Com. v. Nole

Decision Date17 April 1975
Citation461 Pa. 314,336 A.2d 302
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. John Frederick NOLE, Appellant (two cases).
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, 1st Asst. Dist. Atty., David Richman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., James Garrett, Asst. Dist. Atty., Abraham J. Gafni, Deputy Dist. Atty., for Law, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

MANDERINO, Justice.

Appellant, John Frederick Nole, was convicted by a jury on May 21, 1970, of carrying a concealed deadly weapon, aggravated robbery, burglary and murder in the first degree. Post-verdict motions were denied and the appellant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the judgments of sentence. Commonwealth v. Nole, 448 Pa. 62, 292 A.2d 331 (1972). Appellant subsequently filed a petition for relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. An evidentiary hearing was held and the relief requested was denied on November 1, 1973. Appellant now appeals to this Court.

In the late afternoon of February 22, 1969, appellant, then seventeen years of age, and two other youths entered a neighborhood candy store owned and operated by eighty-one year old Joseph Shayka and his wife, Helen Shayka. One of the appellant's companions held a knife to the husband's neck. Appellant pointed a gun at the husband; struck him several times in the stomach with his fists and the gun; and demanded money. The cash register was then rifled and the youths ran out. The husband collapsed and died shortly thereafter of a massive internal hemorrhage resulting from the rupture of his abdominal aorta. At trial, the wife, an eyewitness, described the robbery in detail and identified appellant as her husband's assailant. The prosecution introduced an inculpatory statement, signed by the appellant, which reiterated the wife's description of the crime. Two youths, who were not involved in the robbery, testified that appellant had shown them his gun and had attempted to recruit them as participants shortly before the robbery occurred. The gun which was used during the robbery was produced at trial with the explanation that it had been seized by police pursuant to a lawful search of appellant's home. In his direct appeal, appellant unsuccessfully challenged his certification for trial as an adult, and the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that the blows which appellant had administered to the victim were the cause of death.

Appellant raises several issues in this appeal. He first contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel both at trial and on direct appeal. In support of this claim appellant alleges that (1) counsel failed to object to the trial court's charge in which the court expressed its opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the appellant, (2) counsel failed to assert on direct appeal that the prosecution systematically excluded members of the black race from serving as jurors, thus depriving appellant of a fair and impartial trial, and (3) counsel also failed on direct appeal to challenge the admission into evidence at trial of an allegedly involuntary confession. The record reveals that appellant was represented by two court appointed attorneys both at trial and on direct appeal.

In determining the effectiveness of appellant's counsel '(o)ur task . . . encompasses both an independent review of the record, . . . and an examination of counsel's stewardship of the now challenged proceedings in light of the available alternatives.' Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352 (1967). Ineffective assistance of counsel may only be found if "(t)he defense actually tendered was so insubstantial in relation to those not offered as to cast doubt upon the hypothesis that trial counsel made a deliberate informed choice.' We cannot emphasize strongly enough, however, that our inquiry ceases and counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had Some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interests.' (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 604, 235 A.2d at 352.

That portion of the charge which the appellant contends his counsel should have objected to was as follows:

'Members of the Jury, I have read to you the definition of murder of the first degree. You are not bound by my opinion at any time. It is for you at all times to say and not for me to say. Understanding, therefore, that it is my opinion that does not bind you, I will tell you that it is my opinion in this case that if the defendant is guilty of murder murder of the First Degree, it would be because the killing occurred during the perpetration of a robbery or a burglary; otherwise, the defendant in my opinion, would not be guilty of murder of the first degree.'

Even if we assume that the charge was erroneous, we are of the opinion that trial counsel may reasonably have believed that the charge was to the advantage of appellant since its effect was to limit the legal basis upon which the jury could return a verdict of murder in the first degree. Failure to interpose an objection, therefore, was a product of trial strategy and not of inadequate representation. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 450 Pa. 477, 301 A.2d 587 (1973).

Appellant's second allegation as to counsel's failure to raise on appeal the issue of racial discrimination in the selection of the jury is equally without merit. Initially, we note that procedurally counsel was precluded from arguing the issue of systematic exclusion of black jurors on appeal since it had not first been raised in the trial court. Therefore, our inquiry must be whether there was a reasonable basis for counsel's failure to assert this issue at trial.

Commonwealth v. Darden, 441...

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35 cases
  • State v. Clark
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 2, 1976
    ...Mich.App. 175, 235 N.W.2d 100; Thomas v. State, 516 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo.App.); Rook v. Cupp, 18 Or.App. 608, 526 P.2d 605; Commonwealth v. Nole, Pa., 336 A.2d 302; Baxter v. Rose, Tenn., 523 S.W.2d 930, 936; Ex parte Gallegos, 511 S.W.2d 510, 512-13 (Tex.Crim.App.); In re Cronin, 133 Vt. 23......
  • Com. v. Hubbard
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • May 16, 1977
    ...a baseless claim, counsel cannot be found to have been ineffective for failing to make such an assertion. See, E.g., Commonwealth v. Nole, 461 Pa. 314, 336 A.2d 302 (1975); Commonwealth v. Harrison, 228 Pa.Super. 42, 323 A.2d 848 (1974); cf. Commonwealth v. Goosby, 461 Pa. 229, 336 A.2d 260......
  • Commonwealth v. Hubbard
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • January 28, 1977
    ... ... found to have been ineffective for failing to make such an ... assertion. See, E.g., Commonwealth v. Nole, 461 Pa ... 314, 336 A.2d 302 (1975); Commonwealth v. Harrison, ... 228 Pa.Super. 42, 323 A.2d 848 (1974); cf. Commonwealth ... v. Goosby, ... ...
  • Commonwealth v. Yocham
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • July 8, 1977
    ... ... Therefore, it cannot be argued that appellate counsel ... did not pursue the claim because it had been waived. Cf ... Commonwealth v. Nole, 461 Pa. 314, 319, 336 A.2d 302, ... 304 (1975). [4] Further, since an evidentiary hearing ... was not held on the claim of ineffective assistance ... ...
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