Com. v. McQuaid

• Decision Date: 30 October 1975
• Citation: 464 Pa. 499,347 A.2d 465
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. John McQUAID, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 465

347 A.2d 465

464 Pa. 499

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. John McQUAID, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued June 27, 1975.

Decided Oct. 30, 1975.

Albert Ominsky, Philadelphia, for appellant.

F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

This appeal arises from appellant John McQuaid's commitment in Farvie State Hospital since 1960 because of his incompetency to stand trial. The hearing court held that appellant's confinement could be continued without a civil commitment hearing. We vacate the hearing court's order and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant was involved in a stabbing incident on March 7, 1960, and was subsequently charged with murder. However, on March 11, 1960, after a hearing in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, he was found incompetent to stand trial and was ordered committed. Appellant's first rehearing occurred on February 22, 1974, pursuant to his own motion to commence trial. Appellant was recommitted by the hearing court despite a contrary recommendation by the Psychiatric Division of the Probation Department.

On April 29 and May 3, 1974, the court held an additional hearing to determine what action if any should be taken pursuant to Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), which held that a defendant could not be committed indefinitely solely because he was incompetent to stand trial. At this hearing three medical experts testified that appellant, because of his paranoid schizophrenia, was potentially dangerous to himself and others and would probably never become competent to stand trial. Thus, appellant's incompetency caused what amounted to an indefinite commitment. However, the court, after considering differences in Pennsylvania and Indiana law, concluded that the rule in Jackson did not affect appellant's case. It ordered appellant committed until he either becomes competent to stand trial or ceases to be dangerous to himself or others.

Appellant raises three claims: (1) that his commitment cannot continue under section 408 of the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act (hereinafter 'section 408') ¹ (which provides for the commitment of those charged with crime but found incompetent to stand trial); (2) that the fifteen year delay in appellant's trial violates his constitutional right to a speedy trial; and (3) that his commitment is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The hearing court denied relief on all three claims. We find appellant's first claim to be meritorious.

I

Appellant's first claim, that he may not be committed indefinitely under section 408, is based on the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana, supra. In that case, a mentally defective deaf mute charged with robbery was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to a state mental institution, where he remained for three and a half years. The defendant could not read, write, or otherwise communicate, and the reviewing psychiatrists gave him little chance of gaining competency. Thus, his commitment under the incompetency law of Indiana was tantamount to an indefinite sentence.

Jackson challenged his commitment as a denial of both due process and equal protection. The Indiana statutory scheme permitted the indefinite pretrial commitment of persons charged with a criminal offense under standards for commitment and release that provided fewer safeguards than those applying to any other civil commitment. The United States Supreme Court held that such a scheme for allocating procedural and substantive safeguards to persons civilly committed was repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ² Furthermore, the Court agreed that the commitment violated due process:

'. . . a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding . . . or release the defendant.'

Jackson v. Indiana, supra 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. at 1858.

Our determination in this case depends on the proper interpretation of the commitment, release, and treatment standards contained in the civil commitment provision (section 406) and the incompetency to stand trial provision (section 408) of the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act ³ and the applicability of Jackson to those standards. The hearing court held that these standards were sufficiently similar to avoid any violation of the rule in Jackson. We cannot agree. The two statutory sections serve different purposes, have different commitment and release standards, and must therefore be treated differently by the courts.

Commitment Standards

Section 408, under which appellant is committed, provides for the commitment of 'a person who has been charged with crime (and) is detained in a penal or correctional institution . . ..' ⁴ The court must be 'SATISFIED THAT THE PERSON IS MENTALLY Disabled and that his commitment is necessary' prior to committing the defendant to a mental facility. ⁵

Section 102 ⁶ which defines 'mental disability' in general terms, is applicable to both section 408 and section 406:

"Mental disability' means any mental illness, mental impairment, mental retardation, or mental deficiency, which so lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary or advisable for him to be under care as provided in this act. . . .'

However, in making this determination under section 408, the court must give 'due regard' to:

'the capacity of such person to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own condition in reference to such proceeding, to understand the nature of the punishment which might be inflicted upon him, to confer with his counsel with reference to such proceedings, to make a rational defense, and the probable effect of the trial on such person's physical and mental condition.' ⁷

Trial of a defendant who lacks the capacity substantially similar to that described in this provision would violate due process standards. Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, ---, 329 A.2d 258, 264 (1974); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 451 Pa. 483, 305 A.2d 890 (1973); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 205, n. 1, 255 A.2d 519, 522, n. 1 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Hilberry v. Maroney, 424 Pa. 493, 227 A.2d 159 (1967).

Thus, section 408 has a distinct purpose. It makes no reference to the accused's 'need of care or treatment' and applies only to a criminal defendant. The court's primary concern is the defendant's competency to stand trial. The court must give close attention to particular factors relating to the defendant's ability to stand trial in its determination whether he lacks the 'customery self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs.' A defendant might easily lack 'self-control, judgment and discretion' in the context of a criminal trial and yet be capable of caring for himself in his daily 'affairs and social relations.'

Commitment standards under section 406, on the other hand, differ significantly. The section applies to: '(any) person . . . believed to be mentally disabled, and in need of care or treatment by reason of such mental disability' without regard to an existing detention or criminal charge. ⁸ The court, in certain circumstances may order a compulsory examination, and, if the examining physicians or the director of the facility in which the person is examined determine 'that such person is in need of care at a facility . . . (, they) shall immediately report to (the) court which may order the commitment of such person for care and treatment.' ⁹ No criminal charge is needed, and the court must make a general finding concerning a person's lack of 'customery self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations.' Unlike section 408, the question of the person's ability to stand trial on a criminal charge is irrelevant.

Thus, although the two provisions may not be mutually exclusive, a person could be committable under section 408 but not under section 406. ¹⁰

This conclusion is substantiated by other considerations. Because section 406 can be applied to any person without regard to criminality, at least two safeguards inapplicable to section 408 may be constitutionally required prior to any civil commitment. The hearing court, recognizing this, held that mental deficiency must include a finding of dangerousness to onself or others under either section 406 or section 408. ¹¹ Dangerousness may well be a requirement for civil commitment; ¹² however, it need not and should not be applied to section 408. A defendant's incompetency may be curable but not dangerous. The interests of both the Commonwealth and the defendant would be best served by having the defendant committed and treated in hope that he will become competent and the trial might then proceed. Requiring a finding of dangerousness would cause the trial to be stayed indefinitely because a nondangerous but incompetent defendant could not be committed and therefore would not receive potentially beneficial treatment. The Legislature intended no such result, as shown by its listing of the numerous competency elements, and the Jackson holding does not require otherwise. ¹³

Moreover, involuntary commitment under section 408 requires a finding based only on the preponderance of...