Com. v. Riedel

• Decision Date: 01 December 1994
• Citation: 539 Pa. 172,651 A.2d 135
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Donald Wayne RIEDEL, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 135

651 A.2d 135

539 Pa. 172

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Donald Wayne RIEDEL, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted April 7, 1994.

Decided Dec. 1, 1994.

[539 Pa. 175] Samuel A. Gates, Hanover, for D.W. Riedel.

H. Stanley Rebert, Jonelle L. Harter, York, for Com.

Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.

OPINION

MONTEMURO, Justice.

Appellant, Donald Wayne Riedel, was convicted of Driving Under the Influence, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3731(a)(1) and (a)(4), with a blood alcohol content of 0.255 percent. His appeal to this Court involves the interpretation of the implied consent scheme of the Motor Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1547 and 3755. The pertinent facts follow.

On November 17, 1990, appellant and his girlfriend sustained injuries in a one-car accident in York County, Pennsylvania. When Pennsylvania State Trooper Brian Travis arrived at the scene, emergency medical technicians were already administering treatment in an ambulance. The officer entered the vehicle, and observed the medical team questioning appellant in order to determine his mental state. Appellant's answers were confused, his eyes were glassy, and one of the EMT technicians advised the trooper that appellant had alcohol on his breath. Additionally, Trooper Travis observed a number of empty and full beer cans in the area, and that the full beer cans were cold.

Trooper Travis proceeded to the hospital where appellant was taken for further treatment, apparently intending to request that appellant's blood be drawn for chemical analysis. When the officer arrived at the hospital, he learned that blood had already been taken for medical reasons. Trooper Travis did not request that blood be drawn for chemical testing pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755(a).

Subsequently, Trooper Travis wrote to the hospital requesting the results of appellant's blood test, which indicated a blood alcohol level of 0.255 percent. Based on this information, appellant was charged with driving under the influence, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3731(a)(1) and (a)(4), convicted in a non-jury trial, and sentenced to forty-eight hours to twelve months imprisonment and a $500 fine. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, 425 Pa.Super. 649, 620 A.2d 541.

Appellant raises two arguments on appeal. First, appellant argues the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures when, in the absence of exigent circumstances, they obtained the results of his medical purposes blood test without a warrant. We emphasize that appellant raises this challenge only under the Constitution of the United States, and not that of Pennsylvania. Second, appellant asserts he was denied the right to refuse blood-alcohol testing under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, the Implied Consent Law. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment applies to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334, 105 S.Ct. 733, 738-39, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985).

In order to determine whether appellant's Fourth Amendment rights were implicated by the instant search and seizure, we must determine whether the alleged search was performed by the government or its agents. Commonwealth v. Cieri, 346 Pa.Super. 77, 84, 499 A.2d 317, 320-321 (1985). If such a search was performed, we then consider whether appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his medical records. In re June 1979 Allegheny Cty. Inv. Gr. Jury, 490 Pa. 143, 150, 415 A.2d 73, 77 (1980); Commonwealth v. Hipp, 380 Pa.Super. 345, 354, 551 A.2d 1086, 1090 (1988). Finally, if appellant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, we consider whether the search and seizure of appellant's medical records was reasonable. Commonwealth v. Franz, 430 Pa.Super. 394, 400, 634 A.2d 662, 664 (1993).

In order to determine whether a search was performed by the government or its agents,

the critical factor "is whether [the private individual] in light of all the circumstances of the case, must be regarded as having acted as an 'instrument' or agent of the state...." To determine this, one must look to the purpose of the search, the party who initiated it, and whether the government acquiesced in it or ratified it.

Cieri, 346 Pa.Super. at 84, 499 A.2d at 321 (citations omitted).

