Com. v. Manchas

Decision Date28 October 1993
Citation430 Pa.Super. 63,633 A.2d 618
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Norman Wayne MANCHAS, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Cynthia Cline, Uniontown, for appellant.

Ralph C. Warman, Dist. Atty., Uniontown, for Com., appellee.

Before ROWLEY, P.J., and WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ.

WIEAND, Judge:

Norman Wayne Manchas was tried by jury and was found guilty of third degree murder in connection with the killing of Frances Layne at her home in Uniontown on April 3, 1991. 1 Post-trial motions were denied, and Manchas was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment for not less than ten (10) years nor more than twenty (20) years. On direct appeal from the judgment of sentence, Manchas contends that: (1) his conviction was not supported by the evidence; (2) the jury's verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence; (3) the trial court erred by denying a defense motion in limine based upon allegedly flagrant violations of discovery rules by the district attorney; and (4) the trial court erred by refusing a defense request for an accomplice charge with respect to the testimony of Donald Powell, a Commonwealth witness. We will consider these issues seriatim.

On April 3, 1991, at or about 4:15 a.m., police received a report of a disturbance at 191 North Gallatin Street in the City of Uniontown. Upon arrival at the scene, the police found the body of Frances Layne on the sidewalk in front of her home. Layne's throat had been cut, with the jugular vein having been completely severed and the carotid artery and windpipe partially severed. There was also a cut on Layne's right thumb, lacerations and bruises about her face, a broken nose and bruises in the area of her right breast. Semen was present in Layne's mouth. During their investigation of the killing, police were able to identify fingerprints belonging to appellant on a beer can and a butcher knife found in the living room of Layne's home. When appellant was first interviewed by police on the afternoon of April 3, 1991, he denied having been present in Layne's home. When he was again interviewed by police on April 10, 1991, appellant gave several accounts of when he had last visited Layne's home. When confronted with the presence of his fingerprints, however, appellant admitted that he had visited Layne on the morning of her death. He said that Layne had been alive when he left at approximately 4:30 or 5:00 a.m. On April 15, 1991, knowing that he was being sought by police, appellant went to the home of Marie Rose and asked her to allow him to hide there and give him a ride to Masontown at nightfall. Appellant was arrested by police in Rose's attic.

Donald Powell, a friend of appellant, testified that after a night of drinking he had accompanied appellant to Layne's home at approximately 3:30 a.m. on the morning of April 3. Upon arrival, Layne had allowed them to come into her home, where they sat in the living room, talked and drank beer for about thirty minutes. Powell then excused himself to go to the bathroom. From there, he heard Layne scream. After Powell exited the bathroom, he observed appellant and Layne standing on the front porch, saw appellant make a swinging motion in the direction of Layne's head and heard Layne say "Stop it." When appellant re-entered the house, Powell thought he saw blood on appellant's hand. Powell then went out onto the porch to see if Layne was all right. He received no response to a verbal inquiry, but saw Layne sitting on the steps covered with blood. Powell then began running down a nearby alley, but upon realizing that he had left his coat in Layne's home, he returned. By this time Layne was prone on the sidewalk and again did not respond to an inquiry by Powell about her condition. After retrieving his coat, Powell found appellant still inside Layne's home and urged him to flee. Powell and appellant ran from the house, down an alley and across town to appellant's apartment. When they arrived at appellant's apartment, Powell observed that a carpet knife, which he had seen on appellant's television prior to their going to Layne's house, was no longer there. Police found a carpet knife in a creek near Layne's house, and when they showed the knife to Powell, he identified it as being similar to the one he had seen at appellant's apartment.

Testimony was also given by Edna West, a neighbor of Frances Layne, who said she had been awakened by a scream and, upon going to her living room window, had seen Layne sitting along the wall of her front steps. West then had seen a person matching appellant's description enter Layne's house. West subsequently saw Donald Powell come out of Layne's house, ask Layne if she was all right, and start to run down the alley between Layne's house and her own house. After Powell had begun to run down the alley, West saw Frances Layne move to the bottom of her steps, sit down and begin to rock back and forth while holding her neck. West then observed Layne fall backwards, as if she had passed out. Thereafter, West saw Powell return to Layne's house and then re-emerge holding a coat. At this point, fearing for Layne's safety, West left the window in order to awaken her boyfriend. When she returned to the window, West heard Powell calling to someone and then she saw Powell and appellant flee down the alley.

Testimony was also given by William McMurray, who had once lived in the same apartment house as appellant. He related that, approximately seven or nine months prior to trial, he had encountered appellant on a street in Uniontown. McMurray said that he had remarked to appellant about his trouble with police and then asked appellant what had happened. In response, appellant told McMurray that he had cut Layne's throat. McMurray said that he was so shocked by appellant's reply that he could recall no further details of the conversation which he had had with appellant. 2

Finally, appellant testified on his own behalf and admitted that he had been at Layne's house at the time of her death, but denied that he had killed her. He testified that, while Donald Powell had been in the bathroom, Layne had answered a knock at the front door. After a brief conversation with the unidentified caller, Layne had stepped onto her porch, closing the door behind her. Appellant said he then had heard Layne scream and he had gone outside to check on her. There, he had found Layne dead on the sidewalk. Appellant said he had discovered a knife laying next to Layne's body, which he had picked up and then threw down. He said he had observed an unidentified man running away from Layne's house. According to appellant, he then had gone back into Layne's house, where Powell had approached him and urged him to flee because the police would think that they had been involved in the killing. As he and Powell had left the house, appellant said, he stopped to pick up the knife because he realized that he had touched it. Subsequently, he threw the knife into a creek near Layne's house, where it was later found by police.

In challenging both the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence to sustain the conviction, appellant makes the following assertions: (1) the testimony of Donald Powell was inconsistent with the testimony of other witnesses and inconsistent with Powell's testimony at appellant's preliminary hearing and at the first trial; (2) the testimony of Edna West and William McMurray was incredible; and (3) the Commonwealth's evidence was wholly circumstantial, without any evidence of a motive or malice or any ill will by appellant toward the victim.

"The proper procedure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence is by a post-verdict motion in arrest of judgment." Commonwealth v. Taylor, 324 Pa.Super. 420, 424, 471 A.2d 1228, 1229 (1984). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine "whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the trier of fact could have found that each element of the offense[ ] charged was supported by evidence and inferences sufficient in law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Jackson, 506 Pa. 469, 472-473, 485 A.2d 1102, 1103 (1984). "This standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 246, 546 A.2d 1101, 1105 (1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1169, 107 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1990). "When conflicts and discrepancies arise, it is within the province of the jury to determine the weight to be given to each [witness's] testimony and to believe all, part or none of the evidence as [it] deem[s] appropriate." Commonwealth v. Verdekal, 351 Pa.Super. 412, 419-420, 506 A.2d 415, 419 (1986). Therefore, the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth "need not be absolutely incompatible with [the] defendant's innocence, but the question of any doubt is for the jury unless the evidence 'be so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.' " Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 150, 371 A.2d 468, 478 (1977), quoting Commonwealth v. Libonati, 346 Pa. 504, 508, 31 A.2d 95, 97 (1943).

"A motion for new trial on grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict but contends, nevertheless, that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Taylor, supra 324 Pa.Super. at 425, 471 A.2d at 1230. The decision whether to grant a new trial on this basis rests within the discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Hunter, 381 Pa.Super. 606, 617, 554 A.2d 550, 555 (1989). "A trial court should award a new...

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