Com. v. Ockenhouse

• Decision Date: 21 August 2000
• Citation: 562 Pa. 481,756 A.2d 1130
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. John Phillip OCKENHOUSE, Sr., Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

756 A.2d 1130

562 Pa. 481

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. John Phillip OCKENHOUSE, Sr., Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted March 17, 2000.

Decided August 21, 2000.

John P. Ockenhouse, Sr., appellant, pro se.

Glenn Goodge, Allentown, Standby Counsel for John P. Ockenhouse, Sr.

James Anthony, Allentown, for Commonwealth.

Robert A. Graci, Harrisburg, for Office of Atty. Gen.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION

CAPPY, Justice.

This is an automatic direct appeal of the sentence of death imposed upon John Phillip Ockenhouse, Sr. by the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County.¹ This case is somewhat unique in that Ockenhouse, although sentenced to death, informed our court that he would not file a brief, and that he does not desire to contest his conviction or his sentence. While Ockenhouse has evidently accepted his conviction and sentence of death and has implicitly expressed his desire to forego appellate consideration of his case, our court is nevertheless required to review the decision imposing a sentence of death for adherence to our Commonwealth's Sentencing Code.² Following a detailed review of the record and the trial court's opinion, for the reasons set forth more fully below, we affirm the judgment of sentence imposed by the trial court.

The facts underlying this case are as follows. Ockenhouse was convicted and sentenced for an undisclosed crime arising in Carbon County, Pennsylvania. On March 30, 1998, Ockenhouse was paroled to the Keenan House, located in Allentown, Lehigh County Pennsylvania. Keenan House contracts with the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections as a parole site for inmates leaving correctional institutions. Ockenhouse was paroled to Keenan House as an inpatient for receipt of drug and alcohol treatment and for development of a permanent home plan.

On April 10, 1998 at approximately 10:45 p.m., in violation of house rules, Ockenhouse left the Keenan House. When he left the Keenan House, circumstantial evidence indicates that he most likely had no or very little money on his person.³

Ockenhouse proceeded to the home of Curtis Kratzer, a former acquaintance. The victim, 91-year-old widow Naomi Spankowitch, was Kratzer's sister. Mrs. Spankowitch lived next door to her brother. From having stayed with Kratzer on previous occasions, Ockenhouse knew that Mrs. Spankowitch took care of Kratzer's financial affairs. On April 11, 1998, Ockenhouse sought Kratzer's opinion as to whether his sister would loan Ockenhouse some money. Kratzer replied that she would not lend Ockenhouse money.

The next day, Ockenhouse went to Mrs. Spankowitch's home where by his own admission he killed her and took approximately $100.00 from her wallet.

With regard to the manner of the killing, Ockenhouse pushed Mrs. Spankowitch onto her bed and first stuffed a pair of underwear into her mouth. He then kneed her in the back, fracturing her spine in three places. After breaking her back, Ockenhouse left the bedroom and went into the kitchen. However, he discovered that Mrs. Spankowitch remained alive, whereupon he took a knife from the kitchen and began cutting and stabbing Mrs. Spankowitch. Ockenhouse cut her neck laterally several times in the front. These slashes cut through Mrs. Spankowitch's throat to her spine, severing her carotid artery and jugular vein. Above and below these incisions were seven stab wounds, one of which severed her right carotid artery. All of the stab wounds were inflicted prior to the deep slashing wounds. Also, an additional puncture wound was discovered on the victim's neck. There was a single stab wound to her back that occurred at or near the time of death. The knife was found imbedded in Mrs. Spankowitch's back when her body was discovered.

Ockenhouse was arrested and rendered a confession to police. The Commonwealth filed notice of two aggravating circumstances: that the killing occurred during the perpetration of a felony, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6), and that Mrs. Spankowitch was killed by means of torture, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(8). Trial was set for November 30, 1998. On that date, Ockenhouse entered into a guilty plea to first-degree murder, robbery, theft, and receiving stolen property. The guilty plea was accepted following a colloquy in which it was established that Ockenhouse knowingly and voluntarily entered the plea.

