Com. v. Peterkin

Decision Date21 December 1998
Citation554 Pa. 547,722 A.2d 638
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Otis PETERKIN, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Robert Brett Dunham, Stephen A. Whinston, Kenneth L. Fox, Philadelphia, for O. Peterkin.

Catherine Marshall, Philadelphia, Robert A. Graci, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth.

Before FLAHERTY, Chief Judge, and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the denial of appellant's second PCRA petition. On September 24, 1982, in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, appellant was convicted of two counts of murder of the first degree. He was sentenced to death for murdering two men during the course of a robbery. Appellant appealed his conviction and this court affirmed the conviction on July 25, 1986, 511 Pa. 299, 513 A.2d 373 (1986). On February 24, 1987, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 479 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 962, 93 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1987).

Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on September 7, 1989, raising 44 issues. The PCRA court granted defense counsel's request to withdraw from the case on the grounds that all of the issues had been either finally litigated or were without merit. Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, which transferred the case to this court. We remanded the case to the PCRA court for a determination of whether appellant was eligible for appointment of appellate counsel. After hearing, the PCRA court appointed new counsel, appellant's fifth lawyer. On October 12, 1994, this court affirmed the order denying appellant PCRA relief. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 538 Pa. 455, 649 A.2d 121 (1994).

A sixth counsel was appointed to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. The petition was denied on June 12, 1995. On December 5, 1996, appellant then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The federal court appointed two new attorneys to represent appellant in that action.

While the federal petition was pending, on January 13, 1997, appellant filed a second PCRA petition which was also captioned as a request for habeas corpus relief. The PCRA court dismissed the petition on January 23, 1997, before the Commonwealth had filed its answer, on the grounds that the petition was premature due to ongoing litigation in federal court.1

Now, sixteen years after his conviction, appellant's ninth and tenth attorneys raise twenty-two issues and additional sub-issues in an appeal from the PCRA court's order dismissing the second PCRA petition. The petition which was dismissed requests a remand to the PCRA court so that appellant's claims may be decided on the merits. The Commonwealth asserts that the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to hear the petition because it was not timely filed. Peterkin, on the other hand, relying on the dual status of his petition as sounding both in habeas corpus and also in the PCRA, asserts that his request for habeas corpus relief is constitutionally guaranteed and cannot be suspended by the PCRA; that the legislature lacks the constitutional power to limit the availability of habeas corpus; and that by leaving the habeas corpus statute in place, the legislature acknowledged that habeas corpus cannot be abrogated by the PCRA.

Article I, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in pertinent part, "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."

The alleged suspension or limitation of habeas corpus is found in the PCRA as follows:

This subchapter provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief. The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Section 9545 of the PCRA then provides:

§ 9545. Jurisdiction and proceedings ...
(b) Time for filing petition.
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final....

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545.2 These provisions of the PCRA notwithstanding, there remains a statutory provision for habeas corpus as follows:

§ 6503. Right to apply for writ
(a) General rule. Except as provided in subsection (b), an application for habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of detention may be brought by or on behalf of any person restrained of his liberty within this Commonwealth under any pretense whatsoever.
(b) Exception. Where a person is restrained by virtue of sentence after conviction for a criminal offense, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be available if a remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6503. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, effective June 27, 1978.

The essence of these three sections, read together, is that the PCRA subsumes the remedy of habeas corpus with respect to remedies offered under the PCRA and that any petition seeking relief under the PCRA must be filed within one year of final judgment. Turning to Peterkin's claim that because of the continued presence of the habeas statute after the PCRA was enacted, an action for habeas corpus relief is not limited by the PCRA, we agree that the legislature intended that the writ would continue to exist as a separate remedy. However, as the statute itself provides, the writ continues to exist only in cases in which there is no remedy under the PCRA. To test whether Peterkin had a remedy under the PCRA, we must consider the PCRA itself as applied to Peterkin's case. The PCRA provides, in pertinent part:

§ Eligibility for relief
(a) General rule. To be eligible for relief under this subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of the following:
(1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth and is at the time relief is granted:
(i) currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime;
(ii) awaiting execution of a sentence of death for the crime....
(2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the following:
(i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.
(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a). Because Peterkin alleges violations of the constitution and of law which undermine the truth-determining process, his claims were cognizable under the PCRA.3 Pennsylvania's statutory writ of habeas corpus, therefore, was not available as to these claims, for Peterkin had a remedy at the PCRA, and his claim that he was improperly denied the right to file a petition for habeas corpus is without merit.

Next, Peterkin claims that the PCRA improperly suspended his right to file for a writ of habeas corpus. We note that this is Peterkin's second PCRA petition, not his first. Since Peterkin availed himself of a PCRA filing, which was tantamount to a habeas filing, he can hardly prevail on the assertion that habeas corpus was suspended as to him, for he had access to habeas corpus relief through his first PCRA petition. This claim, therefore, is without merit.

He also contends, however, that habeas corpus was improperly limited as to him. The limitation in this case was that Peterkin was required to file his first PCRA petition within one year of the effective date of the act, or, in the alternative, he was required to qualify for the act's exceptions to the one year filing period.

As already noted, on November 17, 1995, the General Assembly amended the PCRA to require that, as a matter of jurisdiction, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year of final judgment:

§ 9545. Jurisdiction and proceedings ...
(b) Time for filing petition.
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final....
* * *
(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review ... or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.

Act of November 17, 1995, Special Session No. 1, P.L. 1118, No. 32, effective in 60 days, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545.

The conclusion of direct review was February 24, 1987, when the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. Peterkin's second PCRA petition, the subject of this appeal, was filed on January 13, 1997, almost ten years after the conclusion of direct review. Peterkin, therefore, has filed his PCRA petition beyond the one-year period allowed in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545.

However, section 3(1) of the Act of Nov. 17, 1995 (Spec.Sess. No. 1) P.L. 1118, No. 32, also provides that an appellant whose judgment has become final on or before the effective date of this act shall be deemed to have filed a timely petition under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 95 Subchapter B if the appellant's first petition is filed within one year of the effective date of the act. Peterkin is not eligible for the exception to the requirement that the petition be filed within one year of the effective date of the act, however, because 3(1) applies to first petitions, and the petition which appellant filed on January 13, 1997 was his second.4

Since Peterkin's petition was not filed within one year of the...

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