Com. v. Matthews

Citation406 Mass. 380,548 N.E.2d 843
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Rod MATTHEWS.
Decision Date09 January 1990
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Stephanie Martin Glennon, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.

Robert H. Weber & Eileen D. Agnes, for Child Welfare League of America, Inc., & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

Convicted as an adult of murder in the second degree at the age of fifteen, the defendant, Rod Matthews, appeals. The defendant alleges error in (1) the decision to transfer his case to the Superior Court for trial as an adult; (2) the jury empanelment; (3) the jury instructions; and (4) the judge's refusal to vacate the sentence and resentence the defendant as a juvenile pursuant to G.L. c. 119, § 83. We conclude there is no error and affirm his conviction.

We summarize the facts. In the fall of 1986, the defendant, Rod Matthews, and the victim, fourteen year old Shaun Ouillette, were classmates at Canton High School. In late October, 1986, the defendant told two classmates, Robert Peterson and Jonathan Cash, that "[h]e wanted to know what it was like to kill someone." He wrote a note to a teacher stating that he liked to light fires and that he felt like killing people he hated.

Sometime in early November, after initially considering two boys to kill, the defendant told his two friends that he had finally decided to kill Shaun Ouillette. The defendant reasoned that Ouillette "would be easy to get to and he probably would be the least missed ... [because he] didn't have many friends." The defendant planned to kill Ouillette on November 19, 1986. A snow storm, however, cancelled school that day. The defendant postponed his plan to kill Ouillette until the next day.

On November 20, 1986, the defendant invited Shaun Ouillette to come over to his house following school. After playing pool together, the defendant suggested that they go to the woods and build a fort. The defendant brought along a baseball bat, telling Ouillette he needed to return it to a friend. The victim walked into the woods with the defendant behind him. In an effort to disguise his own steps, the defendant walked by stepping in the footprints Ouillette left in the snow.

In the woods the defendant swung the bat, striking Ouillette on the head with enough force to severely crush the skull. Ouillette fell to his hands and knees, crying out for help. The defendant struck Ouillette several more times on the head, thereby killing him. The defendant then used snow to wipe blood off the bat.

A short time later, still carrying the bat, the defendant walked to Peterson's house and said that he had killed Ouillette. He then took Peterson to see the body. When Peterson asked why he had killed Ouillette, the defendant responded, "Just for the heck of it."

Peterson telephoned Cash and told him the defendant had killed Ouillette. Cash refused to believe him. For several days, the defendant would ask Cash, "Do you believe me?" Cash would say that he did not, and the defendant would ask, "Then where is Shaun?" Days later the defendant and Peterson took Cash to view the body. The defendant warned both not to tell anyone or they might be his next victims.

The police investigation into Ouillette's disappearance increasingly pointed to the defendant. During three separate police interviews, the defendant denied having any knowledge of Ouillette's whereabouts on or after November 20, 1986. In a fourth interview, he admitted that Ouillette had come to his house, but indicated that Ouillette had run away from home. In these interviews, the defendant appeared calm and unconcerned, usually grinning or smiling.

In early December, Cash secretly went back to the site of Ouillette's body. He noted the surroundings, returned home, and sent an anonymous letter to the police, describing the body's location and stating that the defendant had killed Ouillette. Acting on this tip, investigators found Ouillette's body on December 11.

On December 13, 1986, the defendant, then fourteen years old, was arrested and arraigned in Stoughton District Court, in juvenile session, on a charge of delinquency by reason of the murder of Shaun Ouillette. Between April 24, 1987, and May 27, 1987, probable cause and juvenile transfer hearings were conducted in the District Court, pursuant to G.L. c. 119, § 61 (1988 ed.). The judge found probable cause, dismissed the juvenile complaint, and ordered that the defendant be transferred to the Superior Court Department for arraignment as an adult.

On July 5, 1987, a Norfolk county grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with murder in the first degree. After a hearing, the trial judge denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment or, alternatively, to remand the case to the juvenile court. On March 10, 1988, a jury found Matthews guilty of murder in the second degree and, pursuant to G.L. c. 265, § 2 (1988 ed.), the judge sentenced him to imprisonment for life. The defendant appealed. We transferred the defendant's appeal to this court on our own motion.

