Com. v. Lipinski

• Decision Date: 07 January 2004
• Citation: 841 A.2d 537
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Glenda C. LIPINSKI, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

841 A.2d 537

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Glenda C. LIPINSKI, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted November 17, 2003.

Filed January 7, 2004.

Veronica A. Smith, Mercer, for appellant.

James P. Epstein, Asst. Dist. Atty., Mercer, for Com., appellee.

BEFORE: ORIE MELVIN, POPOVICH, and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.

OPINION BY ORIE MELVIN, J.:

¶ 1 Appellant, Glenda Lipinski, appeals from the sentence imposed following her conviction of driving under the influence (DUI), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731. She raises several challenges to the constitutionality of Act 63 with respect to its provision for installation of ignition interlock devices, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7001-7003. After review, we affirm in part and vacate in part.

¶ 2 The facts and procedural history may be summarized as follows. During the early morning hours of December 22, 2001, Appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The responding officers detected signs of intoxication, and, following her transport to a local hospital for medical treatment, Appellant consented to chemical testing. Her blood alcohol content was above 0.10%.

¶ 3 Appellant subsequently entered a plea of guilty to DUI as a second offense. Her sentence, imposed on May 28, 2002, included a provision directing compliance with Act 63's requirements relating to an ignition interlock system. Appellant's motion to modify her sentence was denied, and this timely appeal followed.

¶ 4 Four issues are presented for our review.

I. WHETHER ACT 63 VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION AND SUBSTANTIVE

DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES BY INTERFERING WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO INTERSTATE TRAVEL AS WELL AS BY TREATING SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS DIFFERENTLY.

II. WHETHER ACT 63 VIOLATES PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN THAT IT DEPRIVES A LICENSEE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE CHALLENGING WHETHER THERE WAS A PRIOR DUI CONVICTION, WHETHER INTERLOCK DEVICES ARE PROPERLY INSTALLED, OR ANY EVIDENCE REGARDING OWNERSHIP OR LACK OF OWNERSHIP REGARDING ANY SPECIFIC VEHICLE AND CREATES A REQUIREMENT THAT THE IGNITION INTERLOCK BE INSTALLED ON PARTICULAR VEHICLES.

III. WHETHER ACT 63 VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE BY SEIZING FOR THE LEGISLATURE POWER TO PRESCRIBE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES AND OFFICERS.

IV. WHETHER THE LEGISLATURE VIOLATED ARTICLE III, SECTION 3 BY ENACTING A BILL CONTAINING MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT.

Appellant's brief at 4.

¶ 5 This Court recently explained our review of a trial court's sentence where the statutory authority therefor is challenged.

Our Court's "authority to review a sentence is governed by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781." Commonwealth v. Archer, 722 A.2d 203, 209 (Pa.Super.1998)(en banc)." If no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction." Commonwealth v. Alexander, 811 A.2d 1064, 1065 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 573 Pa. 676, 822 A.2d 703 (2003).

Commonwealth v. Randal, 2003 PA Super. 465 ¶ 7, 837 A.2d 1211 (2003)(other citations omitted).¹

¶ 6 Our Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Act 63 in Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 575 Pa. 5, 834 A.2d 488 (2003). There, the defendant had challenged the ignition interlock requirements set forth in the Act, and the trial court found certain of its provisions unconstitutional. On appeal, our Supreme Court agreed that the doctrine of the separation of powers was violated by Act 63 because it delegated executive functions to the judiciary. However, the Court found the offensive provisions were severable from the remainder of the Act:

Here, severing those portions of Act 63 which effectuate the delegation to the sentencing court of the license restoration-related executive responsibilities of ordering installation of the devices and certifying that they have been installed does not render the remainder of the statute incapable of execution in accordance with legislative intent. Our separation of powers holding can be effected by severing three provisions of Act 63: subsection 7002(b), which delegates to the court the inter-related tasks of ordering a serial DUI offender to install the devices, apprising the Department of that order, verifying compliance, and certifying compliance to the Department; subsection 7003(1), which provides that, when a recidivist DUI offender seeks restoration of driving privileges, "the court shall certify to the department that each motor vehicle owned by the person has been equipped with an approved ignition interlock system;" and the last clause of subsection 7003(5), which refers back to subsection 7003(1) (i.e., "after otherwise being eligible for restoration under paragraph (1)"). With these provisions severed, the legislation still requires recidivist DUI offenders seeking restoration of driving privileges to apply to the Department for an ignition interlock restricted license. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7003(2). The Act also precludes the offender in possession of such a restricted license from operating any motor vehicle on a highway in the Commonwealth unless that vehicle is equipped with an approved ignition interlock system. Id. § 7003(3). The Act thus still prevents recidivist DUI offenders from lawfully operating motor vehicles on the highways in Pennsylvania unless they have an approved limited license and are driving a properly-equipped vehicle.

