Com. v. Marshall

Decision Date24 May 1994
Citation537 Pa. 336,643 A.2d 1070
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Jerome MARSHALL, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Robert A. Graci, Harrisburg, for Atty. Gen.

Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, CAPPY and MONTEMURO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CAPPY, Justice.

We have before us an automatic direct appeal from the judgment of sentence of death imposed upon Appellant, Jerome Marshall, by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division. 1 Sentence was imposed following a jury's verdict that Appellant had, beyond a reasonable doubt, committed murder of the first degree. On the record before us, we affirm the judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division.

In 1983, Appellant was brought to trial on charges of criminal homicide for the deaths of Myndie McKoy, Sharon Saunders (a/k/a Sharon Ballard), and Sharon's two-year-old daughter, Karima Saunders. The jury in that trial returned verdicts of murder in the first degree as to each victim. A separate sentencing hearing was held, and the jury fixed Appellant's sentences at death for the murders of Myndie McKoy and Karima Saunders, and at life imprisonment for the murder of Sharon Saunders. Post-trial motions were considered and denied, and an automatic direct appeal was presented to this Court. Upon review, this Court affirmed the judgments of sentence imposed for the deaths of Myndie McKoy and Sharon Saunders. However, the sentence of death imposed for the death of Karima Saunders was vacated and the matter was remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for a new sentencing hearing. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 523 Pa. 556, 568 A.2d 590 (1989).

Upon remand, a new jury was impaneled for the sole purpose of fixing Appellant's sentence for the death of Karima Saunders. On July 27, 1990, the jury found one aggravating circumstance, 2 which outweighed the mitigating circumstances, 3 and fixed Appellant's penalty at death. Post-trial motions were considered and denied, and Appellant was sentenced to death by the trial court. 4 We are now presented with Appellant's direct appeal from this sentence.

In Marshall, this Court conducted an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Appellant's conviction for the death of Karima Saunders pursuant to Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 26-27 n. 3, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983), and determined that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury's verdict of murder of the first degree. Nevertheless, in order to properly address the matter currently before us, a concise statement of the circumstances concerning the death of Karima Saunders is warranted. In Marshall, this Court stated:

On January 25, 1983, James Burley, the brother of Sharon Saunders, in the company of his mother, went to the victims' apartment in the City of Philadelphia. Upon entering the apartment, James noticed that it was very hot in the apartment and that a foul odor permeated the air. Upon searching, he found the bodies of his sister, niece, and Myndie McKoy, under a mattress in one of the bedrooms.... The post mortem examination of the victims indicated that they were all strangled to death and that the time of death was from one and one-half to five and one-half days from their discovery on January 25, 1983. Myndie McKoy's corpse also revealed that she had been stabbed in the back, which wound was listed as a contributing factor to her death....

Appellant recounted that he and Sharon had been lovers and that when she told him she was to marry another he became enraged. On the day of the murders, he had sex with the twenty year old Sharon, and while she slept, he put a clothes line around her neck and strangled her to death. He then went into Myndie McKoy's room to tie her up. When she awoke and began to scream, he found a knife and stabbed her in order to quiet her and tied her up. He then dragged her into the bathroom and filled the tub with water. She pleaded with him to leave her alone and she promised not to tell anyone and again began to scream, and then Appellant plunged Myndie's head under the water in the tub and held it there until Myndie no longer moved. Having permanently silenced Myndie, he dragged her body into Sharon's bedroom and laid her corpse next to Sharon. Appellant also admitted that he killed Sharon's two-year-old baby, Karima, by strangulation and drowning because the baby was awakened by the commotion and called out for her mother. When little Karima was dead, Appellant put her between the bodies of Sharon and Myndie and covered their bodies with a mattress.

Before us, Appellant now asserts several claims of error and prejudice which he alleges occurred during the penalty hearing conducted on remand with regard to the death of Karima Saunders. We will address these claims seriatim.

