Com. v. Novak

• Decision Date: 16 March 1959
• Citation: 150 A.2d 102,395 Pa. 199
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Edward NOVAK, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 102

150 A.2d 102

395 Pa. 199

COMMONWEALTH v. Edward NOVAK, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 16, 1959.

Rehearing Denied April 27, 1959.

Mervyn R. Turk, Chester, Walter Stein, Philadelphia, Berger & Gelman, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Paul R. Sand, Asst. Dist. Atty., Raymond R. Start. Dist. Atty., Media, for appellee.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, MUSMANNO, BENJAMIN R. JONES, COHEN, and BOK, JJ.

BELL, Justice.

A jury found defendant guilty of murder of the first degree and fixed the penalty at death in his trial for the murder of Katherine Jones, and also found him guilty of murder of the first degree and fixed the penalty at death in his trial for the murder of Ella K. Jones, Katherine's daughter. Defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment and a motion for a new trial which were dismissed by the lower Court. The lower Court thereupon sentenced him to death. From the judgment and sentence defendant took this appeal.

Because this is a capital case we shall discuss every one of defendant's contentions which may have any possible merit.

The first question presented was whether the Commonwealth made out a prima facie case, and if so whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

Defendant and Ella Jones were engaged to be married. They, with her mother, were living at 500 Fern Street, Darby. There was considerable friction in the home for a month. According to defendant, Ella and her mother kept reminding him that he was on probation and that they could have him arrested at any time. He became incensed when Ella and her mother allowed a coffee pot to burn; he became incensed when Ella's mother insisted on bringing old furniture into the house, and when she sold some tools, although they were her property. Because of their almost constant arguments, defendant demanded that Ella convey her interest in the property to him, which she did on February 1, 1955. On the evening of that day, Ella had defendant arrested on charges of drunk and disorderly conduct, threatening to kill and breach of the peace. At the hearing before the Justice of the Peace, Ella testified that defendant had kicked her on the leg and had threatened her several times with a gun which he had in the house. After they returned home, they continued to argue during the next two days.

On the morning of February 4, 1955, defendant and Ella again became involved in an argument over his recent arrest. Ella refused a reconciliation. When she started to leave the house to go to work, defendant ran to a closet in the living room, got his revolver and fired seven bullets into her head and body. Many of the shots were fired with the muzzle of the gun within 24 inches of the victim's body, and one at the distance of 18 inches. Since the cylinder of the revolver held but five cartridges, the jury could well have found that the defendant must have paused to reload his gun. Ella's death was caused by one or more of these bullets. Defendant then went to the rear of the house and shot Ella's mother as she was standing on the landing just outside the kitchen door calling for help. He fired two bullets into Mrs. Jones. Her death was caused by one or both of these bullets. The murder of Mrs. Jones was witnessed by Mrs. Grace Wood, a neighbor who was walking past the house at the time; there were no eyewitnesses to the shooting of Ella Jones.

Officers arrived quickly and were met at the front door by the defendant who immediately said 'I killed them.' Defendant added 'I have no gun.' The officers then went into the house and found Ella Jones lying on the floor of the living room moaning in pain. Mrs. Katherine Jones was found lying in the snow at the bottom of the steps leading down from the kitchen door. She was apparently dead. The women were rushed to the hospital and were pronounced dead on arrival. Defendant gave detectives several false leads as to what he had done with the gun. It was found after many hours of search secreted in an automatic gas heater in the basement.

There is not the shadow of a doubt as to defendant's guilt. These were two cruel, heartless, savage murders. Defendant wilfully, deliberately and premeditatedly got a gun and shot and killed Ella Jones and her mother after numerous threats and after Ella refused a reconciliation. Defendant alleges that the killings were without the slightest motive and because of that and because he was in a state of intense excitement, the killings could not amount to murder in the first degree. 'Evidence to prove motive, intent, plan or design are admissible [citing cases].' Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 159, 94 A.2d 743, 747. However, 'proof of motive is always relevant but never necessary.' Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180, 188, 47 A.2d 445, 449. Moreover, in this case the motivation was obvious, namely, hatred and resentment. Mrs. Freedman, a witness for defendant, whose home defendant had visited on February 2nd, testified that defendant called Ella's mother a foul name, said he 'hated her guts' because she was keeping Ella away from him, and said 'I ought to kill her.' Defendant testified on the witness stand 'There was murder in my heart the day she [Ella] had me arrested [February 1st].' He testified that after his return from the hearing on February 1st he looked for the gun and failed to find it, but added 'I would have believed I would have killed the both of them that night there and then.'