575 Pa. at 29-30, 834 A.2d at 502-03. In so concluding, the Court determined that it did not need to address the arguments related to due process and equal protection.

¶ 7 Subsequently, in Randal, supra, the appellant raised challenges to Act 63 based upon equal protection, due process, and ex post facto grounds. We stated that pursuant to Mockaitis, "it is clear that a sentencing court does not have the statutory authority to impose the requirement that a DUI offender install an approved ignition interlock system(s) on his or her motor vehicle(s)." 2003 PA Super 465 at ¶ 8, 837 A.2d 1211. Accordingly, we vacated that portion of the sentence which required installation of such a system. Id.

¶ 8 Similarly, in the case sub judice, we conclude that we need not further address Appellant's first three issues since it is clear that the trial court did not have authority to order installation of an ignition interlock system. Randal, supra.

However, we note that Appellant herein raises an additional issue, namely whether Act 63 should be set aside in its entirety as violative of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This argument presents a challenge beyond the scope of the holding in Mockaitis because, as the Supreme Court there explained, the Act "still prevents recidivist DUI offenders from lawfully operating motor vehicles on the highways in Pennsylvania unless they have an approved limited license and are driving a properly-equipped vehicle" despite severance of the Act's unconstitutional provisions. 575 Pa. at 29-30,

834 A.2d at 503. We thus proceed to examine this issue on its merits.

¶ 9 At the outset, we observe that "[a] statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution[.]" Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 574 Pa. 460, 466, 832 A.2d 418, 421 (2003). Article III, Section 3 of our Constitution provides as follows.

§ 3. Form of bills

No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general appropriation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a part thereof.

PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.

¶ 10 Once again we may look to a recent decision of our Supreme Court for guidance on the issue before us. In City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 575 Pa. 542, 838 A.2d 566 (2003), the Court explained that "Article III's general purpose is `to place restraints on the legislative process and encourage an open, deliberative and accountable government.' " 575 Pa. at 573,838 A.2d at 585 (quoting Pennsylvania AFL-CIO ex rel. George v. Commonwealth, 563 Pa. 108, 119, 757 A.2d 917, 923 (2000)). One of the purposes of Section 3 is to preclude the incorporation into one bill of "hidden legislation" covering a variety of topics. Id.,838 A.2d at 582-84.

¶ 11 "In practice, Section 3's dual requirements—clear expression and single subject—are interrelated, as they both act to proscribe inserting measures into bills without providing fair notice to the public and to legislators of the existence of the same." Id. at 586. This is so even where a bill is amended as it passes through the legislature, as is so often the case. Id. Consequently, "the strictures of Article III, Section 3 are often satisfied where the provisions added during the legislative process assist in carrying out a bill's main objective or are otherwise `germane' to the bill's subject as reflected in its title." Id. The term "subject" has been defined as follows.

[T]hose things which have a `proper relation to each other,' which fairly constitute parts of a scheme to accomplish a single general purpose, `relate to the same subject' or `object.' And provisions which have no proper legislative relation to each other, and are not part of the same legislative scheme, may not be joined in the same act.

DeWeese v. Weaver, 824 A.2d 364, 369-70 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003)(quoting Payne v. School District of Borough of Coudersport, 168 Pa. 386, 31 A. 1072 (1895)).

¶ 12 Appellant contends that Act 63 addressed two different topics which are not germane to a single subject. We begin by examining the title of the legislation: "AN ACT amending Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, providing for the use of ignition interlock systems and for restitution for identity theft." Thus it is plainly evident that Act 63 applied to two particular portions of the Judicial Code. We are cognizant that the mere fact that both topics of the bill are codified within the same title is not sufficient, standing alone, to satisfy Article III,...