Com. v. Mayfield

• Decision Date: 29 March 1976
• Citation: 362 A.2d 994,239 Pa.Super. 279
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert King MAYFIELD, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 994

362 A.2d 994

239 Pa.Super. 279

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert King MAYFIELD, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

March 29, 1976.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted May 5, 1976.

Joseph A. Malloy, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellant.

Milton O. Moss, Dist. Atty., William T. Nicholas, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Stewart J. Greenleaf, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Norristown, for appellee.

Jean B. Green and Donald J. Martin, Norristown, amici curiae.

Before WATKINS, President Judge, and JACOBS, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.

PRICE, Judge.

Appellant argues that the lower court erred by granting the Commonwealth an extension of time for commencement of trial pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c). ¹ The Commonwealth based its petition for a time extension upon a claim that trial could not be commenced within 180 days from the date the criminal complaint was filed against the appellant, as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a) (2), ² because of an overcrowded court docket. The Commonwealth further contends that it exercised the requisite due diligence in bringing the appellant to trial and that the Commonwealth should not be held responsible for any period of delay occasioned solely by the judiciary. In Commonwealth v. Shelton, --- Pa.Super. ---, ---, 361 A.2d 873, --- (filed March 29, 1976), we refuted this contention, holding Inter alia, that 'Rule 1100 . . . precludes an Extension of the prescribed time period predicated upon judicial delay.' Therefore, because the appellant's trial did not commence within the time period prescribed by Rule 1100(a)(2), we reverse the judgment of sentence and discharge the appellant.

Also, the record shows that the judges of the court below normally grant the Commonwealth an extension of time for commencement of trial unless the accused can show some prejudice. Although the lower court granted the Commonwealth's petition in this case solely upon a belief that the Commonwealth had exercised due diligence, we feel constrained to remark that prejudice to an accused is not a factor to be considered by the court in deciding whether an extension should be permitted under Rule 1100(c). Rule 1100(c) allows the lower court to grant the Commonwealth an extension of time only upon a finding that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in bringing the case to trial. The rule does not relax the requirement by allowing the court to extend the time if an accused would not suffer any prejudice as a result of such extension. Prejudice is simply not a factor in the application of the rule.

We reverse the judgment of sentence and discharge the appellant.

JACOBS, J., files a dissenting opinion in which WATKINS, President Judge and VAN der VOORT, J., join.

JACOBS, Judge (dissenting).

This appeal, taken after appellant's conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, ¹ challenges the propriety of the lower court's order granting the Commonwealth's petition to extend the time for trial past the 180-day time limit prescribed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100. I would hold that the court below acted within the boundaries of its discretion in making its order granting the extension and would affirm the judgment of sentence.

A written criminal complaint was filed against appellant on the above charge on November 29, 1974. A preliminary hearing was waived and on February 20, 1975 appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury. That same day the Commonwealth certified to the Court Administrator that the case was ready for trial. On May 8, 1975 appellant was advised that the case would be called for trial on June 6, 1975. Realizing that May 27, 1975 was the last day for trial within the time limits of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100, the Commonwealth on May 16, 1975 filed a petition for an extension of time for the commencement of trial. On May 27, 1975 appellant filed an application to dismiss the charges with prejudice because of the violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100. A few days thereafter, a hearing was held by the court below on both petitions. Appellant's application to dismiss was denied but the Commonwealth's petition for an extension was granted on May 30, 1975. A trial was held on June 10, 1975 in which appellant was convicted.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(2) which is applicable to the facts of this case requires a trial to commence within 180 days from the date of the filing of the complaint. Rule 1100 further provides:

'(c) At any time prior to the expiration of the period for commencement of trial, the attorney for the Commonwealth may apply to the court for an order extending the time for commencement of trial.

A copy of such application shall be served upon the defendant through his attorney, if any, and the defendant shall also have the right to be heard thereon. Such application shall be granted only if trial cannot be commenced within the prescribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth. Any order granting such application shall specify the date or period within which trial shall be commenced.'

In interpreting section (c) of Rule 1100 the Pennsylvania Courts have been strict in requiring the application for extension to be presented to the court Prior to the expiration of the time period for trial. In both Commonwealth v. Woods, 461 Pa. 255, 336 A.2d 273 (1975) and Commonwealth v. Cutillo, 235 Pa.Super. 131, 339 A.2d 123 (1975) the Commonwealth applied for an extension after the time period for trial had expired. In each case the Court held that under the plain wording of the rule no extension could be granted. Curiously enough, I have been unable to discover any appellate decision discussing the propriety of granting an extension when the Commonwealth has been timely in its application for extension. Nevertheless, I will now proceed to interpret Rule 1100(c) in the framework of the arguments set forth in the parties' briefs.

Rule 1100(c) declares that the application for extension 'shall be granted only if trial cannot be commenced within the prescribed period Despite due diligence by the Commonwealth.' (Emphasis added). The Commonwealth argues that it exercised 'due diligence' by certifying the case with the Court Administrator as ready for trial on February 20, 1975; by discovering in early May, 1975 that the Court Administrator had improperly listed the case for trial on a day beyond the 180-day period; and by applying to the court for an extension 11 days before the period for trial had elapsed. Appellant, on the other hand, argues that the Commonwealth had the duty 'to monitor the Court Administrator's listing and insure that cases, not delayed by the Defendant, are called to trial within one hundred eighty days.' Appellant's brief at 10. The Commonwealth cannot be found diligent, contends appellant, when the Court Administrator's office has not been diligent.

Although I agree with appellant that the general policy of Rule 1100 is to require trial to commence within a certain period of time and the reason for the delay is irrelevant, unless the delay is caused by defendant or his counsel, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d), that rule is not inflexible and extensions in time may be granted by showing that trial cannot commence within that period 'despite due diligence By the Commonwealth.' Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c) (emphasis added). The same general policy was found to prevail in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Act of September 8, 1959, P.L. 829, § 1, 19 P.S. § 1431 (1964), which requires that trial shall commence within 180 days after a request for trial has been made by a prisoner. In Commonwealth v. Wilson, 231 Pa.Super. 451, 454, 331 A.2d 792, 794 (1974), we held that 'the indictment was properly dismissed where the Commonwealth complied with the time limits of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers; but where the trial court, through administrative inadvertence, failed to effect an orderly or efficient progression of the case.' Wilson, however, is not dispositive of the present case because, there, the Commonwealth failed to file a petition for an extension although the Interstate Agreement on Detainers allows the court to 'grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.' Wilson is instructive in that it indicates that it is possible for the 'Commonwealth' to have been diligent even though the court system was not.

In another recent decision, Commonwealth v. Cutillo, supra, our Court dismissed the indictment under Rule 1100 where the failure to bring the defendant to trial within the required period was due to an error in the Court Administrator's computer system. The Commonwealth in that case sought an extension, but its application was untimely and was properly rejected by the lower court. In Cutillo, however, this Court expressed in dicta its opinion as to what the district attorney should have done: 'the simplest filing system would have alerted him (the district attorney) to call this case to the attention of the court when the end of the permissible trial period approached and no appropriate trial date had been scheduled.' Id., 235 Pa.Super. at 136, 339 A.2d at 125. (Footnote omitted). In the present case, the district attorney's office did precisely what was suggested in Cutillo. Its filing system alerted the office that the trial was scheduled for an improper date and eleven days before the time period expired it brought this matter to the court's attention.

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