Com. v. Rivera

Decision Date19 June 2001
Citation565 Pa. 289,773 A.2d 131
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. William RIVERA, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

David Rudenstein, Philadelphia, for William Rivera.

Catherine Marshall, Helen Kane, Philadelphia, for Com.

Robert A. Graci, Harrisburg, for Office of the Attorney General.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION

NIGRO, Justice.

In this capital case, Appellant William Rivera appeals from the sentence of death imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.1 A jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery, criminal conspiracy, robbery of a motor vehicle, and possessing an instrument of a crime. Following a penalty hearing, the jury determined that the one aggravating factor it found, that Appellant killed the victim while committing a felony,2 outweighed the one mitigating factor it found, any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of Appellant and the circumstances of his offense.3 Accordingly, the jury returned a verdict of death, and on March 20, 1998, the trial court formally imposed the death sentence against Appellant.4 After post-sentence motions were filed and denied by the trial court, Appellant filed this direct appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence.

Although Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is required in all cases in which the death sentence has been imposed to independently review the record in order to determine whether the Commonwealth has established the elements necessary to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder. See Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 26, 454 A.2d 937, 942 (1982). When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, in this case, the Commonwealth, and determine whether the fact-finder could have found every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Keaton, 556 Pa. 442, 455, 729 A.2d 529, 536 (1999). Circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to convict a defendant of a crime. See Commonwealth v. Rios, 546 Pa. 271, 279, 684 A.2d 1025, 1028 (1996).

In order to obtain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill, that a human being was unlawfully killed, that the defendant committed the killing, and that the killing was committed with deliberation. See 18 Pa. C.S. § 2502(a); Rios, 546 Pa. at 280, 684 A.2d at 1030. The use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body is sufficient to establish the specific intent to kill. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. 464, 484, 668 A.2d 491, 500 (1995).

Here, the record establishes that on the evening of September 25, 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Kumok Kang closed their jewelry store located on North Front Street in Philadelphia. The Kangs exited the store and crossed the street to their parked station wagon. Mrs. Kang was carrying her pocketbook, a small paper bag containing a makeup kit, and an icebox that she used to carry her lunch. Mr. Kang was carrying a manila envelope containing an x-ray. Appellant and his two accomplices, Robert Ortiz-Bonilla and Luis Centeno, observed the Kangs as they approached the station wagon. Believing that the Kangs were transporting money in the manila envelope, the three men decided to rob the couple.

The Kangs traveled their usual route home, down Front Street towards Rising Sun Avenue. Mr. Kang was driving the car, while Mrs. Kang sat on the passenger side. Mr. Kang stopped at a red light at the intersection of Front Street and Rising Sun Avenue. Suddenly, Mrs. Kang heard shattering glass and the sound of a man's voice screaming at her husband to exit the car. Mrs. Kang observed a gun poking through the shattered glass, aiming straight at her husband's chest.

Mrs. Kang then heard two shots fired. After being dragged out to the front of the car, Mr. Kang was shot two more times. Eyewitnesses later identified Appellant as the shooter. Appellant then entered the driver's side of the station wagon, while one accomplice, later identified as co-defendant Robert Ortiz-Bonilla, opened the passenger side door and yelled at Mrs. Kang to exit the car. While the station wagon was in motion, Mrs. Kang exited the car and Ortiz-Bonilla grabbed her pocketbook and then jumped into the moving vehicle. The vehicle then headed north on Rising Sun Avenue. Later that evening, Mr. Kang was pronounced dead at Einstein Hospital. He suffered four gunshot wounds in total, one to his hand and three to the chest.

Appellant and Ortiz-Bonilla abandoned the station wagon in the Hill Creek Housing Projects and divided the $40 found in Mrs. Kang's pocketbook. The two men split up and met later that evening at the home of Doris Santos, Ortiz-Bonilla's girlfriend at the time. The two men entered the house and requested that she turn on the news. The evening news covered the shooting, showing a picture of the station wagon and also reporting that Mr. Kang had died of the gunshot wounds. After watching the news report, Appellant stated "that's what we did." N.T., 1/30/98, at 67.

