Com. v. Laird
Citation | 726 A.2d 346,555 Pa. 629 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Richard LAIRD, Appellant. |
Decision Date | 01 March 1999 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
Robert Brett Dunham, Philadelphia, for R. Laird.
Alan M. Rubenstein, Doylestown, for the Com.
Robert A. Graci, Harrisburg, for Office of Atty. Gen.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.
This is a direct appeal from the denial of Petitioner's request for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 For the reasons set forth herein, the order of the trial court is affirmed.
Petitioner, along with his co-defendant, Frank Chester, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death on May 21, 1988.2 This court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Laird, 526 Pa. 578, 587 A.2d 1367 (1991). On July 22, 1993, a pro se PCRA petition was filed. Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed on January 12, 1995. An evidentiary hearing as to a portion of the claims raised in the PCRA petition was held on May 25, 1995 and concluded on April 1, 1996. On July 19, 1996 current PCRA counsel entered his appearance. Additional testimony in support of the petition was heard January 21st through the 28th, 1997. An opinion and order denying PCRA relief was entered on September 2, 1997. This appeal followed.
This Court in the opinion on direct appeal summarized the facts underlying the conviction for first degree murder as follows:
Before discussing the specific issues presented in this appeal we must first address the PCRA court's ruling that petitioner's post-conviction petition would be reviewed under the revised standards set forth in the 1995 amendments to the PCRA. During the January 1997 hearings on the petition, the PCRA court ruled that only issues arising from the guilt phase of petitioner's original trial were cognizable under the current PCRA. The PCRA court reached this conclusion by reference to the provisions in the most recent amendments to the PCRA that limit review of claims to only those issues that "so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(2)(i) and (ii). The PCRA court reasoned that as penalty phase issues relate to the imposition of sentence, rather than the determination of guilt, penalty phase issues do not provide a basis for relief under the current PCRA. The PCRA court held that the PCRA in effect at the time of the hearing controlled. The PCRA court did permit the introduction of testimony as to penalty phase issues, and granted leave for PCRA counsel to submit additional written proffers as to evidence that would be presented if penalty phase issues were cognizable, so that a record would be available to the appellate court. (N.T.1/23/97). In its opinion denying PCRA relief the PCRA court did not address the merits of any issues relating to the penalty phase of petitioner's trial.
Petitioner raises several objections to the trial court's ruling on this point. We need not address each of petitioner's objections as the first one is dispositive. The petition for post-conviction relief was docketed in the lower court on July 22, 1993. The PCRA was amended on November 17, 1995, to be effective 60 days thereafter. Section 3(1) of Act 1995 (Spec.Sess. No. 1), Nov. 17, P.L. 1118, No. 32, specifically provides that the amendments to the PCRA at 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9542, 9543, 9544, 9545 and 9546 shall apply to petitions filed after the effective date of the Act. The PCRA in effect at the time of the original filing is the act which governs petitioner's claims for relief. Commonwealth v. Whitney, 550 Pa. 618, 708 A.2d 471 (1998).
Although the PCRA court erred in applying the amended PCRA to this case, and in declining to address the penalty phase issues raised in its opinion denying PCRA relief, a sufficient record was made to permit this court's review of the claims.3 Our review of the claims presented will be in accordance with the following provisions of the PCRA, as it read at the time petitioner's original petition for relief was filed:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Commonwealth of Pa. v. Smith
...such a defense would conflict with the defendant's sworn testimony in furtherance of his defense strategy. See Commonwealth v. Laird, 555 Pa. 629, 726 A.2d 346, 353–54 (1999); Commonwealth v. Williams, 537 Pa. 1, 640 A.2d 1251, 1264 (1994). Moreover, addressing the substance of the mental h......
-
Com. v. Tedford
...a reasonable likelihood of prejudice. Commonwealth v. Rollins, 558 Pa. 532, 738 A.2d 435, 451 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Laird, 555 Pa. 629, 726 A.2d 346, 356 (1999)). Although they may testify to the existence of an outside influence, jurors are prohibited "from testifying as to the e......
-
Commonwealth v. Keaton
...the Commonwealth argues the PCRA court impermissibly employed a hindsight analysis, contrary to Strickland and Commonwealth v. Laird, 555 Pa. 629, 726 A.2d 346 (1999).29 It contends the PCRA court improperly read Williams v. Taylor 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), and W......
-
Laird v. Horn, CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-2311 (E.D. Pa. 9/5/2001)
...opinion and order denying PCRA relief on September 2, 1997. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the order. Commonwealth v. Laird, 555 Pa. 629, 726 A.2d 346 (1999) ("Laird"). Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 5, 1999. Counsel was......