Com. v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan (Plaza)

Citation418 Pa. 457,211 A.2d 536
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. ONE 1958 PLYMOUTH SEDAN (PLAZA), Man. Serial # L PIN 3159, in Possession of George McGonigle, Appellant.
Decision Date30 June 1965
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Paul M. Chalfin, Louis Lipschitz, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Thomas J. Shannon, Asst. Atty., Gen., James Iannucci, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Leonard Langan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, for appellee, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

JONES, Justice.

At approximately 6:30 a. m. on December 16, 1960, two officers of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, stationed near the approach to the Benjamin Franklin bridge in New Jersey, observed a 1958 Plymouth sedan bearing Pennsylvania license plates proceeding toward the bridge in the direction of Philadelphia. Noting that 'the car was low in the rear, quite low', the officers followed the automobile across the bridge into Philadelphia where they stopped and searched the automobile without first having obtained either a body or a search warrant. Their search revealed that the rear seat and back-rest of the automobile had been removed and that the rear and trunk of the automobile contained 375 bottles of whiskey and wine, none of which bore Pennsylvania tax seals.

Both the car and alcoholic beverages were seized. The Commonwealth instituted proceedings for the forfeiture of the automobile pursuant to Section 601 of the Liquor Code of 1951, 1 in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County. That court dismissed the forfeiture proceedings on the ground that the attempted forfeiture of the automobile was founded upon evidence illegally obtained, i. e., without a search warrant and without probable cause. The Superior Court reversed, three judges dissenting, and we granted an allocatur.

On appeal to this Court, we affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. 2 (Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 414 Pa. 540, 201 A.2d 427). The basis of our decision was that the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. State of Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, applied only to criminal prosecutions and not to a forfeiture proceeding which we deemed civil in nature.

The Supreme Court of the United States (379 U.S. 927, 85 S.Ct. 323, 13 L.Ed.2d 340), granted certiorari and held that the exclusionary rule of Mapp does apply to forfeiture proceedings and reversed the judgment of this Court (One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170). In so reversing, however, the United States Supreme Court stated: 'Our holding frees the Pennsylvania court on remand to review the trial court's finding that the officials did not in this case have probable cause for the search involved, a question which it previously did not consider necessary to decide.'

In line with the order and opinion of the United States Supreme Court, we now turn to a determination of the issue whether the enforcement officers had reasonable and probable cause to stop and search this automobile for contraband liquor. If they did have 'reasonable and probable cause' to search the automobile, then the search and seizure of the alcoholic beverages were proper, the evidence was admissible and the automobile, on the basis of such evidence, was subject to forfeiture. If they did not have 'reasonable and probable cause' to make the search, then the evidence revealed by the search was illegally obtained, was inadmissible under Mapp v. Ohio, supra, and the automobile was not subject to forfeiture.

The enforcement officers, as peace officers, are granted by statute '* * * police power and authority * * * to arrest on view, except in private homes, without warrant, any person engaged in the unlawful * * * importation * * * or transportation, or having unlawful possession of liquor * * *. Such officers * * * shall have power and authority, upon reasonable and probable cause, to search for and to seize without warrant or process, except in private homes, any liquor * * * unlawfully possessed * * * imported or transported, and any * * * vehicles * * * which are or have been used in the unlawful * * * importation or transportation of the same'. Liquor Code of 1951, supra, § 209, 47 P.S. § 2-209. Section 209 sets forth the standard of conduct which controlled the power and authority of these enforcement officers to stop and search this automobile and to seize the untaxed liquor in the case at bar but 'the standard of probable cause is the same in the state courts as in the federal courts.' 3

The Fourth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution 'does not denounce all searches and seizures, but only such as are unreasonable.' (Carroll v. U. S., 267 U.S. 132, 147, 45 S.Ct. 280, 283, 69 L.Ed. 543; Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 66, 190 A.2d 304) and the propriety of the search and seizure depends on the reasonableness thereof. 'On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid'. Carroll, supra, 267 U.S. at 149, 45 S.Ct. at 283, 284.

