Com. v. Morgan
| Decision Date | 02 February 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 26,26 |
| Citation | 517 Pa. 93,534 A.2d 1054 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Joseph Stanley MORGAN, Appellee. E.D. 1987. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
John A. Reilly, Dist. Atty., Media, Dennis C. McAndrews, Wayne, for appellant.
Michael P. Dignazio, Media, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.
In this matter we are called upon to interpret the "knock and announce" rule as provided by Rule 2007 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 2007 provides, in relevant part:
(a) A law enforcement officer executing a search warrant shall, before entry, give, or make reasonable effort to give, notice of his identity, authority and purpose to any occupant of the premises specified in the warrant, unless exigent circumstances require his immediate forcible entry.
On October 12, 1984, at or about noon, law enforcement authorities in Delaware County initiated the execution of a search warrant at 249 West Chelton Road, Parkside Borough, Delaware County, the address of appellee, Joseph Stanley Morgan. Two detectives in plain clothes approached the front door with the warrant and knocked on the screen door. The inner door was open. Appellee asked, "Who is it." One of the detectives, who observed appellee entering the living room from the kitchen at the rear of the house, called out "Joe," which is appellee's name, and appellee said, "Come on in." The detectives entered the premises, joined by five additional officers. Before beginning to search the premises, the detectives identified themselves as police officers, advised appellee that they had a search warrant, and read the search warrant to appellee. A search was conducted and police officers found and seized scales and bagging materials containing suspected methamphetamine residue, over $4,800.00 in U.S. currency, tally sheets of recorded transactions and a small amount of suspected methamphetamine. Appellee was arrested and charged with violations of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-101--s 780-144.
Appellee filed omnibus pre-trial motions challenging the legality of the search and seeking to suppress the items seized during the execution of the search warrant. Appellee's pre-trial motions were denied by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County following a suppression hearing, and appellee was convicted by a jury of knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled substance (159 milligrams of methamphetamine) and possessing a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver. The trial court granted appellee's post-trial motions for a new trial, finding that evidence seized pursuant to a search that violates Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 2007 must be suppressed, 2 and that the police officers who executed the search warrant had violated Rule 2007. The trial court specifically found that appellee did not consent to the entry of the premises by police officers for purposes of executing a search warrant, and, by implication, the trial court found that the officers did not enter the premises by means of a ruse. A divided panel of Superior Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 353 Pa.Super. 463, 510 A.2d 754 (1986). We granted the Commonwealth's petition for allowance of appeal and we now reverse.
Our standard of review of an appeal from a suppression ruling is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. Whitney, 511 Pa. 232, 512 A.2d 1152 (1986). As a matter of law, appellee's statement, "Come on in," cannot be construed as anything other than consent. This Court has held that a warrantless search and seizure conducted with the consent of the defendant is permissible under the law. Commonwealth v. Gockley, 411 Pa. 437, 192 A.2d 693 (1963). Surely, a consent to entry of premises by law enforcement authorities who are armed with a valid search warrant, which would entitle them to forcibly enter the premises and conduct a search with or without the permission of the occupants under certain circumstances, is equally permissible. Hence, the trial court erred when it concluded that the entry was consentless.
"Generally, absent exigent circumstances, police must announce both their authority and purpose before forcible entry." Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326, 334, 446 A.2d 583, 587 (1982); Rule 2007. The purpose of this "knock and announce" rule is to prevent violence and physical injury to the police...
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...entry was consensual, the Commonwealth concludes that announcement of identity of purpose was unnecessary pursuant toCommonwealth v. Morgan, 517 Pa. 93, 534 A.2d 1054 (1987). We In Commonwealth v. Morgan, supra, law enforcement authorities, armed with a search warrant, approached the reside......
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