Com. v. Pucillo
Decision Date | 18 March 1998 |
Citation | 427 Mass. 108,692 N.E.2d 15 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Christopher PUCILLO. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Robert A. George, Boston, for defendant.
Robert C. Cosgrove, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Before WILKINS, C.J., and ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY and IRELAND, JJ.
A jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree as a joint venturer under theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, the defendant claims that the judge erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements he made to police; (2) denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty; and 3) instructing the jury on joint venture. He also requests that we exercise our plenary power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or to reduce the murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the conviction and decline to exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E.
Facts. We set forth the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for discussion in conjunction with certain issues raised. See Commonwealth v. Nichypor, 419 Mass. 209, 210, 643 N.E.2d 452 (1994); Commonwealth v. Burnett, 417 Mass. 740, 741, 632 N.E.2d 1206 (1994). On the evening of June 3, 1993, the defendant, two companions, and the victim purchased a case of beer and a bottle of vodka, and then proceeded to an area known as "Sharon Woods" in Sharon. The four spent the next two hours drinking in a secluded area of the woods near Gavin's Pond. While still in the woods at approximately 9 P.M., the defendant and his two companions secretly made plans to "jump" the victim. Soon thereafter, the three attacked the victim by wrapping a jacket or shirt around the victim's head, knocking him to the ground, and beating him with their fists and feet. They also removed the victim's clothing as he lay motionless on the ground. One of the defendant's companions then found a stick with which he subsequently penetrated the victim's rectum and struck his testicles. For his part, the defendant conceded that he "just kept hitting" and "kicking" the victim. The attack lasted about thirty minutes. At this point, the victim's face was still covered, and there were no signs that he was either conscious or breathing. The defendant's two companions then dragged the victim to the edge of the pond and held his head under water for an extended period. The defendant checked the victim's pulse and found none. Finally, one of the defendant's companions stabbed the victim in the neck. They then covered the half-submerged body with a blanket and sticks from the woods, and the three left the scene.
After finding the victim's body and learning that he had last been seen in the company of the defendant and his two companions, the police interviewed the defendant on the morning of Saturday, June 5. He told them at that time that, on the night of the victim's disappearance, he and his two companions had dropped off the victim at 8 P.M. at Wrentham Center. He then left the police station. At approximately 6 P.M., however, the defendant voluntarily returned to the station, and was subsequently placed under arrest in connection with the victim's death.
1. The defendant's statement. At a suppression hearing, the motion judge found the following facts. On his arrest the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, and chose not to make any statements at that time. After his father encouraged him to speak openly with the police, the defendant agreed to be interviewed again. The interview was tape recorded by the police. At the outset, the defendant was given a written form containing Miranda warnings. State police Lieutenant Robert Zepf then read the form aloud to the defendant. The defendant acknowledged that he understood each right, and subsequently signed the Miranda form. Over the next hour and twenty minutes, the defendant made statements linking himself to the victim's death.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the judge erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress these statements. "In reviewing a judge's determination regarding a knowing waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness, we 'grant substantial deference to the judge's ultimate conclusions and we will not reject a judge's subsidiary findings if they are warranted by the evidence.' " Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 412, 492 N.E.2d 74 (1986), quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 389 Mass. 411, 419, 451 N.E.2d 101 (1983). "However, we conduct an independent review to ascertain whether the judge properly applied the law." Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 425 Mass. 361, 364, 682 N.E.2d 591 (1997). The Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a Miranda waiver was valid. Commonwealth v. Magee, 423 Mass. 381, 386, 668 N.E.2d 339 (1996). "To be valid [a] waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 670, 651 N.E.2d 398 (1995). In determining the voluntariness of a waiver, "the court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the waiver." Commonwealth v. Magee, supra at 386, 668 N.E.2d 339, quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra at 670, 651 N.E.2d 398. The relevant factors include "promises or other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the defendant's age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the police), and the details of the interrogation, including the recitation of Miranda warnings." Commonwealth v. Mandile, supra at 413, 492 N.E.2d 74.
In the present case, the judge's findings, which were warranted by the evidence, amply support the conclusion that the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was valid. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was seventeen years old and had attained a tenth-grade education. See Commonwealth v. Sarourt Nom, 426 Mass. 152, 158, 686 N.E.2d 1017 (1997) ( ); Commonwealth v. Guyton, 405 Mass. 497, 498, 541 N.E.2d 1006 (1989) ( ). Moreover, he was apprised of his Miranda rights both orally and in writing, stated that he understood them, and subsequently waived each. Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 384, 649 N.E.2d 1106 (1995). As he did this, the defendant appeared "responsive" and "coherent," and "did not appear to be confused." Commonwealth v. Raymond, 424 Mass. 382, 396, 676 N.E.2d 824 (1997). Finally, there was no evidence of coercion or other "unfair tactics" on the part of the police. Commonwealth v. Silva, 388 Mass. 495, 503, 447 N.E.2d 646 (1983). The interviewing officer's warning to the defendant that "it would be better if he were truthful" falls far short of the type of police assurances, express or implied, which we have previously found impermissible. See Commonwealth v. Raymond, supra at 395-396, 676 N.E.2d 824; Commonwealth v. Mandile, supra at 414-415, 492 N.E.2d 74, citing Commonwealth v. Meehan, 377 Mass. 552, 564, 387 N.E.2d 527 (1979), cert. dismissed, 445 U.S. 39, 100 S.Ct. 1092, 63 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). Similarly, the defendant's lack of prior experience with police procedures does not necessarily invalidate his waiver, especially where, as the judge found, he had successfully invoked his right to silence earlier in the evening. Commonwealth v. Mandile, supra at 414, 492 N.E.2d 74. Consequently, the judge properly concluded that the defendant's waiver was valid. 1
2. Motion for required finding of not guilty. The defendant next contends that the judge erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty. In reviewing such a contention, "we determine whether the evidence offered by the Commonwealth, together with reasonable inferences therefrom, when viewed in its light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to persuade a rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the crime charged." Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 686, 393 N.E.2d 820 (1979).
Specifically, the defendant claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he shared the requisite intent for conviction under a joint venture theory. In order to convict a defendant as a joint venturer, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant "was (1) present at the scene of the crime, (2) with knowledge that another intends to commit the crime or with intent to commit a crime, and (3) by agreement ... willing and available to help the other if necessary." Commonwealth v. Bianco, 388 Mass. 358, 366, 446 N.E.2d 1041,, S.C., 390 Mass. 254, 454 N.E.2d 901 (1983). "Additionally, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant shared with the principal the mental state required for the crime of murder." Commonwealth v. Semedo, 422 Mass. 716, 719, 665 N.E.2d 638 (1996). The mental state required for murder is malice aforethought. Malice aforethought includes intent to kill or cause grievous bodily injury. Alternatively, malice may be inferred if, in the circumstances known to the defendant, "a reasonably prudent person would have known that according to common experience there was a plain and strong likelihood that death would follow the contemplated act." Commonwealth v. Grey, 399 Mass. 469, 470 n. 1, 505 N.E.2d 171 (1987).
Here, the jury could reasonably have found from the evidence presented by the Commonwealth that the defendant shared malice aforethought with his companions. "The jury may infer the requisite mental state from the defendant's knowledge of the circumstances and subsequent participation in the offense." Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 470, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S....
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