Com. v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 18 April 1995
• Citation: 657 A.2d 927,540 Pa. 318
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Craig MURPHY, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 927

657 A.2d 927

540 Pa. 318

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Craig MURPHY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Jan. 25, 1995.

Decided April 18, 1995.

Oscar N. Gaskins, Philadelphia, for Craig Murphy.

Catherine Marshall, Ronald Eisenberg, Karen A. Brancheau, Philadelphia, for Com.

Robert A. Graci, Harrisburg, for Atty. Gen. Office.

Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.

OPINION

ZAPPALA, Justice.

Following a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Appellant, Craig Murphy, was found guilty of murder in the first degree and terroristic threats. A sentencing hearing was conducted after which the jury recommended that appellant be sentenced to death after it found that one aggravating circumstance, that appellant had a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9), outweighed two mitigating circumstances: age of appellant at the time of the crime, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(4), and any other evidence of mitigation, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8). The court formally imposed a sentence of death on the first-degree murder conviction and additionally imposed a term of imprisonment of two and one half to five years for the conviction of terroristic threats, to run concurrently with the sentence of death. Direct appeal from the judgment of sentence was taken to this Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h).

In cases where the capital sanction is imposed, we are obligated to independently examine the sufficiency of the evidence. Commonwealth v. DeHart, 512 Pa. 235, 516 A.2d 656 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010, 107 S.Ct. 3241, 97 L.Ed.2d 746 (1987); Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983); reh'g. denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983). The test for determining the sufficiency of evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner and drawing all proper references favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could reasonably have determined all elements of the crime to have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Syre, 507 Pa. 299, 489 A.2d 1340 (1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 935, 107 S.Ct. 1577, 94 L.Ed.2d 768 (1987); Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 361 A.2d 282 (1976). This standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 150, 371 A.2d 468, 478 (1977); Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 354 A.2d 545 (1976).

A review of the record reveals that on January 21, 1981, Raymond Gambrell, the deceased, and his friend, Steven Brown, spent the day travelling from one liquor establishment to another purchasing wine to consume. At about 10:30 p.m., they were walking down Clearfield Street in North Philadelphia where they encountered appellant and two of his cohorts who were in a Buick parked between Rosewood and Carlisle Streets. As Gambrell and Brown walked past the parked automobile, appellant made "smart" remarks to them; however, they continued on their way. Later that evening, while Gambrell and Brown were drinking a newly purchased bottle of wine, they saw the appellant and his cronies circling the block in the Buick stalking them.

At approximately 1:00 a.m. on January 22, 1981, after another trip to a speakeasy, Gambrell and Brown encountered appellant and his cohorts who were in the Buick at 15th and Clearfield Streets. As they walked past the car, appellant said, "There they go." Appellant then got out of the car from his driver's seat and confronted Raymond Gambrell by the steps to an apartment building next to a vacant lot. Brown stood by as appellant accused Gambrell of breaking into appellant's mother's house. Gambrell told appellant that he did not do it. Appellant then pulled out a gun and told Brown to get into the car. When he hesitated, appellant said to Brown, "You think I'm playing, get in the car ... sit between them."

After he was inside the car, seated between Ronald and Bernie Smith in the back seat along with Dennis Cook, Brown saw appellant place his gun to Gambrell's head and escort him to the vacant lot. Moments later, two gunshots rang out from the direction of the lot.

When appellant returned to the automobile with his gun in hand a couple of minutes later, one of appellant's cronies asked him where he shot Gambrell. Appellant replied, "Where do you think?" Another passenger in the Buick then said, "If you shot him where I think you shot him, he's dead, you got a body." Appellant then turned around, pointed his gun at Brown and said, "You better not say anything because, I swear to Allah, I'm going to get you no matter where you're at." He then drove away from the scene and dropped Brown off at Broad and Olney Street at around 1:30 a.m. Before leaving though, appellant told Brown that if the police were to question him about this incident, he should tell them that he was not with Gambrell that evening.

At approximately 1:54 a.m., the police discovered Gambrell lying on his back in the vacant lot. The police officers observed blood flowing from the bridge of his nose, his right ear, and the back of his head. Subsequently, they located Brown who was brought in at 4:30 a.m. Brown, although visibly nervous and frightened, made a statement to police implicating appellant. On February 3, 1981, an arrest warrant for appellant was executed.

Dr. Halbert Fillinger, who had performed the autopsy on the deceased, testified at trial that the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head and the manner of death was homicide. It was his testimony that the projectile, a .38 caliber bullet, travelled back to front and right to left causing severe damage to the brain. A firearms examiner also testified that the .38 caliber bullet obtained from Gambrell's head was likely fired from a .357 Smith and Wesson revolver. Sergeant Schmid of the Philadelphia Police Department testified that a .357 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver was found in appellant's possession when he was arrested.

Gail Brown testified at trial that on the morning of January 22, 1981, her brother, Steven Brown, visited her. Brown, who was usually a strong person, told his sister that he was scared and frightened because threats had been made against the family and he was afraid for his life. Consequently, his family sent him to Portland, Maine to stay with his brother.

As a result, the preliminary hearing in this case was continued because the Commonwealth's star witness, Steven Brown, failed to appear. Two more scheduled dates passed while Brown was in Maine. Following the third listing on March 5, 1981, the trial court discharged appellant. On May 1, 1981, Steven Brown returned to Philadelphia. Two weeks later he was gunned down.

On May 13, 1981, Steven Brown was sitting on the porch of Jerome Watson's house located at 3122 N. 15th Street. Wanda Wilson, then ten years old, observed appellant stealthily approach the bushes in front of Watson's house and open fire, killing Brown. ¹ Renee Jones, who lived with appellant from 1979 to 1981, testified that she also saw appellant shoot up onto the porch of Watson's house. She then observed appellant and Bernie Smith jump into a car and take off down the street. Renee Jones further testified that appellant had told her that he shot Raymond Gambrell because Gambrell had broken into his mother's house. Moreover, in a statement she had given to police on February 24, 1986, Renee Jones stated that appellant shot Steven Brown because he was a witness to the Gambrell killing. ²

Review of the facts of this case leaves no doubt that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have determined that all elements of the crimes were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we will now proceed to address appellant's allegations of error relating to the trial underlying his conviction and sentence.

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence pertaining to the death of Steven Brown in its case in chief.

It is well established in this Commonwealth that evidence of distinct crimes is not admissible against a defendant being prosecuted for another crime solely to show his or her bad character and propensity for committing criminal acts. Commonwealth v. Banks, 513 Pa. 318, 349, 521 A.2d 1 (1987). This general rule nevertheless allows evidence of other crimes to be introduced to prove (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme, plan or design embracing commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to prove the others, or (5) to establish the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial--in other words, where there is such a logical connection between the crimes that proof of one will naturally tend to show that the accused is the person who committed the other. Commonwealth v. Tedford, 523 Pa. 305, 567 A.2d 610 (1989); Commonwealth v. Morris, 493 Pa. 164, 425 A.2d 715 (1981).

Another special circumstance where evidence of other crimes may be relevant and admissible is where such evidence was part of the chain or sequence of events which became part of the history of the case and formed part of the natural development of the facts. Commonwealth v. Lark, 518 Pa. 290, 543 A.2d 491 (1988).

The facts behind the murder of Steven Brown were so interwoven with the facts of the case sub judice that such evidence was properly admitted as res gestae. As detailed above, Brown was in the company of Gambrell the entire day prior to the shooting. Later that evening, Brown witnessed the killing of Gambrell by appellant. Brown was then...