Com. v. McGill

Decision Date19 July 1996
Citation680 A.2d 1131,545 Pa. 180
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Bernard McGILL, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Jeremy H. G. Ibrahim, Philadelphia, for Bernard McGill.

Catherine Marshall, Norman Gross, Philadelphia, Robert Graci, Attorney General's Office, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth.

Before NIX, C.J. and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Chief Justice.

On July 28, 1992, following a trial by jury, Appellant, Bernard McGill, was found guilty of murder of the first degree, 1 aggravated assault, 2 recklessly endangering another person, 3 and possession of an instrument of crime. 4 A penalty phase hearing was held the following day, during which Appellant jumped out of a courtroom window and fell two stories, seriously injuring himself. The Honorable Eugene H. Clarke, Jr., declared a mistrial due to the fact that this event occurred in full view of the jury.

On January 23, 1993, a new jury was empaneled, and a penalty phase hearing was conducted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the jury found one aggravating circumstance 5 and no mitigating circumstances, and therefore set the sentence at death pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). On March 23, 1993, trial counsel was permitted to withdraw, and new counsel was appointed. An evidentiary hearing was held in response to the filing of Appellant's post-verdict motions which alleged, inter alia, trial counsel's ineffectiveness. The trial court denied the post-verdict motions and imposed sentence. This direct appeal followed.

Appellant first contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for first degree murder. We note that, pursuant to the standard established in Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 26-27 n. 3, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), we independently undertake a review of the evidence supporting a first degree murder conviction irrespective of whether such a challenge is specifically made. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, and draw all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, to determine whether there is support for the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 Pa. 537, 539-40, 510 A.2d 1217, 1218 (1986).

The evidence presented at trial established that on February 10, 1990, the victims, Susan Phillips and Karen Forte, were at Ms. Phillips' home for bible study. Appellant, who had been a boarder at Ms. Phillips' home until the previous week, 6 arrived at the residence and knocked on the door. Ms. Phillips opened the door, at which time Appellant indicated that he had returned to get his clothes. Ms. Phillips acknowledged the request, closed the door, and proceeded upstairs to retrieve Appellant's belongings.

As the two women were in the process of bringing Appellant's clothes downstairs, they noticed that Appellant had entered the residence without being invited. As Ms. Forte attempted to give him a bag of clothes, Appellant immediately punched her in the face, causing her to fall to the ground. A violent struggle then ensued between Ms. Forte and Appellant during which Appellant brandished a knife. He stabbed, punched and kicked Ms. Forte. Appellant then grabbed Ms. Forte by the hair and dragged her into the kitchen. Ms. Phillips screamed and begged Appellant to stop what he was doing and leave the premises. Appellant replied, "[S]hut up [before] I put this knife in your back...." (N.T. 7/21/92, 65).

Appellant then proceeded to bind Ms. Forte's wrists with some type of cord. As Appellant pulled down Ms. Forte's pantyhose, she pleaded with him not to rape her. Appellant responded by punching and kicking her in the head until she lost consciousness for some undetermined period.

At some point during Ms. Forte's unconsciousness, Appellant severely beat Ms. Phillips, who was seventy-two years old at the time. In addition to punching her with his fists, Appellant beat Ms. Phillips in the head with a metal file. He struck her with such force that the handle of the file broke off.

When Ms. Forte regained consciousness, Appellant came back in to the room and accused her of "faking." (N.T. 7/21/92, 67). He repeatedly choked, punched, and kicked Ms. Forte, complaining that she would not die. Appellant finally struck Ms. Forte over the head with a ketchup bottle, breaking the bottle. At that point, Ms. Forte feigned unconsciousness in the hope that Appellant would believe that she was dead. Appellant left the scene shortly thereafter.

Ms. Forte lay still for several minutes in order to insure that Appellant was gone. She then went to a neighbor's house to call the police. Both victims were taken to the hospital; however, Ms. Phillips died as a result of the injuries inflicted by Appellant. Ms. Forte spent three days in intensive care and three days in general admission recovering from her injuries. While there, she viewed a photographic array in which she identified Appellant as the person that attacked her.

Appellant was ultimately arrested and charged with various crimes resulting from the foregoing episode. While in police custody, he confessed to the crime, stating that he went to Ms. Phillips' house with the intention of stealing money in order to purchase drugs. (N.T. 7/23/92, 41, 43). He further admitted that he punched and struck Ms. Phillips in the head with a metal file. (N.T. 7/23/92, 42, 44-45). Appellant also confessed that, after beating the two women, he stole approximately two hundred dollars from Ms. Phillips' purse and "[s]pent it all on cocaine." (N.T. 7/23/92, 42-43).