When defendant was arrested and taken to the police station he was 'perfectly calm, he was talking like an ordinary person would talk if you had a conversation with him.' When he was asked by one of the arresting officers why he had shot the women, defendant replied 'They were robbing me.' All the ingredients necessary for first degree murder are so clearly present in this case and the evidence of defendant's guilt is so overwhelming that a citation of authorities to support the conviction is unnecessary.

Defendant contended prior to arraignment and before trial and on this appeal that he lacked the mental capacity requisite to standing trial.

Defendant's Mental Capacity to Stand Trial and to Make a Rational defense

'* * *, the test at common law and employed by the courts in determining the mental capacity of a defendant to stand trial or to be sentenced or executed is not the M'Naghten 'right or wrong' test but whether the defendant is able to comprehend his position and make a rational defense.' Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 23, 117 A.2d 96, 99.

Prior to trial and pursuant to the Mental Health Act of 1951 as amended, 50 P.S. § 1071 et seq. the lower Court appointed a Commission to examine defendant. We adopt the following excerpt from that Court's opinion on the question of defendant's ability to stand trial:

'The commission thereupon proceeded to make a psychiatric examination of the defendant, and a neurologic examination was performed independently by the two physicians. In due course, the commission filed its report with this Court in which it found, inter alia, that Edward Novak is not mentally defective; that there is no evidence of organic disease of the nervous system; that he shows a profound personality disorder that has led to all types of aggression and anti-social behavior, but he is not mentally ill; ¹ that he is not insane, but can distinguish right from wrong; that he is able to comprehend his position with relation to the crimes of which he stands accused, to confer with his counsel in an intelligent manner to prepare his defense if he so desires and to make a rational defense to the crimes of which he stands accused.'

The lower Court then held that defendant was not mentally ill within the purview of the Mental Health Act:

'After a thorough study of the commission's report and the evidence upon which it was based, and in the exercise of our own independent judgment (Commonwealth v. Patskin, 375 Pa. 368, 375 ), * * *

* * *

* * * 'We have read and re-read the commission's report and the evidence upon which it was based. It is our considered opinion, after mature and deliberate study, that the commission discharged the duties of its appointment with ability, fidelity and complete impartiality. The report gives every evidence of thorough, painstaking consideration and preparation. We find no inconsistency or contradiction in the commission's findings and conclusions. And such findings and conclusions, in our opinion, find abundant support in the evidence.

'The commission's estimate of defendant's general attitude throughout the examination, accords with our own impression after repeated readings of the evidence. After remarking that defendant showed during the examination, evidences of marked hostility and aggression towards others, the commission said: 'However, during the course of our examination he was polite and co-operative. When he dealt with matters irrelevant to the questioning he agreed to drop such discussion and return to the topic at hand. A half dozen times during the interview he went into violent rages screaming, crying, beating his fist on the table, yet, when he was ordered to desist and return to the orderly questioning, he did so and was relevant once more.'

* * *

* * *

'We were not, of course, bound by the findings and conclusions of the commission. As the Supreme Court said in Commonwealth v. Patskin, 375 Pa. 368, 375 , 'If a commission is appointed its findings are advisory and not mandatory upon the court--under the Act it is the Court and not the psychiatrist or the Sanity Commission which must be satisfied that the petitioner is insane or mentally ill.' We were of opinion that defendant was not mentally ill. On occasions when we had opportunity to observe him, there was nothing in his bearing, appearance, or demeanor suggestive of mental illness.'

Defendant also contends that his statutory and constitutional rights were violated because his counsel was not present...