1. Decision to transfer. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss claiming that he was improperly transferred for trial as an adult under G.L. c. 119, § 61, because (1) neither the subsidiary findings nor the weight of the evidence in the record support the District Court judge's ultimate conclusion that he is not amenable to rehabilitation as a juvenile; and (2) the judge refused to consider the defense of lack of criminal responsibility at the probable cause hearing. The motion was denied. The defendant asserts that the denial of the motion was error.

a. Amenability to rehabilitation. "[A] judge has considerable discretion, within this statutory framework, to determine whether a child should be treated as an adult." A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 272, 282, 347 N.E.2d 677 (1976). In reviewing a motion to dismiss an indictment, a Superior Court judge does not "review de novo the soundness of decisions made by Juvenile Court judges" during juvenile proceedings. A Juvenile v. Commonwealth (No. 1), 380 Mass. 552, 556, 405 N.E.2d 143 (1980). Rather, the Superior Court judge considers "whether there has been a material failing in the prescribed steps leading to the issuance of the order of transfer." Id. at 557, 405 N.E.2d 143. "Serious deficiency in the subsidiary findings should count as a faulty step in the process of transfer, examinable" by a Superior Court judge on a motion to dismiss the indictment or by this court after trial and conviction on the criminal complaint. Id. at 558, 405 N.E.2d 143. The Superior Court judge determined that the District Court judge followed the procedure required by G.L. c. 119, § 61, and our cases, and made all statutorily required findings. See Commonwealth v. Hawkesworth, 405 Mass. 664, 669, 543 N.E.2d 691 (1989).

The District Court judge determined that the defendant was a fourteen year old juvenile who was charged with murder, "an offense involving the infliction ... of serious bodily harm." G.L. c. 119, § 61. The judge held the statutorily required transfer hearing, where he initially determined that probable cause existed to believe that the defendant had committed first degree murder as charged. He then considered the five statutorily delineated "factors." 1 G.L. c. 119, § 61. "[A] judge, having considered all relevant factors in light of the legislative intent and having made supportive findings, may legitimately conclude that transfer is warranted." A Juvenile, supra 370 Mass. at 283, 347 N.E.2d 677. The judge made detailed written findings concerning each enumerated factor. See Two Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 736, 741-742, 412 N.E.2d 344 (1980). A Juvenile v. Commonwealth (No. 1), 380 Mass. 552, 563, 405 N.E.2d 143 (1980).

The District Court judge concluded that (1) the defendant presented a significant danger to the public, as demonstrated by the nature of the offense charged; 2 and (2) the defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation as a juvenile. G.L. c. 119, § 61. The defendant does not dispute the seriousness of the alleged offense. Rather, he argues that "[t]he transfer findings were unsupported by the weight of the evidence before the court." He asserts that the overwhelming evidence before the District Court judge demonstrated his amenability to rehabilitation and, therefore, he should have been treated as a juvenile. G.L. c. 119, § 61.

Based on the testimony he credited, the District Court judge determined that "there is little or no likelihood of rehabilitation of [the defendant] within the juvenile system due to the length of time treatment would be required and for [the] reason that there are no guarantees or assurances that rehabilitation or a measure thereof could be accomplished." 3 The defendant acknowledges that testimony varied concerning the amount of time it would take to accomplish rehabilitation, but argues that "there was no evidence indicating [that his rehabilitation] could not be accomplished while [he] was still a juvenile and in the custody of appropriate state agencies." 4

The record supports the judge's conclusion. Although expert testimony produced conflicting opinions as to the defendant's amenability to rehabilitation as a juvenile, even the most optimistic prognoses would place the defendant's rehabilitation well into adulthood. That the judge's finding is in "direct conflict" with the defendant's view of the evidence is not error. "The judge was entitled to resolve the conflicting testimony.... We do not 'revise a judge's subsidiary findings of fact, where they are warranted by the evidence, or ... review the weight of the evidence related to the findings. In particular, it is inappropriate to ask us to reverse a judge's findings involving credibility, since he saw the witnesses and we did not.' " Commonwealth v. Day, ...

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