Com. v. Murray

Decision Date20 March 1970
Citation437 Pa. 326,263 A.2d 886
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. William MURRAY, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Fred E. Baxter, Jr., Pittsburgh, William Murray, in pro. per., for appellant.

Robert W. Duggan, Dist. Atty., Robert L. Campbell, Carol Mary Los, Asst. Dist. Attys., Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.

OPINION

EAGEN, Justice.

About 11 a.m. on July 8, 1966, a retail jewelry store located on the second floor of the Plaza Building in downtown Pittsburgh was held up by two armed robbers. During the holdup, the operator of the store was fatally shot. Later the same afternoon, William Murray and Garfield Gordon were taken into police custody and charged with the murder and robbery. Johnnie Lee Smith was also arrested and charged with driving the automobile in which the felons escaped from the scene. In separate jury trials, all three individuals were convicted of murder in the first degree, and the punishment was fixed at life imprisonment. After post trial motions were denied and sentences were imposed in accordance with the jurys' verdicts, appeals were filed in this Court. We previously affirmed the convictions and sentences of Gordon and Smith. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 431 Pa. 512, 246 A.2d 325 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 937, 89 S.Ct. 1215, 22 L.Ed.2d 469 (1969), and Commonwealth v. Smith, 432 Pa. 517, 248 A.2d 24 (1968). The appeal of Murray is presently before us for disposition.

A study of the record readily manifests that the trial evidence was amply sufficient to sustain Murray's conviction, and this is not disputed in this appeal. However, it is urged that certain errors occurred in the course of the prosecution proceedings which require a new trial. We disagree and hence will affirm.

It is first argued that Murray's arrest was illegal in that it was not based on probable cause. 1 We first note that this issue was never raised in the court below. Nevertheless, our examination of the record is persuasive that the contention lacks merit.

In pertinent part, the Commonwealth's evidence established the following:

The robbery was committed by two armed men, one of whom was wearing a red shirt. As these two men fled from the Plaza Building immediately following the crime and hurried across the street, one accidentally dropped a loaded automatic revolver in the cartway. A nearby policeman who witnessed this occurrence tried to stop the men for questioning, but they ran to a waiting automobile and fled. Within an hour, Garfield Gordon, wearing a red shirt, and Murray, the appellant, appeared together at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Gordon, Garfield Gordon's brother and sister-in-law. Garfield Gordon was bleeding from a wound in the midsection of his body and told his brother that he had been shot during a robbery and that Murray 'had what was taken.' When Murray arrived at the Charles Gordon residence, he had in his possession two guns which he threw under a couch in the living room. Shortly thereafter, Murray left the premises and Charles Gordon retrieved the guns and hid them in a garbage pail. Charles Gordon then drove Garfield to their mother's home in an automobile and during this period Garfield warned his brother 'to get rid of the guns.' Charles Gordon then returned to his own residence and took the guns to a river near McKees Rocks where he threw them into the water. When he returned again to his own residence at about 3 p.m., the police were waiting and took him into custody. At this time, Sylvia Gordon, the wife of Charles Gordon, who was at home when Garfield Gordon and Murray arrived there about one hour after the robbery and homicide, as before related, told one of the investigating officers 'certain events that occurred that day,' 2 and 'as a result of this information,' volunteered by Sylvia Gordon, Garfield Gordon and Murray were subsequently taken into police custody, Murray's arrest occurring at 4:20 p.m.

' Probable cause' to arrest exists if 'the facts and circumstances within their (the officers') knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the suspect had committed or is committing a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). See also, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967); Commonwealth v. Brayboy, 431 Pa. 365, 246 A.2d 675 (1968). And as we stated in Commonwealth v. Marino, 435 Pa. 245, 253, 255 A.2d 911, 916 (1969): 'While it is true that suspicion and conjecture do not constitute probable cause (Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964)), it is equally true that probable cause means less than evidence which would justify conviction: United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d...

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2 cases
  • Com. v. Evans
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 27 Junio 1995
    ...an arrest or search and seizure." Commonwealth v. Kelly, 487 Pa. 174, 178, 409 A.2d 21, 23 (1979). See also: Commonwealth v. Murray, 437 Pa. 326, 329, 263 A.2d 886, 888 (1970); Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 423 Pa.Super. 289, 293, 620 A.2d 1226, 1228 (1993); Commonwealth v. Parker, 422 Pa.Super......
  • Com. v. Brinkley
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 1 Marzo 1993
    ...would justify conviction, or even a prima facie showing of criminal activity; but more than a mere suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 437 Pa. 326, 263 A.2d 886 (1970). Specifically, we have Probable cause is a flexible, commonsense standard. As the Supreme Court in Texas v. Brown, supra......

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