Com. v. Mackie

• Decision Date: 24 May 1974
• Citation: 320 A.2d 842,456 Pa. 372
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Thomas MACKIE, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 842

320 A.2d 842

456 Pa. 372

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Thomas MACKIE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 24, 1974.

Vincent J. Ziccardi, Defender, Jonathan Miller, Chief, Appeals Div., Defender Ass'n of Philadelphia, Kenneth L. Mirsky, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Milton M. Stein, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., L. A. Perez, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

MANDERINO, Justice.

This appeal involves a street encounter between a citizen and a police officer which resulted in the arrest of the citizen. The issue is whether the arresting police officer had the constitutionally required probable cause to arrest the appellant, Thomas Mackie. See U.S.Const. amend. IV; Pa.Const. art. I, § 8, P.S. The appellant raised the issue in a pretrial application to suppress evidence. The application was denied, and the appellant was found guilty, in a nonjury trial, of receiving stolen goods. Post-verdict motions were denied and the judgment affirmed per curiam in an appeal to the Superior Court. Commonwealth v. Mackie, 220 Pa.Super. 741, 286 A.2d 407 (1971). We granted the appellant's petition requesting an allowance of appeal to this Court. We now reverse the judgment of sentence and award a new trial.

The arresting officer was on traffic control duty at an intersection in an area which the officer described as a high crime area when he saw Mackie about ten feet away 'walking' along the street 'with a portable television in his right hand and a pair of field glasses in his left hand slung over his shoulder.' The television set was not 'encased in any carton or box . . . (t) he field glasses were in a case.' The officer decided to stop the appellant for 'investigation and to ask him why he was walking down the street with the television.' The officer testified:

'I asked him--I asked the defendant where was he going. The defendant told me he was going home. I asked him where did he live at. He told me in the (3100) block of Bancroft. I asked the defendant where he was coming from. He told me 3800 North 18th Street. I asked where did he get the t.v. from. He told me him and his girl friend had an argument. He took the t.v. back. So I told him it was unusual for him to be coming from 3800 North 18th Street all the way to Broad and Erie and Bancroft Street is only seven blocks away. The defendant told me that he was looking for a cab and there was no cab that passed him on the way. So I asked the defendant did he have any money to catch a cab. He said no, he was going home, let the cab take him home and pay the cab when he got home. So the story didn't seem right. So I took the defendant in for investigation.'

After the arrest of the appellant, the items being carried were identified as stolen property by the property owner and the identification was introduced into evidence during the appellant's trial. The police officer testified that the owner had identified the property prior to trial, but the owner did not testify. These subsequent events, however, are irrelevant to the issue of probable cause for arrest. That issue must be determined on the facts and circumstances known 'at the moment the arrest was made.' Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 618 (1972).

The arresting officer in this case may have had good faith suspicions, but 'common rumor or report, suspicion, or even 'strong reason to suspect' (is) not adequate to support' an arrest. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101, 80 S.Ct. 168, 170, 4 L.Ed.2d 134, 138 (1959); See Commonwealth v. Holton, 432 Pa. 11, 247 A.2d 228 (1968). Probable cause to arrest depends upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the citizen had committed or was committing an offense. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 618 (1972); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 148 (1964); Commonwealth v. Brayboy, 431 Pa. 365, 246 A.2d 675 (1968). 'It is important . . . that this requirement be strictly enforced. . . .' Hentry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 171, 4 L.Ed.2d 134, 138 (1959). 'Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticular hunches, a result this (Government) has consistently refused to sanction.' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908 (1968); Cf. Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 301 A.2d 695 (1973).

The good faith suspicions of the arresting officer in this case may have justified '(a) Brief stop' of the citizen 'in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo Momentarily. . . .' Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 617 (1972) (emphasis added); See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The officer's suspicions, however, did not justify the arrest of the citizen.

The police officer did not have any information that a crime had been committed. The appellant was walking along the street during daylight hours. All kinds of people carrying all kinds of articles also walk along the streets during the day. Some of those people may appear suspicious to others. That does not warrant their arrest. The appellant in this case may have acted...