Com. v. Piole

Decision Date24 January 1994
Citation431 Pa.Super. 391,636 A.2d 1143
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Joseph A. PIOLE, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Thomas R. Ceraso, Greensburg, for appellant.

Kevin F. McCarthy, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for Com., appellee.

Before ROWLEY, President Judge, and JOHNSON and HUDOCK, JJ.

ROWLEY, President Judge:

Joseph A. Piole, (hereinafter "appellant") has appealed from the judgment of sentence imposed following his bench trial conviction of one count of Aggravated Assault 1 and one count of Simple Assault 2. On appeal, he claims that he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth's failure to provide him with the statement of an eye-witness during pre-trial discovery such that he is now entitled to a new trial. Having reviewed this claim in light of the relevant law, we conclude that it is without merit. We affirm.

As a result of a bar fight, appellant was arrested and charged with a single count of Aggravated Assault, and two counts of Simple Assault. We approve and adopt the trial court's accurate summation of the factual background of this case as adduced from the trial testimony:

"On the evening of June 14, 1992, the victim, Lyle Lawver, along with his friends, Rege O'Rourke and Paul Christiann, went to Bellisario's Lounge, located on Duncan Avenue, [in] McCandless Township [Allegheny County]. They arrived [at the bar] about 11 o'clock in the evening. Subsequently, Lawver observed his friend, O'Rourke, having a discussion with [appellant]. Lawver observed O'Rourke's mannerisms, which caused him to laugh. [Appellant,] apparently taking objection to Lawver's [amusement,] came around the horseshoe-shaped bar and confronted Lawver, asking if he was some sort of tough guy. Lawver responded [by] telling [appellant] [that] he obviously had a problem with somebody but it had nothing to do with [Lawver]. Lawver then turned his back on [appellant,] feeling threatened. He next remembered a beer bottle being smashed in his face.

Anthony Bellisario, the bar manager, testified that [appellant] was one of four men who were involved in an altercation earlier that evening. Subsequently, the four men began began 'banging other people around.' Bellisario decided [not to serve the four men any more alcoholic beverages]. However, they asked if they could have one more drink, and Bellisario [acquiesced]. He testified: 'And, after I gave them the other round of drinks, it looked like things [had] gotten worse [than they were] before.' Bellisario [also testified] that 10 or 15 minutes later, he observed [appellant] walk behind [Bellisario] to the other side of the bar, where he took a position next to the victim. As Bellisario watched both sides of the bar, he heard a bottle shatter and then observed [appellant] holding the victim with one hand and punching him in the face with the other.

Bartender Cathy Huncheck stated [that] she heard noise on the other side of the bar and then heard glass breaking. When she turned around, she observed [appellant's] arms moving as though he were punching, but [she] had no idea who was on the floor. When [onlookers] picked [the victim] up, she observed that his face was [very] bloody.

Kitchen chef, John Sciulli, testified that he heard broken glass and a lot of noise. He ran over to where the incident occurred and observed [appellant] on top of the victim swinging his arms up and down.

Sandra Lubbert, a real estate office manager, was at Bellisario's [Lounge] that evening because she dated a man who worked there. She observed the victim, apparently leaning against the bar, with several men surrounding him. She then observed [appellant] hit [the victim] with [a] beer bottle, knocking him up against the wall ... behind him. [Appellant] continued his assault [upon the victim] by punching [him] several times in the face as he slid down the wall onto the floor. [Ms. Lubber] observed that the [beer] bottle broke upon impact with Lawver's face and that [appellant] struck [Lawver] at least eight to ten times.

Subsequently, [appellant] admitted to McCandless Township Police Officer Gary W. Anderson that he [had] struck Lawver with a bottle, [but contended] that it was in retaliation [for] being 'sucker-punched.' At trial, however, [appellant] absolutely denied [ever] striking Lawver with a bottle. Th[e] [trial] court found [appellant] and his defense witnesses to be absolutely uncredible."

(Trial Court Opinion, 3/5/93, pp. 2-4).

The trial court found appellant guilty of Aggravated Assault and one count of Simple Assault as a result of the altercation. However, appellant was found not guilty as to the second count of Simple Assault. Appellant filed timely post-verdict motions, which were then denied by the trial court. Appellant thereafter filed the instant appeal, contending that he is entitled to a new trial because of the Commonwealth's failure to provide him with the statement of eyewitness Sandra Lubbert in accordance with the provisions of Rule 305(B)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 3. That rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows (2) Discretionary with the Court: In all court cases, ..., if the defendant files a motion for pretrial discovery, the court may order the Commonwealth to allow the defendant's attorney to inspect and copy or photograph any of the following requested items, upon a showing that they are material to the preparation of the defense, and that the request is reasonable:

(a) the names and addresses of eyewitnesses;

(b) all written or recorded statements and substantially verbatim oral statements of eyewitnesses the Commonwealth intends to call at trial; ....

Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(B).

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth's failure to provide him with the statement of Sandra Lubbert prior to trial prejudiced him in two distinct ways. First, appellant claims that because he was not aware of her statement prior to trial he could not adequately prepare for cross-examination of that witness. In his brief, appellant asserts that there is "no way of knowing whether or not her prior statement may have permitted defense counsel to impeach her credibility."

We find appellant's claim in this regard to be without merit. In so concluding, we approve and adopt the trial court's analysis and disposition of this issue, as stated in its well-reasoned opinion:

"It has been held that the prosecution does not violate the discovery rules in instances where it fails to provide the defense with evidence that it does not possess or [of] which it is unaware [during pre-trial discovery, even if the evidence is in police custody]. Commonwealth v. Bonacurso, 500 Pa. 247, 455 A.2d 1175 (1983), [cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120, 103 S.Ct. 3090, 77 L.Ed.2d 1350 (1983) ]. Such is the case here."

(Trial Court Opinion, 3/5/93, p. 8) 4.

Moreover, as the Commonwealth notes in its brief, the record is very unclear as to whether Ms. Lubbert's statement was even written down by the police officer who questioned her, much less in a form which would be discoverable. The courts of this Commonwealth...

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4 cases
  • Com. v. Burke, 6 W.D.2000.
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • October 17, 2001
    ...violation, the prosecutor cited two cases, Commonwealth v. Bonacurso, 500 Pa. 247, 455 A.2d 1175 (1983), and Commonwealth v. Piole, 431 Pa.Super. 391, 636 A.2d 1143 (1994), for the proposition that the prosecution does not violate discovery rules when it fails to provide the defense with ev......
  • Com. v. Sullivan
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • March 25, 2003
    ...v. Colson, 507 Pa. 440, 490 A.2d 811 (1985); Commonwealth v. Bonacurso, 500 Pa. 247, 455 A.2d 1175 (1983); Commonwealth v. Piole, 431 Pa.Super. 391, 636 A.2d 1143 (1994); Commonwealth v. Battiato, 422 Pa.Super. 285, 619 A.2d 359 (1993); Commonwealth v. Rakes, 398 Pa.Super. 440, 581 A.2d 212......
  • Com. v. Neal
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • June 24, 1998
    ...is clear that the waiver of a jury trial has no impact upon either the burden of proof or evidentiary rules. See Commonwealth v. Piole, 431 Pa.Super. 391, 636 A.2d 1143 (1994). Therefore, the claims in question merely assert the existence of a constitutional violation and ineffective assist......
  • Rosenfield v. Pennsylvania Auto. Ins. Plan
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • January 27, 1994

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