Com. v. Moultrie
Decision Date | 03 March 2005 |
Citation | 870 A.2d 352 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Eric MOULTRIE, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Joseph F. Sklarosky, Sr., Forty Fort, for appellant.
Frank P. Barletta, Asst. Dist. Atty., Wilkes-Barre, for Com., appellee.
BEFORE: ORIE MELVIN, McCAFFERY, and TAMILIA, JJ.
OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.:
¶ 1 After a conversation with a police officer in which he was told he was free to leave, Appellant, Eric Moultrie, consented to a search of his person. The search revealed that he was carrying packets of what was later determined to be cocaine and heroin. On appeal, we are asked to decide whether the fruits of that search should have been suppressed. We conclude that the encounters between the police and Appellant were proper investigative detentions, and that Appellant's consent to the subsequent search was voluntary. Accordingly, the suppression court properly denied Appellant's motion to suppress, and we affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence.
¶ 2 The facts as found by the Honorable Peter Paul Olszewski, Jr. at the suppression hearing are as follows:
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated December 9, 2003, at 1-5) (numerical references omitted). To this rendition we add that Officer Blaski finished the pat down of Appellant and recovered a bag of suspected narcotics,2 a total of $370 in cash and a cell phone. (Notes of Testimony ("N.T.") Suppression Hearing, 12/3/03, at 44-45, 57-58). On December 3, 2003, Judge Olszewski held a hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the search. After listening to the testimony and observing the witnesses, Judge Olszewski resolved the issue of credibility in favor of the Commonwealth (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5), and denied Appellant's motion to suppress the contraband. At the conclusion of the bench trial on December 8, 2003, Judge Olszewski convicted Appellant of two (2) counts of possession with intent to deliver3 and related crimes,4 and later sentenced him to a total of six and one-half (61/2) to thirteen (13) years' incarceration. Appellant then filed this timely appeal, presenting the following issues for our review:
¶ 3 As a prefatory matter, we are mindful of the following:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Since the prosecution prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Blair, 860 A.2d 567, 571 (Pa.Super.2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831, 842 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1115, 124 S.Ct. 1053, 157 L.Ed.2d 906 (2004)).
¶ 4 We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that it fully supports the suppression court's factual findings. (See N.T. Suppression Hearing at 7-68). Thus, our focus now shifts to the propriety of the legal conclusions drawn from those facts by the suppression court. See Blair, supra.
¶ 5 Appellant first contends that he was subjected to an illegal investigative detention by Officer Blaski and, therefore, his consent to the pat down was not voluntary. As a consequence, Appellant maintains that the fruits of the pat-down should have been suppressed because the search was tainted by the illegal detention. (Appellant's Brief at 12-13). We reject Appellant's argument.
¶ 6 At the outset, we recognize that while the law regarding search and seizure is continually evolving, "its focus remains on the delicate balance of protecting the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and protecting the safety of our citizens and police officers by allowing police to make limited intrusions on citizens while investigating crime." Blair, supra (citations omitted). Mindful of this balance, we recently addressed the elements of a voluntary consensual search in Commonwealth v. LaMonte, 859 A.2d 495 (Pa.Super.2004). There, we reiterated the applicable analysis in these cases:
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