The police eventually questioned Appellant about the shooting. On August 10, 1996, Appellant waived his constitutional rights and gave a statement to the police. In that statement, Appellant admitted taking part in the robbery and that he was the shooter that evening. Appellant insisted, however, that the gun accidentally fired while he was struggling with Mr. Kang.

Several eyewitnesses testified at trial. Derek Chapman testified that on the night in question he was with his fiancée, Lissa Woods, when he observed two men on the northbound side of Rising Sun Avenue running towards a station wagon. Mr. Chapman heard two gunshots and then witnessed the victim, Mr. Kang, struggling with the shooter as the shooter dragged him out of the car. After Mr. Kang put his hands up in the air, Mr. Chapman heard another two shots fired. Mr. Chapman then saw a different man, later identified as Ortiz-Bonilla, pull a woman from the passenger side of the same car, and then drive off in the victims' car with the shooter. Lissa Woods, who had previously identified Appellant as the shooter from a photo array, also testified at trial about the events surrounding the shooting.5

This evidence was clearly sufficient to support Appellant's conviction for first-degree murder. Although Appellant claims that the shooting was an accident, the evidence clearly shows that the killing was committed with deliberation and with the specific intent to kill. The medical examiner testified that the victim had four bullet wounds: one to the right hand and three to the upper body. Police Officer John Cannon, a firearms expert, testified that in order for the gun to be fired, the trigger had to be pulled each time. N.T., 1/30/98, at 47. This evidence is more than sufficient to find that Appellant acted with deliberation and with a specific intent to kill. See Jones, 542 Pa. at 484,668 A.2d at 500 (use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body is sufficient to establish the specific intent to kill).

Next, Appellant claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred in failing to sever his trial from his co-defendants. In a cursory fashion, he appears to argue that severance was necessary because the accounts of his co-defendants were in conflict. This claim fails.

The decision whether to grant a motion for severance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent a manifest abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Chester, 526 Pa. 578, 589, 587 A.2d 1367, 1372 (1991). The defendant bears the burden of proving that he was prejudiced by the decision not to sever, and he must show real potential for prejudice rather than mere speculation. See Commonwealth v. Uderra, 550 Pa. 389, 399, 706 A.2d 334, 339 (1998); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 519 Pa. 190, 197, 546 A.2d 596, 600 (1988). The probability of antagonistic defenses is a factor that trial courts should consider in deciding whether to grant severance, but the claim must be more than bare antagonism. See Chester, 526 Pa. at 590, 587 A.2d at 1373. However, when defendants have conflicting versions of what took place, the truth may be more easily determined if all are tried together. See id. Where conspiracy is charged, joint trials are advisable. See id. at 589, 587 A.2d at 1372.

Contrary to Appellant's assertions, the record reveals that the evidence adduced at trial did not conflict concerning the roles of each defendant. All three defendants, including Appellant, agreed in their statements that Appellant was the shooter. All three men also were in agreement that there was no prior plan to kill Mr. Kang, and that the plan was only to rob the Kangs. Appellant simply fails to support his argument that the accounts of the co-defendants "clearly indicated that the defendants were on a collision course." Appellant's Brief at 19. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to sever Appellant's trial from that of his co-defendants on this basis.

Appellant next claims that the trial court should have severed his trial from his co-defendants because the admission of his co-defendant's confession violated his confrontation clause rights pursuant to Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998). Both co-defendant Centeno's and Ortiz-Bonilla's redacted confessions were admitted at trial, but only Centeno testified at trial.6 In each redacted confession, Appellant's name was replaced with the term "other guy," which Appellant asserts did not sufficiently comply with the standards for redaction set forth in Gray. This claim fails.

Under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth...

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