Com. v. Perry P.

• Decision Date: 14 November 1994
• Citation: Com. v. Perry P., 641 N.E.2d 1313, 418 Mass. 808 (Mass. 1994)
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. PERRY P., a juvenile.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 1313

641 N.E.2d 1313

418 Mass. 808

COMMONWEALTH v.PERRY P., a juvenile.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Sept. 9, 1994.

Decided Nov. 14, 1994.

Juliane Balliro, Boston, for the juvenile.

Katherine E. McMahon, Asst. Dist. Atty. (John P. Zanini, Asst. Dist. Atty., with her), for Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

We conclude that a juvenile charged in a complaint with being delinquent by reason of murder is entitled to an indictment proceeding unless the juvenile waives indictment.We conclude further that the juvenile in this proceeding had not waived that right when he raised the issue for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's presentation of evidence.We discuss briefly what steps the Commonwealth may now take in charging the juvenile with delinquency by reason of murder.

In June, 1992, a complaint issued from the juvenile session of the Roxbury District Court charging the juvenile with delinquency by reason of murder.¹The Commonwealth moved pursuant to G.L. c. 119, § 61 (1992 ed.), that the juvenile be transferred to the Superior Court for trial as an adult.A judge found probable cause that the juvenile had committed the offenses charged, but, after a so-called Part B hearing under § 61, declined to transfer the juvenile.The Commonwealth unsuccessfully appealed from the latter ruling.SeeCommonwealth v. Perry P., 36 Mass.App.Ct. 914, 628 N.E.2d 32(1994).

The juvenile waived his right to a jury trial in the first instance and, after the Commonwealth had presented its case, moved that the judge dismiss "so much of the complaint as charges him with Murder as the Juvenile has a constitutional (State and Federal) and statutory right (M.G.L. Chapter 119, section 61 and Chapter 263,section 4A) to be tried upon an indictment and the Commonwealth has failed to so proceed in this case."The judge denied the juvenile's motion to dismiss the murder count, and stated that the evidence presented a prima facie case of murder in the first degree.After a hearing devoted to the issue, the judge concluded that the juvenile had a statutory right to an indictment, that the juvenile had not waived that right, and that the trial was a nullity as to the entire murder count.The judge granted the Commonwealth time to seek an indictment.

The Commonwealth instead sought an order from a single justice of this court under G.L. c. 211, § 3 (1992 ed.), that the trial judge revoke his ruling that the delinquency proceeding on the murder count was a nullity and then enter judgment on that count.A single justice of this court reported the case to the full court on the Commonwealth's petition, the judge's memorandum and order, and the motion to dismiss.

1.There is no challenge to the exercise of the court's supervisory authority to resolve the issues presented.The juvenile states that the exercise of jurisdiction under G.L. c. 211, § 3, is appropriate and does not contest the propriety of the order reserving and reporting the case.The Commonwealth has no right of direct appeal from the judge's nullity ruling, and the issues are important to the administration of justice in juvenile proceedings.We need not decide whether, over objection, the Commonwealth would have the right to seek relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3, from the nullity ruling, which has some similarity to the allowance of a motion to dismiss.SeeCommonwealth v. Gordon, 410 Mass. 498, 499, 574 N.E.2d 974(1991);Commonwealth v. Babb, 389 Mass. 275, 282-283, 450 N.E.2d 155(1983).

2.The juvenile had a statutory right to an indictment.That right is set forth in G.L. c. 119, § 61, as amended bySt.1991, c. 488, § 3, which in the last sentence of the fifth paragraph states that "[i]n all cases brought pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph [where murder in the first or second degree is alleged against the juvenile], the child shall have the right to an indictment proceeding under [G.L. c. 263, § 4], unless such child, upon advice of counsel, duly waives indictment."²This right is also expressed in G.L. c. 263, § 4, as amended bySt.1991, c. 488, § 10("A juvenile charged ... in a juvenile session of a district court with delinquency by violation of [G.L. c. 265, § 1(i.e., murder) ], shall also have the right to be proceeded against by indictment").

The Commonwealth seeks to justify the procedure it followed on the basis of the first sentence of the fifth paragraph of G.L. c. 119, § 61, as amended bySt.1991, c. 488, § 3.That sentence stated that "[i]f the offense alleged is murder in the first or second degree, the commonwealth may proceed by filing a complaint in juvenile court or in a juvenile session of a district court, as the case may be, or by filing an indictment in such court."³The Commonwealth's option to use a complaint in charging murder against a juvenile can be exercised effectively to a conclusion favorable to it only if the juvenile "upon advice of counsel, duly waives indictment."G.L. c. 119, § 61.Where the Commonwealth proceeds by complaint, the juvenile is entitled to a probable cause hearing, a right not available if the Commonwealth shall have proceeded by indictment.Id.This circumstance, plus the use of a standard in a probable cause proceeding more favorable to the defendant than in a grand jury proceeding, might well induce counsel to recommend that a juvenile waive indictment.There is, however, no explicit waiver in this case.We shall consider shortly whether such a waiver should be inferred when the lack of an indictment was raised only at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case.

There must be a waiver of an indictment in order to justify a finding of delinquency by reason of murder on a complaint filed against a juvenile.Section 61 is confusing in its seeming endorsement and then withdrawal of the Commonwealth's right to proceed by a complaint against a juvenile.The language is not irretrievably in conflict, however, because it is true that the Commonwealth may properly start with a complaint charging murder but, as a practical matter, the Commonwealth may advance to trial in a juvenile session on that complaint only when the juvenile has properly waived indictment.

Because we construe § 61 to require an indictment if the juvenile does not waive his right to one, we need not consider whether art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights also grants such a juvenile the right to an indictment.The penalty imposed on a juvenile, who has attained the age of fourteen and is adjudged delinquent by reason of murder, is a maximum confinement of twenty years for murder in the first degree (with no eligibility for parole for fifteen years) and fifteen years for murder in the second degree (with no eligibility for parole for ten years).G.L. c. 119, § 72 (1992 ed.).No such sentence may be suspended, nor are certain statutory deductions for good conduct allowed.Id.The fact that the sentence is not necessarily to State prison, one measure whether an indictment is a constitutional requirement (Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, 394 Mass. 89, 91-92, 474 N.E.2d 1059[1985] ), may not be controlling where the mandated sentences are substantial in length and where, after the juvenile attains the age of twenty-one, the Department of Correction obtains custody of the delinquent.The soundness of our construction of § 61 is supported by its avoidance of this constitutional question.SeeBeeler v. Downey, 387 Mass. 609, 613-614, 442 N.E.2d 19(1982)(if reasonably possible, statute should be construed to avoid unnecessary decision of serious constitutional question), and cases cited.

3.The juvenile did not waive his right to an indictment.Section 61 recognizes the prospect of no indictment when "the child, upon advice of counsel, duly waives indictment."There is no showing of any waiver "upon advice of counsel" or even a waiver after receiving the advice of counsel.If there was a waiver, it would have to be implied from the late assertion of the right to an indictment because there is nothing to show that the juvenile made an informed decision on waiver.An implied waiver of the right to indictment is not permissible.Rule 3(c)(1) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, 378 Mass. 847 (1979), applicable to delinquency proceedings in the District Court"consistent with the General Laws"(see...