In the instant case, appellant was subjected to two different searches, the latter of which involved government action. The first search of appellant occurred when the hospital took blood samples to facilitate medical treatment. However, because the hospital did not withdraw appellant's blood at the direction of Trooper Travis, this search did not implicate appellant's Fourth Amendment rights. Compare Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-772, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1836-1837, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (withdrawal of blood constitutes a search). Rather, the hospital withdrew appellant's blood on its own initiative for its own specific purposes. Commonwealth v. Franz, 430 Pa.Super. 394, 398, 634 A.2d 662, 663 (1993); Cieri, at 85, 499 A.2d at 321.

The second search occurred when Trooper Travis obtained the results of appellant's blood test by mailing a request to the director of the hospital's laboratory. The hospital, in complying with the trooper's request, acted as an agent of the government: the purpose of the search was to obtain appellant's blood test results for use in his subsequent prosecution, police initiated the search, and the Commonwealth ratified the search by using the test results to convict appellant. Cieri, at 85, 499 A.2d at 321; Franz, 430 Pa.Super. at 399-400, 634 A.2d at 664. Consequently, the search implicated appellant's Fourth Amendment rights, and we must determine whether appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his medical records.

The courts of this Commonwealth as well as the Third Circuit have always recognized "that an individual has a substantial privacy interest in his or her medical records." McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1253 (3d Cir.1993); In re June 1979, 490 Pa. at 151, 415 A.2d at 77-78; Hipp, 380 Pa.Super. 345, 354, 551 A.2d 1086, 1090; but cf. People v. Perlos, 436 Mich. 305, 325, 462 N.W.2d 310, 319 (1990) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in blood test results). However, this privacy right is not inviolate. See In re June 1979, 490 Pa. at 152, 415 A.2d at 78 (hospital medical records necessary for purpose of investigation obtainable pursuant to subpoena duces tecum); Hipp, 380 Pa.Super. at 355, 551 A.2d at 1091 (privacy not abridged when hospital personnel volunteered blood test results pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1547 and 3755). Rather, "the proper function of the Fourth Amendment ... 'is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.' " Hipp, at 354, 551 A.2d at 1090 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 768, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-1835). Thus, appellant does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his medical records, subject only to reasonable searches and seizures.

Generally, "a search or seizure is not reasonable unless conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant upon a showing of probable cause." Franz, 430 Pa.Super. 394, 400, 634 A.2d 662, 664; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1414, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 161, 615 A.2d 308, 313 (1992). However, exceptions to the warrant requirement do exist. ¹ For example, actual consent, implied consent, search incident to lawful arrest, and exigent circumstances may negate the necessity of obtaining a warrant before conducting a search. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (search incident to lawful arrest and exigent circumstances); Cieri, 346 Pa.Super. 77, 499 A.2d 317 (implied consent); Commonwealth v. Quarles, 229 Pa.Super. 363, 324 A.2d 452 (1974) (plurality opinion) (actual consent).

In the instant case, neither the actual consent nor search incident to lawful arrest exceptions are applicable. The Commonwealth asserts that the implied consent provision of the Motor Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a), and its emergency room counterpart, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755(a), justify the warrantless search of appellant's medical records to obtain his blood test results. See Hipp, 380 Pa.Super. 345, 355-356, 551 A.2d 1086, 1091 (search of blood test results justified under sections 1547 and 3755). On the other hand, appellant argues the search was not valid because of the absence of exigent circumstances. We agree with the Commonwealth, and hold that where an officer has probable cause to request a blood test pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755(a), the failure to verbalize the request shall not bar the officer from obtaining the results of a medical purposes blood test without a warrant.

Section 3755 of the Motor Vehicle Code requires emergency room personnel to withdraw blood from a suspect when

the person who drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the movement of any involved motor vehicle requires medical treatment in an emergency room of a hospital and if probable cause exists to believe a violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance) was involved....

75 Pa.C.S. § 3755(a). The statute directs the testing of the blood by an authorized laboratory, and the release of the results to the driver, his attorney, his doctor, or government officials upon their request. Id.

Similarly, section 1547, known as the Implied Consent Law,...