Com. v. Pond
| Decision Date | 25 March 2004 |
| Citation | 846 A.2d 699 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. David POND, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Scranton, for appellant.
Ellen Goffer, Asst. Dist. Atty., Scranton, for Com., appellee.
¶ 1 David Pond appeals from the judgment of sentence of six to twenty-three months' imprisonment imposed following his conviction for violating the verification of residence provisions of the Registration of Sexual Offenders statute, as amended, commonly referred to as Megan's Law II. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.7 (as amended May 10, 2000, effective July 9, 2000). We reverse the judgment of sentence.
¶ 2 A brief factual and procedural history follows. In 1990, Appellant was convicted of sexual crimes falling under Megan's Law. He served his maximum prison sentence and was released on April 15, 2000. On the day before Appellant's release, an employee of the prison, Vito Casella, provided information to Appellant with regard to the mandatory registration provisions of Megan's Law1 and registered Appellant as a sex offender. See N.T. Trial, 10/7/02, at 22-25. Mr. Casella informed Appellant that he had to report changes of address to the Pennsylvania State Police within ten calendar days of moving, as per Megan's Law. Id. at 24-25. Appellant read and signed the registration notification form. Id. at 26.
¶ 3 State Trooper Sean Doran was on duty at the State Police barracks on September 20, 2000, when Appellant voluntarily arrived to complete a change of address form. Id. at 40-41, 49. Although Trooper Doran did not have a specific recollection of Appellant coming in to do this, Trooper Doran testified that it was his normal practice to fill out the form, including the former and new address information, based on information provided by the offender, following which the offender signs the form. Id. at 42-44, 47. Trooper Doran testified that he could not have made a mistake on the form because he filled out the form based on information provided by Appellant and then Appellant signed it. Id. at 43-44. Appellant was not provided a copy of the form and so, as he contends, he was not aware of a mistake on the form until the police arrived to arrest him for violation of the Megan's Law II address verification provisions. Id. at 66, 85-86.
¶ 4 The form completed by Trooper Doran and signed by Appellant was presented at trial in this matter. Id. at 40. It revealed that Trooper Doran wrote Appellant's former address as the state correctional institution at Waymart, where Appellant was formerly incarcerated, although Trooper Doran admitted that he knew Appellant was not incarcerated when he arrived at the barracks to complete the change of address form. Id. at 49-50. In the new address area of the form, Trooper Doran wrote down a North Main Avenue address in Scranton. Curiously, the former address area of the form indicated the same phone number as the new address area of the form. Id. at 52. The number included a Scranton area code, even though the state correctional institution is not in Scranton. Id. Additionally, the change of address form indicated the same old and new addresses as the initial registration form filled-out just prior to Appellant's release from prison.
¶ 5 A Scranton detective, Victor Sanguiliano, testified that on November 13, 2001, he received a report from the Megan's Law section of the Pennsylvania State Police indicating that Appellant may have failed to properly verify his address. Id. at 79. The report indicated that Appellant's last known address was the North Main Avenue address in Scranton. Id. at 80. Detective Sanguiliano went to that address and discovered that Appellant was not residing there, so he went to the post office, which, as of September 12, 2000, had a forwarding address listed for Appellant in Scranton at 1725A Stafford Avenue. Id. Detective Sanguiliano went to the Stafford Avenue address and discovered that Appellant was residing there. Id. at 81. He discovered that this last address change was not properly registered by Appellant and, therefore, Appellant was arrested. Id. at 81-82. Specifically, Appellant was charged with violating sections 9796(b) () and 9796(c) () of Megan's Law II, both of which are graded as third-degree felonies.
¶ 6 A jury trial was held on October 7 and 8, 2002. At trial, the Commonwealth argued that failure to properly register is a strict liability crime and an allegation of mistake is no defense. Additionally, the trial court gave the following jury instruction:
The defendant's theory of the case is that he provided that information, but the police officer erroneously marked that down on the form. A mistake as to a matter of fact is only a defense if it negates the intent of the defendant as required by law. In the charge against the defendant the Commonwealth need not prove a specific intent. If he were to have indicated that he mistakenly gave the wrong address that is not a defense to the case.
N.T. Trial, 10/8/02, at 111-112. Appellant's trial counsel did not object to this charge. The jury found Appellant guilty of violating the verification of residence provision at section 9796(c) of Megan's Law II. Appellant, represented by new counsel, filed a post trial motion challenging the above jury instruction and asserting trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to object to the instruction and similar comments made by the Commonwealth. Essentially, Appellant's position is that the Commonwealth failed to present evidence with regard to the mens rea required to establish the crime of failure to properly verify one's address under Megan's Law II and, in turn, that mistake is a defense for the failure to properly register. The trial court subsequently denied Appellant's post trial motion. Appellant filed the instant, timely appeal.
¶ 7 Appellant raises two issues in this appeal. Appellant first argues that there is a mens rea requirement under section 9796 of Megan's Law II for the crime of failing to properly verify one's address. Within this first issue, Appellant also argues that the Commonwealth, proceeding on the incorrect assumption that there is no mens rea element, failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a mens rea underlying the incorrect current address noted on the change of address form completed by Trooper Doran based on information provided by Appellant.2 This issue is one of first impression in Pennsylvania, that is, whether the failure to properly verify one's address under Megan's Law II requires a showing of intent, or some other degree of mens rea, on the part of the offender. Accordingly, we must examine the statutory language of Megan's Law II. ¶ 8 Appellant was not deemed a "sexually violent predator" under Megan's Law II. Rather, Appellant falls into the general category of "sexual offender," which has somewhat different and arguably less onerous registration requirements than those applicable to sexually violent predators. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9792 (). Compare 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(a) () with § 9795.1(b)(1)-(3) (). Appellant is required to register for ten years pursuant to section 9795.1(a) of Megan's Law II.
¶ 9 Additionally, under Megan's Law II, sexual offenders must register with the Pennsylvania State Police upon release from incarceration and must provide information pertaining to all current or intended residences. Id. at § 9795.2(a)(1) (). Sexual offenders must inform the Pennsylvania State Police within ten days of "[a]ny change of residence or establishment of an additional residence or residences...." Id. at § 9795.2(a)(2)(i). As in Appellant's case, where the sexual offender has completed serving his maximum term of imprisonment for the underlying sexual offense, the Department of Corrections must collect registration information, including intended residence, prior to the offender's release from prison. Id. at § 9795.2(a)(4)(i). The Department of Corrections then forwards such information to the Pennsylvania State Police. Id. If the offender to be released from prison after serving his maximum term refuses to provide registration information, the Department of Corrections must so notify the Pennsylvania State Police and provide the offender's expected release date, time and location. Id. at § 9795.2(a)(4)(ii). Such is not the case here, as Appellant did not refuse to provide information prior to his release. The issue is, rather, the incorrect change of address information memorialized by Trooper Doran several months following Appellant's release.
¶ 10 Accordingly, Appellant was convicted under the following section of Megan's Law II:
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