemeal prosecutions so as to maximize their chances of success. We do not accept this supposition, as we are confident that the Commonwealth will follow the fundamental rule that charges arising out of the same criminal transaction should be consolidated. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 131(b); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973).
Finally, concerning the Superior Court's "fairness" consideration, we question whether "fairness to the defendant" is such a laudatory policy goal when it is gained at the expense of perpetuating an erroneous ruling, thereby unfairly terminating a legitimate prosecution.
All in all, we are unpersuaded by the Superior Court's policy arguments, and consequently we cannot accept their proposed solution. That is not to say however that there are no policy considerations favoring the application of collateral estoppel to suppression hearings. One of the most important of these is the sound policy of avoiding having judges of equal...
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