First, Appellant claims that he was sentenced to death pursuant to an unconstitutional ex post facto application of the death penalty statute. The basis of this claim is the Legislature's amendment of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h), which was effective December 21, 1988. Prior to the amendment of Section 9711(h), if this Court determined that a sentence of death must be vacated, we were required to remand for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment. However, the amendment of Section 9711(h) now allows this Court to remand for a new sentencing hearing rather than for the imposition of a life sentence, unless the sentence is vacated because it is disproportionate or none of the aggravating circumstances are supported by sufficient evidence. Since the amendment to Section 9711(h) became effective during the pendency of Appellant's previous appeal to this Court, and specifically provided for application to all cases and appeals pending at that time, this Court remanded for a new sentencing hearing instead of a life sentence, once it was determined that one of the two aggravating circumstances found by the jury was not supported by sufficient evidence.

Appellant claims that this Court's remand for a new sentencing hearing amounts to an ex post facto application of the law in violation of Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In support of this proposition Appellant contends that this Court's application of amended Section 9711(h) applies to events occurring before its enactment, and also provides for a more onerous sanction than previously existed, since a remand for a new sentencing hearing instead of a sentence of life, could, and in fact did, result in a sentence of death. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). This same argument was recently rejected by a majority of this Court in Commonwealth v. Young, 536 Pa. 57, 637 A.2d 1313 (1993), wherein it was determined that the Legislature's amendment of Section 9711(h)(4) worked only a procedural change in the law and did not effect an increase in the potential sentence. Accordingly, this claim cannot serve as a basis for vacating the judgement of sentence of death.

Second, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in admitting allegedly inflammatory and gruesome photographs, which were prejudicial and irrelevant. Our standard of review with regard to such a claim is well settled:

The question of admissibility of photographs of a corpse in homicide cases is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, and only an abuse of that discretion will constitute reversible error. A photograph of a bloody corpse in a homicide trial is not inflammatory per se. Whether the photographs are admissible depend [sic] on a two step analysis. First, the court must decide whether a photographs is inflammatory in nature. "If, but only if, the photograph is deemed to be inflammatory, the Court must then apply the balancing test ... i.e., is the photograph of 'such essential evidentiary value that its need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors.' "

Commonwealth v. Buehl, 510 Pa. 363, 392, 508 A.2d 1167, 1181, (1986) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 187, 102 L.Ed.2d 156 (1988).

The record reveals that the trial court permitted the introduction of two black and white photographs of the victims as they were discovered by the police, which were circulated briefly among the jury and not provided to the jury during deliberations. The first photograph exhibits the nude body of Sharon Saunders, partially covered by a mattress, lying face down. No blood or wounds are visible. The second photograph exhibits the bodies of all three of the victims, lying face down, side by side. Sharon Saunders is nude, Myndie McKoy is clothed from the waist up, and Karima Saunders is fully clothed. Myndie McKoy's hands are bound behind her back. Once again, no blood is visible. Although there are black markings on the wall, it is not clear whether they are blood stains. There are no obvious signs of decomposition. Upon viewing these photographs, we conclude that they were clearly not inflammatory, and could not have prejudiced Appellant. 5 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these photographs.

Appellant further contends that because the proceedings on remand were convened for the sole purpose of sentencing Appellant for the death of Karima Saunders, the jury should have received only evidence directly supporting the aggravating circumstance presented, i.e., that all three victims had...

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  • Commonwealth v. Baez
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • 23 Noviembre 1998
    ...outweighs the likelihood that the photograph will improperly inflame the minds and passions of the jury. See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 537 Pa. 336, 341, 643 A.2d 1070, 1075 (1994). Appellant first contends that four evidentiary photographs of the victim which emphasized the way in which the......
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    ...details are unnecessary and can only serve to prejudice the jury. This contention is contrary to our law. In Commonwealth v. Marshall, 537 Pa. 336, 643 A.2d 1070, 1074 (1994), we [a] capital sentencing hearing is not a sanitized proceeding limited only to evidence of aggravating circumstanc......
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