Com. v. Rhine
Decision Date | 14 June 1957 |
Citation | 303 S.W.2d 301 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellant, v. Henry RHINE, Appellee. |
Court | Supreme Court of Kentucky |
Jo M. Ferguson, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Matthews, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., A. Scott Hamilton, Louisville, for appellant.
Robert W. Zollinger, Louisville, for appellee.
Carl L. Wedekind, Jr., Louisville, for Kentucky Civil Liberties Union, Inc., amicus curiae.
On October 23, 1956, during the course of a hearing before the Jefferson County grand jury, Henry Rhine was summoned and questioned concerning his association with Carl Braden. The first twenty-seven questions asked by the Commonwealth's Attorney, A. Scott Hamilton, were innocuous. They related to Rhine's past residences, education and work history, and were answered readily by him. In Question 28, he was asked how long he had known Braden. Rhine refused to answer on the ground that it might incriminate him. In ensuing questions, he was asked whether he was or had ever been a member of the Communist Party, whether he had ever attended cell meetings in Jefferson County, and whether he had been acquainted with known or suspected associates of Braden. Rhine asserted his privilege on the ground of self-incrimination and refused to answer any of the questions propounded by the Commonwealth's Attorney. Questions 56 and 57, together with Rhine's answers, were as follows:
'56 Q. Mr. Rhine, regardless of whether or not you are a Communist--I am not interested in that--but do you know whether or nor Carl Braden is a Communist? A. Same answer. I refuse to answer on the ground that anything I may say may tend to incriminate me. * * *
* * *'
Questions 56 and 57 were certified to the trial judge for a ruling. He ruled that Rhine was privileged not to answer. The Commonwealth is appealing for the purpose of a certification of the law under Section 337 of the Criminal Code of Practice.
The Commonwealth urges first that answers to the certified questions could not result in incriminating Rhine, because the Commonwealth's Attorney told Rhine in Question 56 that he was not concerned with Rhine's connection with the Communist Party. It is argued further that the privilege was not available for the protection of third persons, and that Rhine attempted so to use the privilege in his answers to the questions certified.
The first argument requires little comment. Rhine was advised carefully concerning his privilege to refuse to make self-incriminating answers at the beginning of the questioning. Most of the questions were directed towards eliciting information concerning Rhine himself. Even if it be concluded that the Commonwealth's Attorney's phrasing in Questions 56 and 57 amounted to an offer of immunity to the witness, we have not been referred to any statute, nor have we found any, empowering him to grant immunity in this kind of hearing. Rhine was not called to testify for the Commonwealth in a sedition prosecution, and thus was not placed within the limits of our immunity statute. See KRS 432.020 to 432.070. Furthermore, it was necessarily beyond the power of the Commonwealth's Attorney to provide immunity from prosecution by the United States Government, even if it should be considered that he could so insulate the witness from prosecution by the Commonwealth.
Even though the question certified seemingly were not directed toward discovering facts about the witness himself, answers to them could have provided an essential link of evidence in a prosecution against Rhine. As stated by Chief Justice Marshall,
United States v. Burr (In re Willie), 25 Fed.Cas., pages 38, 40, No. 14,692e.
There is no doubt that the information desired by the Commonwealth's Attorney could have provided some evidence for a Federal prosecution under the Smith Act or other related Federal statutes. As to the determination of the evidentiary value of the information by the trial judge, we are inclined to follow the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit:
'* * * in determining whether the witness really apprehends danger in...
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