Based on the eyewitness testimony of Karen Forte, as well as the confession of Appellant himself, we are satisfied that there is more than ample evidence to support the jury's finding of guilt for first degree murder in this case. "If a deadly force is knowingly applied by the defendant to another, the specific intent to kill is as evident as if the defendant stated the intent to kill at the time the force was applied." Commonwealth v. Williams, 537 Pa. 1, 13, 640 A.2d 1251, 1257 (1994) (citation omitted). Thus, Appellant's claim that he lacked the specific intent to sustain a conviction for first degree murder must be rejected.

Appellant next claims that no attempts were made during the course of his trial to monitor his competency. He therefore asserts, without citation to legal authority, that his incompetency must be presumed. This argument does not rise to the level of a cognizable claim of error which can be properly evaluated by this Court. Appellant has not suggested that he was, in fact, incompetent during his trial. Instead, he submits that he was deprived of a fair trial merely because his competency was not monitored. In addition to the fact that this is not a basis for relief, a review of the record does not support Appellant's contention that his competency was not monitored.

A person is incompetent to stand trial where he is 'substantially unable to understand the nature or object of the proceedings against him or to participate and assist in his defense.' The person asserting incompetency has the burden of proving it by clear and convincing evidence. Moreover the determination of competency rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Sam, 535 Pa. 350, 357, 635 A.2d 603, 606 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115, 114 S.Ct. 2123, 128 L.Ed.2d 678 (1994) (citations omitted); see also 50 P.S. § 7402. We note that two months prior to trial, a report was prepared by doctors of Norristown State Hospital, where Appellant had received treatment, indicating that Appellant was competent to stand trial. Due to the age of the report at the time of trial, the trial court, in the presence of counsel, called the hospital on July 14, 1992, and spoke with the acting director, Leona Baldwin. (N.T. 7/16/92, 4). Ms. Baldwin confirmed that Appellant was still competent at that time. (N.T. 7/16/92, 4).

The trial court thoroughly and comprehensively responded to the issue of Appellant's competency during trial by citing to a number of specific instances in which the court engaged in colloquies with Appellant. Commonwealth v. McGill, No. 3920-22, 3924 March Term 1990, slip op. at 15-21 (C.P. Philadelphia County Feb. 10, 1995). Based on these exchanges and first-hand observation of Appellant throughout the trial, the court concluded that Appellant "was competent to stand trial, understood the nature of the proceedings, and conferred with counsel throughout the proceedings." Id. at 21.

With respect to the allegation that Appellant's competency was not monitored during the trial, the trial court took strong exception:

Nothing could be farther from the truth. As the record reveals[,] communication was maintained with the doctors at Norristown State Hospital and regular monitoring of defendant's medication was undertaken. This specious argument has no foundation whatsoever. Moreover, [Appellant] was examined by a defense psychologist who found that [Appellant] could not avail himself of a diminished capacity defense.

Id. at 22. Our review of the record satisfies us that the trial court took deliberate steps to insure that Appellant was competent throughout the course of the proceedings, and that the court acted within its discretion in determining that Appellant was competent to stand trial. See Commonwealth v. Logan, 519 Pa. 607, 624, 549 A.2d 531, 540 (1988) ("The determination of competency ... rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge and can be disturbed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion."). Accordingly, this allegation of error must be rejected. 7

Appellant's next assignment of error concerns trial counsel's failure to investigate certain character witnesses...

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13 cases
  • Com. v. O'DONNELL
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • October 28, 1999
    ...should have been presented to establish that she was incompetent during either phase of her trial. See Commonwealth v. McGill, 545 Pa. 180, 184-86, 680 A.2d 1131, 1134 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1152, 117 S.Ct. 1087, 137 L.Ed.2d 221 (1997) (claim that trial court did not monitor defenda......
  • Com. v. Wright
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • December 22, 2008
    ...requires a different analysis. See Commonwealth v. Michael, 562 Pa. 356, 755 A.2d 1274, 1281 (2000) (citing Commonwealth v. McGill, 545 Pa. 180, 680 A.2d 1131, 1136 (1996) (there can be no cumulative effect of prejudice when there was no harm in first instance)). Accordingly, appellant's cl......
  • Commonwealth v. Jones
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • December 3, 2002
    ...(1998) ("there [can] be no prejudicial cumulative effect when there [is] no harm in the first place") (citing Commonwealth v. McGill, 545 Pa. 180, 680 A.2d 1131, 1136 (1996)). In Argument XIX, appellant's final claim, appellant argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing based upon......
  • Com. v. Rompilla
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • December 10, 1998
    ...case undermine confidence in the outcome at both stages of the trial. The Court rejected a similar argument in Commonwealth v. McGill, 545 Pa. 180, 680 A.2d 1131 (Pa.1996). In that case, the defendant's individual claims of error failed for lack of merit. As such, there could be no prejudic......
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