Com. v. Pierce

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Writing for the CourtNEWMAN, Justice.
Citation786 A.2d 203,567 Pa. 186
Decision Date21 December 2001
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Michael PIERCE, Appellant.

786 A.2d 203
567 Pa. 186

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee,
v.
Michael PIERCE, Appellant

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted April 5, 2000.

Decided December 21, 2001.


786 A.2d 208
Michael Pierce, pro se

Ramy I. Djerassi, Philadelphia, for Michael Pierce as standby counsel.

Catherine Marshall, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth.

Robert A. Graci, Harrisburg, for Office of Attorney General.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

786 A.2d 204
786 A.2d 205
786 A.2d 206

786 A.2d 207
OPINION

NEWMAN, Justice.

Michael Pierce (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the denial of his first petition for post-conviction relief, pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

We described the facts of Appellant's convictions for three counts of first-degree murder and related charges in our opinion on direct review as follows:

The evidence presented in the instant case established that at approximately 3:00 a.m. on the morning of July 10, 1989, Joan Pierce, the appellant's sister, was awakened by the strong smell of gasoline. Joan woke her father, George Pierce, and the two of them descended the stairs to discover the living room sofa on fire. George Pierce opened the basement door and flames then shot forth, forcing them to flee the house. George reentered the house in an attempt to rescue his wife and mother-in-law. George was unable to reach the stairs and collapsed inside. He was pulled out of the flaming building by neighbors who had been awakened by the fire.
786 A.2d 209
George was taken from the scene to a hospital where he was treated for burns and smoke inhalation. Eventually he was transferred to a nursing home where he died six months later from complications due to smoke inhalation and bronchopneumonia. Appellant's mother, Mary Pierce and her ninety-five-year old mother, Anna Hayes, were pronounced dead at the scene, with the cause of death later determined to be smoke and soot inhalation.
Upon investigation, experts from the Philadelphia fire department determined that the house burned down as a result of two separate fires, each having been deliberately set. The minor cause of the fire was found to have been deliberately caused by an open flame being struck to the sofa. The major cause of the fire was found to have occurred in the basement by use of an accelerant. In the opinion of the fire department expert, a plastic anti-freeze bottle found on the basement floor had been filled with gasoline and deliberately set ablaze. In the opinion of the fire department investigator, the fire was the result of arson. The Pierce home was located at 3011 Byberry Road in Philadelphia and was physically located within a row of attached houses.
Sharon DeFazio, a neighbor, testified that she recognized the anti-freeze bottle as identical to the one George Pierce used as a container for gasoline for his lawnmower. Ms. DeFazio testified that Mr. Pierce had, shortly before the fire, given her a similar bottle filled with gasoline for her lawnmower, explaining that it was a safer container in which to keep gasoline. Ms. DeFazio also knew where in his garage Mr. Pierce had kept his anti-freeze bottle containing gasoline. After the fire, the anti-freeze bottle containing gasoline was not found in the Pierce garage.
In the garden behind the Pierce home a partial impression of a shoe print was discovered. Soil samples taken from the impression matched soil samples taken from the boots the appellant was wearing on the morning of the fire. A short distance away from and to the rear of the Pierce home, in an area of abandoned buildings, police discovered a partially used book of matches. The same type of matchbooks [sic] were found in a box of matchbooks at the home of Tim O'Reilly, where the appellant had been staying the week preceding the fire. The area containing the abandoned buildings was surrounded by a fence. On the top rail of the fence police discovered a soil sample which matched with the samples taken from the impression in the garden of the Pierce home and the sample from the appellant's boots.
At the time the fire was raging two teen-age boys were in the vicinity. The boys, Harry Espanshade [sic] and Randy Zehnder, approached two officers who were in the area on an unrelated matter and told them of the fire. The boys then began to walk through the woods towards the fire. As they were proceeding towards the fire, they saw a man running away from the fire wearing jeans and a flannel shirt over a dark T-shirt. The boys immediately gave the police a description of the man. A few minutes later they again saw the man, this time without the flannel shirt. Two hours later while at the scene of the fire the boys saw the same man walking up the street toward the Pierce home. They identified him as the appellant.
Police Sergeant Shanfield was one of the officers who had been notified of the fire by Harry and Randy. As he was driving towards the Pierce house a man crossed in front of his car and ran into the woods. As the man was running
786 A.2d 210
Sergeant Shanfield observed him stumble. Two and one-half hours later the Sergeant saw appellant at the police station and recognized him as the man he had seen running into the woods earlier. After appellant was arrested, he was treated at the Philadelphia county prison for an injury to his toe.
Joan Pierce, appellant's sister, testified that her parents and appellant had a very strained relationship. Appellant had accused his parents of putting steroids in his food and depriving him of an inheritance from his Uncle Al. One week prior to the fire George and Mary had asked appellant to leave the family residence. Appellant had told Joan on many occasions that he hated their parents and threatened to kill them. Joan had seen appellant on Sunday night before the fire; he was wearing jeans, a dark T-shirt and a red flannel shirt and boots.
The week before the fire appellant had been living with his friend Tim O'Reilly and Tim's mother across the street from his parents' home. Mrs. O'Reilly testified that during that week appellant had told her that he would have no peace while his parents were alive. Appellant told Mrs. O'Reilly that he would get away with murdering his parents and would flee to Indonesia. Mrs. O'Reilly related this conversation to Joan Pierce.
Tim O'Reilly testified that during the week appellant stayed in his home, appellant repeatedly expressed the intent to kill his parents. Appellant told Tim of his intent to burn down the Pierce home and either commit suicide or escape to Indonesia. Appellant referred to his parents as "the enemy." Appellant explained that he would break his grandmother's neck so she wouldn't have to suffer, or be placed in a nursing home.
Appellant had a disagreement with Tim's mother and decided to leave the O'Reilly home the Sunday before the fire. Appellant left Tim's house about 11:00 p.m. Sunday night before the fire. At that time he was wearing a dark blue or green T-shirt, jeans and boots, and carrying a black and red flannel shirt Tim had given him.
At approximately 3:25 a.m. on the morning following appellant's departure from the O'Reilly home, Tim was in his kitchen when he noticed lights on in the Pierce garage and observed the garage door partially opened. About ten minutes later the lights went out and he heard a thud and then saw the garage door was closed. Two minutes thereafter he saw the fire erupt in the Pierce home. Tim called the police and went outside to help with the fire.
Appellant was arrested later that morning when he was observed walking towards the Pierce home.