On December 3, 1998, the date of sentencing, Ockenhouse motioned for the withdrawal of his attorneys, which was granted, subject to the trial court's order that counsel be present to assist Ockenhouse. The trial court then engaged in a colloquy regarding Ockenhouse's competence and his desire to waive his right to have a jury decide his sentence. The trial court deemed Ockenhouse to be competent and accepted his waiver of sentencing by jury.

The trial court heard the Commonwealth's evidence regarding the two aggravating circumstances. Ockenhouse refused to present any mitigating evidence, despite his counsel's indication of the existence of such evidence. The trial court conducted a colloquy regarding Ockenhouse's decision to forego the presentation of mitigating evidence. The trial court permitted counsel to proceed with its offer of proof of mitigating evidence and allowed such information to be submitted into the record for purposes of confirming Ockenhouse's knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to present mitigating evidence.

Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Ockenhouse to death. Specifically, the trial court found that the Commonwealth had established the two proffered aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, in accord with Ockenhouse's decision to withhold mitigation evidence, the trial court found no mitigating circumstances. Ockenhouse filed no post-sentence motions. However, Ockenhouse, through his attorneys filed a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.⁴ The trial court issued a memorandum opinion in response thereto. Pursuant to the automatic direct appeal provisions found in 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(4) and § 9711(h)(1), the case progressed to this court for our review.

As noted above, it is evidently Ockenhouse's intention that our court affirm his conviction and judgment of sentence. Ockenhouse's letter to this court, received February 10, 2000, indicated that he did not intend to file a brief. Moreover, in his letter, Ockenhouse, inter alia, stood by his decision to proceed pro se, his decision to enter a guilty plea, and his decision not to present mitigation evidence. By deciding not to file a brief, Ockenhouse has presented no issues and has set forth no argument for our consideration.

However, regardless of Ockenhouse's desires, our court is required to conduct an automatic and independent review of all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(1); Commonwealth v. Heidnik, 526 Pa. 458, 587 A.2d 687, 689 (1991). This automatic review of capital cases has been rightfully described as "an integral and absolutely essential procedural safeguard prescribed by the legislature in the enactment of Pennsylvania's death penalty statute...." Commonwealth v. Appel, 517 Pa. 529, 539 A.2d 780, 781 (1988).

In the absence of any issues on appeal, our review is confined to a three-fold inquiry. The first inquiry stems from section 9711(h)(3)(i), which requires the court to affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that the sentence of death was "the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor." Second, our court will review the record to determine whether the evidence fails to support the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance specified in section 9711(d). 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)(ii).⁵

Additionally, our court engages in a third, judicially-created inquiry that is inextricably linked with its statutorily required review. It has been determined by our court that to properly perform the statutory-requirements noted above, "and because `imposition of the death penalty is irrevocable in its finality' and warrants, therefore, the relaxation of our waiver rules, Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 437-41, 383 A.2d 174 (1978), our court shall review, in death penalty cases, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction of murder of the first degree." Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n. 3 (1982),cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983). Thus, in addition to the statutorily-mandated review, our court will also engage in an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence used to establish the first-degree murder conviction. Commonwealth v. Kemp, ___ Pa. ___, 753 A.2d 1278, 1280 (2000); Commonwealth v. Lester, 554 Pa. 644, 722 A.2d 997, 1001 (1998).

As has been this court's practice, and because a review of the sufficiency of the evidence of the underlying conviction is logically a threshold matter, we will address these three areas of inquiry in reverse order, beginning with an analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence.

As an appellate court considering the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the conviction that led to the sentence of death, we do not consider the evidence de novo. Rather, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Hall, 549 Pa. 269, 701 A.2d 190, 195 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082, 118 S.Ct. 1534, 140 L.Ed.2d 684 (1998). This standard is applicable in cases where the evidence is circumstantial, as long as the evidence implicates the accused in the...