In making a search without a warrant, recognition has been given to a distinction between the search of a movable as opposed to an immovable object of the search. In Carroll, supra, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S.Ct. at 285, the U. S. Supreme Court noted this distinction and the reason therefor: '* * * the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.' See also: Brinegar v. U. S., 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879; U. S. v. Haith, 297 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1961); Ray v. U. S., 255 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1958); Commonwealth v. One 1955 Buick Sedan, 198 Pa.Super. 133, 182 A.2d 280. While a warrant may not be necessary for the stoppage and search of a moving automobile, such rule does not relax the requirement that the officers must have 'reasonable or probable cause' to believe that the automobile contains contraband. Without a warrant the officers take a calculated risk; the search and seizure must be shown to have been upon reasonable and probable cause, i. e., that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe an offense has been or is being committed. The character of the object to be searched goes to the question of justification for not having obtained a search warrant; in no manner does it alter the requirement that reasonable and probable cause must exist to justify the search.

The determination of what is 'reasonable or probable' cause upon which can be based a lawful search and seizure is often most difficult. Recently, we said: 'The 'reasonableness' of a search and seizure must be determined on an ad hoc basis, i. e. on the facts and the circumstances of each particular case. In U. S. v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 434, 94 L.Ed. 653, the Court said: 'What is a reasonable search [and seizure] is not to be determined by any fixed formula. The Constitution does not define what are 'unreasonable' searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready litmus-paper test. The recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case [citing a case].' [Citing cases].' Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. at 65, 66, 190 A.2d 304, 309.

Many years ago this Court stated that 'probable cause' depends upon the honest and reasonable belief of the officer (Smith v. Ege, 52 Pa. 419), and must be judged by the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the search and seizure (McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63, 69). In Bosurgi, supra, 411 Pa. at 67, 68, 190 A.2d at 310, we said on the subject of 'probable cause': "Probable cause' has been said to exist where 'the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed and that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing the offense: [citing cases]. However, '* * * an arrest with or without a warrant must stand upon firmer ground than mere suspicion * * * though the arresting officer need not have in hand evidence which would suffice to convict * * *.' [Citing a case.] Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the Court, in United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106 (2nd Cir. 1945) well stated: 'It is well settled that an arrest may be made upon hearsay evidence; and indeed, the 'reasonable cause' necessary to support an arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the accused's guilt upon a trial, unless the powers of peace officers are to be so cut down that they cannot possibly perform their duties.' * * *

"Reasonable' or 'probable' cause, difficult as those terms are of exact definition, are exceedingly difficult in their application to the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The language of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879, may well act as a guide: 'In dealing with probable cause * * * as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations...

To continue reading

Request your trial
25 cases
  • Betrand, In re
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • April 13, 1973
    ...proposition we cannot accept.' Commonwealth v. Goslee, supra, 427 Pa. at 407, 234 A.2d at 851. See Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 418 Pa. 457, 211 A.2d 536 (1965). Thus this record reveals only an anonymous, unsubstantiated tip, knowledge that the suspect was a gang mbmber, and th......
  • In re Betrand
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • April 13, 1973
    ......at 407, 234 A.2d at 851. See. Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 418 Pa. 457, 211 A.2d 536 (1965). . . ......
  • Commonwealth v. Leed
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • June 1, 2018
    ...the kind of speculation and conjecture that is prohibited by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan (Plaza) , 418 Pa. 457, 466, 211 A.2d 536, 540 (1965). Thus, I would reverse the Superior Court's decision.Justices Todd and Donohue join this dissenting o......
  • Search Warrant B-21778, In re
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • February 24, 1987
    ...S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968). See also, Commonwealth v. Strickland, 457 Pa. 631, 326 A.2d 379 (1974); Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 418 Pa. 457, 211 A.2d 536 (1965). Neither constitutional provision affords a definition of reasonableness. However, it is well established tha......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT