Com. v. Langnes

• Decision Date: 23 April 1969
• Citation: 434 Pa. 478,255 A.2d 131
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Herbert F. LANGNES, Richard Oliver Joseph Mayberry, Dominick Codispoti, Appeal of Richard Oliver Joseph MAYBERRY.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 131

255 A.2d 131

434 Pa. 478

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v.Herbert F. LANGNES, Richard Oliver Joseph Mayberry, Dominick Codispoti Appeal of Richard Oliver Joseph MAYBERRY.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 23, 1969.

Richard O. J. Mayberry, in pro. per., Peter Kanjorski, Wilkes-Barre, for appellants.

Robert W. Duggan, Dist. Atty., Charles B. Watkins, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

OPINION

JONES, Justice.

Herbert Langnes, Dominic Codispoti and Richard Mayberry were indicted by the Grand Jury of Allegheny County on two charges: (1) holding hostages in a penal institution and (2) prison breach.All three defendants were tried together and all three defendants were found guilty on both counts.

Richard Mayberry entered a plea of not guilty, waived his right to representation by counsel and chose to act as his own counsel at trial.¹

On December 12, 1966, the court sentenced Mayberry to a term of imprisonment of not less than fifteen or more than thirty years on the first count and not less than five or more than ten years on the second count.These sentences were to be served consecutively at the expiration of any sentence Mayberry was already serving.

On the same day the court also sentenced Mayberry on eleven separate acts of criminal contempt which allegedly took place during the trial of the case and imposed a sentence of not less than one or more than two years for each separate act of criminal contempt, said sentences to be served consecutively at the expiration of the sentences imposed for the two crimes of which he had been convicted.From these judgments on the contempt charges Mayberry has filed the instant appeals.²

Mayberry in his brief presents three contentions: (1) that he was denied the right to trial by jury on the contempt charges in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;(2) that he was denied due process of law by being convicted and sentenced for criminal contempt without procedural safeguards; (3) that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in being sentenced to a minimum of eleven and a maximum of twenty-two years on the contempt charges.Mayberry's appointed counsel in his brief raises the following issues: (1) that the court erred in failing to provide Mayberry with substantive constitutional safeguards by not apprising him of the nature and elements of the crime of criminal contempt, by not giving timely notice of the commission of criminal contempt, by not informing him of his right to counsel and in failing to provide him with counsel at the time of sentence; (2) that the statute providing for criminal contempt is unconstitutional as applied to the instant factual situation.

The contempt charges grew out of Mayberry's conduct during the course of the trial where he acted as his own counsel.An examination of the record reveals a course of conduct on Mayberry's part almost beyond belief and of an obviously and patently planned and determined attempt on Mayberry's part to interfere with the administration of justice and to make a farce and mockery of his trial.Mayberry accused the trial judge of denying him a fair trial, called him a 'hatchet man for the State' and a 'dirty S.O.B.,' stated he would not 'be railroaded into any life sentence by any dirty tyrannical old dog like (the judge),' told the trial court'to keep (his) mouth shut,' referred to the court as a 'bum' and a 'stumbling dog,' accused the court of working for the prison authorities and of conducting a Spanish Inquisition.He further told the judge that he was in need of psychiatric treatment and was 'some kind of nut.'These few examples are indicative of Mayberry's outrageous conduct during the course of the trial.Moreover, in open court, Mayberry stated his intention of disrupting the court's charge to the jury and carried out his intention to such an extent that the court was finally forced to have him gagged, placed in a strait jacket and removed to an adjoining court room to which the charge to the jury was broadcast through a public address system.The record further demonstrates beyond any question that Mayberry's behavior was calculated and planned with the aim of disrupting the orderly procedure of the trial and the administration of justice.

RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491(1968), the United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution guaranteed the right to jury trial in serious criminal cases in state courts.In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 522(1968), the Court was called upon to decide whether the Constitution guaranteed the right to a jury trial for a criminal contempt punished by a two-year prison sentence.Holding that 'petty crimes need not be tried to a jury' and recognizing that the court had deemed it unnecessary under Duncan to fix 'the exact location of the line between petty offense and serious crimes,'the court held that a criminal contempt punishable by a two-year prison sentence constitutes a serious crime which entitles a defendant to the right to trial by jury and that it is constitutional error to deny the defendant such right.If Duncan and Bloom are presently applicable, Mayberry would be entitled to a jury trial on the contempt charges.

However, the United States Supreme Court, in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308(1968), held that Duncan and Bloom 'should receive only prospective application.'Since Duncan and Bloom were decided in 1968 and since Mayberry's trial took place in December, 1966, the rulings in Duncan and Bloom do not apply to Mayberry, and Mayberry is not entitled to a trial by jury on the contempt charges.

DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS

The contempt charges upon which Mayberry was sentenced constituted Direct criminal contempts which took place in open court in the presence of the court and the jury.Punishment for direct criminal contempt may be inflicted summarily.See: Philadelphia Marine Trade Association v. International Longshoremen's Association, 392 Pa. 500, 509, 140 A.2d 814(1958).³

The Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, § 23,17 P.S. § 2041, provides, inter alia, as follows:

'The power of the several courts of this commonwealth to issue attachments and to inflict summary punishments for contempts of court shall be restricted to the following cases, to wit: * * *

'III.To the misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice.'

In a direct criminal contempt, the court has the inherent power to protect its judicial dignity and conscience and to protect itself from insult and abuse.See: Aungst Contempt Case, 411 Pa. 595, 192 A.2d 723(1963).Section 24 of the Act of 1836, supra, provides: 'The punishment of imprisonment for contempt as aforesaid shall extend only to such contempts as shall be committed in open court, and all other contempts shall be punished by fine only.'(17 P.S. § 2042)

In Weiss v. Jacobs, 405 Pa. 390, 394, 395, 175 A.2d 849, 851(1961), this Court said:

'In In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, at 275--276, 68 S.Ct. 499 at 508, 92 L.Ed. 682, the United States Supreme Court stated: 'due process of law, * * * requires that one charged with contempt of court be advised of the charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have a chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or explanation.The narrow exception to these due process requirements includes only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court * * * and where immediate punishment is essential to prevent 'demoralization of the court's authority' * * * before the public.If some essential elements of the offense are not personally observed by the judge, * * * due process requires, * * * that the accused be accorded notice and a fair hearing * * * ".(Emphasis added)

The instant contempt charges arose out of the misconduct and misbehavior of Mayberry before the court and all the actions and utterances upon which these contempt charges were based took place in front of the trial judge.Under such circumstances, the court had plenary power to punish summarily for such contumacious conduct.To hold otherwise would be to offend the inherent power of a court, particularly when the misconduct and misbehavior were as outrageous as that of Mayberry in the instant case.

We find no evidence under the circumstances of a violation of the constitutional due process requirements so far as Mayberry is concerned.

DID THE SENTENCES CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT?

The court below imposed not one but eleven sentences, each based on a separate contemptuous act of Mayberry.Each sentence was for one to two years.

The instant record is replete with instance after instance of contumacious conduct on Mayberry's part.Moreover, it is evident beyond question that such conduct was not only in definance of the court and its dignity but was planned with a view to disrupting the orderly process of the trial and preventing and obstructing the proper administration of justice.

Under the instant circumstances, we conclude that the imposition of eleven one-to-two year sentences is not cruel and unusual punishment.

We now consider the several contentions made by Mayberry's court-appointed

appellate counsel in his separate brief on behalf of

Mayberry.WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADVISE

MAYBERRY OF THE NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AND

THAT HIS ACTIONS AMOUNTED TO CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

Mayberry...