Com. v. Parker
Court | Superior Court of Pennsylvania |
Writing for the Court | HUDOCK, STEVENS, and BECK, JJ. |
Citation | 847 A.2d 745 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Steven PARKER, Appellant. |
Decision Date | 12 April 2004 |
847 A.2d 745
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee,v.
Steven PARKER, Appellant
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted January 5, 2004.
Filed April 12, 2004.
Francis T. Chardo III, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Before: HUDOCK, STEVENS, and BECK, JJ.
¶ 1 This is an appeal, nunc pro tunc, from the judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County following Appellant's conviction on one count of theft by receiving stolen property,1 two counts of carrying a firearm without a license,2 and one count of former convict not to possess a firearm.3 We affirm.
¶ 2 The record reveals that Appellant's convictions stemmed from a September 29, 1996, traffic stop in Harrisburg. N.T. 4/13/98 at 21-22. At approximately 11:30 p.m., Officer Jones observed a car, driven by Appellant, make a right-hand turn on red without stopping at the intersection. N.T. 4/13/98 at 21-22. Officer Jones approached the vehicle and asked Appellant for his license, registration, and insurance verification. N.T. 4/13/98 at 22. Appellant stated that his driver's license was suspended. N.T. 4/13/98 at 22. While Officer Jones was verifying this information, another police officer, Officer Davis, arrived on the scene. N.T. 4/13/98 at 23.
¶ 3 The officers re-approached the vehicle with Officer Jones on the driver's side and Officer Davis on the passenger side. N.T. 4/13/98 at 23. Officer Davis shone a flashlight into the vehicle and observed a handgun protruding out from underneath the passenger seat; approximately 80% of the handgun was visible. N.T. 4/13/98 at 39-42. Officer Jones then removed Appellant from the car, while Officer Davis secured the handgun. N.T. 4/13/98 at 25-26, 30, 39. Officer Jones later learned that the handgun had been reported stolen. N.T. 4/13/98 at 25-26, 30, 39. Officer Davis looked inside the driver's side of the vehicle and discovered a second handgun underneath the driver's seat. N.T. 4/13/98 at 42.
¶ 4 On October 22, 1997, Appellant, who was incarcerated pending trial on the instant matter, was interviewed by special agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on an unrelated matter. N.T. 3/19/98 at 12-13. The interview lasted approximately ten minutes and terminated when Appellant stated that he was represented by counsel. N.T. 3/19/98 at 15-16, 26. On October 24, 1997, the agents were contacted by Appellant's girlfriend, who stated that Appellant wished to advise them that he was not represented by counsel and that he wanted to speak with the agents. N.T. 3/19/98 at 17-18. Later that day, the agents interviewed Appellant who signed a Miranda4 waiver. N.T. 3/19/98 at 19-20. During the interview, which lasted approximately three hours and mostly concerned matters unrelated to the instant proceeding, Appellant stated that the gun recovered from underneath the driver's seat was his gun and that he did not know who owned the firearm found underneath the passenger's seat but they were both .380 caliber guns. N.T. 3/19/98 at 22-24; N.T. 4/13/98 at 74.
¶ 5 On March 19, 1998, the trial court heard, and denied, Appellant's motion to suppress his October 24, 1997 statement. N.T. 3/19/98 at 75-76. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of all charges. Trial Court Opinion 2/6/04 at 3. On May 27, 1998, Appellant was sentenced to a term of 3 to 6 years of incarceration. Trial Court Opinion 2/6/04 at 3. Appellant did not file an appeal. Trial Court Opinion 2/6/04 at 3. On March 24, 2003, following
¶ 6 On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements made to the federal agents, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike testimony and/or for a new trial,5 that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his conviction for carrying a firearm without a license with respect to the gun found on the passenger's side of the car6 and for theft by receiving stolen property, and Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
¶ 7 Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to the federal agents since his statements were coerced by the federal agents' promises to Appellant of a benefit if he spoke to the agents.7
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, our responsibility is to determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. If the suppression court held for the prosecution, we consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. When the factual findings of the suppression court are supported by the evidence, the appellate court may reverse if there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those factual findings.
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 415 Pa.Super. 252, 609 A.2d 177, 178-79 (1992) (citation omitted).
A confession obtained during a custodial interrogation is admissible where the accused's right to remain silent and right to counsel have been explained and the accused has knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights. The test for determining the voluntariness of a confession and whether an accused knowingly waived his or her rights looks to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 546 Pa. 161, 170, 683 A.2d 1181, 1189 (1996) (citations omitted). "The Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights." Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 547 Pa. 460, 464, 691 A.2d 907, 913 (1997) (citation omitted).
¶ 9 While Appellant argues that he was improperly induced into making a statement, he has pointed to nothing in support of his argument that a "promise" to make known to federal officials that Appellant had cooperated...
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Jacome v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 20-2439
...3925(a)'s subjective statutory standard, see, e.g., Crespo v. Hughes , 167 A.3d 168, 188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) ; Commonwealth v. Parker , 847 A.2d 745, 752 (Pa. Super. Ct....
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Pugh v. Overmyer, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-0364
...held that constructive possession may be established by the totality of the circumstances.Id. at 677-78 (quoting Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)). Further, the Superior Court has "held that circumstantial evidence isPage 60 reviewed by the same standard as di......
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Jacome v. Attorney Gen., 20-2439
...§ 3925(a)'s subjective statutory standard, see, e.g., Crespo v. Hughes, 167 A.3d 168, 188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017); Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 752 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). --------- ...
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United States v. Brooks, Criminal Action No. 17-250
...(c) that where the firearm was concealed on or about the person, it was outside his home or place of business." Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bavusa, 750 A.2d 855, 857 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) ) (emphasis added). 54. Based upon the for......
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Jacome v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 20-2439
...3925(a)'s subjective statutory standard, see, e.g., Crespo v. Hughes , 167 A.3d 168, 188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) ; Commonwealth v. Parker , 847 A.2d 745, 752 (Pa. Super. Ct....
-
Pugh v. Overmyer, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-0364
...held that constructive possession may be established by the totality of the circumstances.Id. at 677-78 (quoting Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)). Further, the Superior Court has "held that circumstantial evidence isPage 60 reviewed by the same standard as di......
-
Jacome v. Attorney Gen., 20-2439
...§ 3925(a)'s subjective statutory standard, see, e.g., Crespo v. Hughes, 167 A.3d 168, 188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017); Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 752 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). --------- ...
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United States v. Brooks, Criminal Action No. 17-250
...(c) that where the firearm was concealed on or about the person, it was outside his home or place of business." Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bavusa, 750 A.2d 855, 857 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) ) (emphasis added). 54. Based upon the for......