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 645 A.2d 189, 192-94 (1994).

At the conclusion of Appellant's trial on October 30, 1990, a jury convicted Appellant of three counts of first-degree murder, arson, aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person, and risking a catastrophe. Following a one-day penalty hearing, the jury sentenced Appellant to three concurrent death sentences for each first degree murder conviction, finding that the two aggravating circumstances, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6) (killing while in the perpetration of a felony) and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(7) (knowingly creating grave risk of death to another), outweighed the one mitigating factor, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(1) (no significant history of prior criminal convictions). Appellant obtained new counsel and filed post-verdict motions alleging trial counsel's ineffectiveness. The trial court denied these motions. On

786 A.2d 211
direct appeal, we affirmed Appellant's Judgment of Sentence. See Pierce, supra.

The present proceedings commenced when Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on October 5, 1994. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an Amended Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief on June 28, 1995. Appellant, through his then counsel, Bernard Siegel, Esquire, filed a Supplement to Amended Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief on January 23, 1997 and a Second Supplement to Amended Motion for Post Conviction Relief on November 12, 1997. The PCRA court held multiple hearings regarding the status of Appellant's petition and his counsel's request that Appellant undergo psychiatric or psychological evaluation to explore potential PCRA issues concerning the effectiveness of prior counsel in developing mental health mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of Appellant's trial. The PCRA court permitted Appellant to retain a psychologist and held a hearing on July 30, 1997, at which Appellant was present and stated on the record his refusal to undergo psychological evaluation.2 Because Appellant refused to cooperate with the presentation of any potential issues regarding the effectiveness of counsel in investigating possible mental health mitigation evidence, the PCRA court determined that no further evidentiary hearing was needed on Appellant's remaining PCRA...

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173 practice notes
  • Com. v. Bryant
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • August 18, 2004
    ...is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v. (Michael) Pierce, 567 Pa.186, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (2001); Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (1999). A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness w......
  • Com. v. D'AMATO
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • September 2, 2004
    ...to each layer of ineffective assistance, on all three prongs of the ineffectiveness standard as set forth in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203 (2001). These elements are: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel's act or omission lacked a reasonable basis; an......
  • Com. v. Williams, No. 430 CAP.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • June 17, 2008
    ...is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent such error. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 203, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (2001); Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 312, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (1999); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.......
  • Com. v. Smith, No. 436 CAP.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • May 27, 2010
    ...merit, counsel's performance lacked a reasonable basis, and counsel's ineffectiveness caused him prejudice. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 995 A.2d 1151 213 (2001); see also Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987). Prejudice in the context of ineffective......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
170 cases
  • Pierce v. Blaine, No. 04-9000.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • October 24, 2006
    ...App. 31-32. Pierce filed a notice of appeal to the state supreme court and Siegel petitioned to withdraw as counsel. See Commw. v. Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 211 (2001). The request was granted and the trial court appointed Norris Gelman, Esquire, 467 F.3d 366 to handle the appeal. ......
  • Com. v. Bryant
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • August 18, 2004
    ...is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v. (Michael) Pierce, 567 Pa.186, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (2001); Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (1999). A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness w......
  • Com. v. D'AMATO
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • September 2, 2004
    ...to each layer of ineffective assistance, on all three prongs of the ineffectiveness standard as set forth in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203 (2001). These elements are: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel's act or omission lacked a reasonable basis; an......
  • Com. v. Williams, No. 430 CAP.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • June 17, 2008
    ...is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent such error. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 203, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (2001); Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 312, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (1999); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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