Com. v. Robles

Citation666 N.E.2d 497,423 Mass. 62
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Raul ROBLES, Jr.
Decision Date25 June 1996
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Peter M. Onek, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant.

Elizabeth Dunphy Farris, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and GREANEY, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

The defendant, Raul Robles, Jr., was convicted, after a jury trial, of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, and unlawful carrying of a firearm. He appeals. 1 We conclude that the convictions should be affirmed. We decline to exercise our extraordinary power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E (1994 ed.), to order a new trial, or enter a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt on the conviction of murder in the first degree.

The facts may be briefly summarized as follows: In the early morning hours of February 10, 1991, Daniel Larson was found shot to death in "the Flats" section of Holyoke. Clutched in Larson's hand was his wallet. It contained no money. Testimony revealed that Larson had left his fiancee's house in South Hadley at 12:25 A.M. on the morning of February 10, 1991, with five or six dollars in his wallet. Further testimony revealed that Larson was in the habit of going to the Flats to purchase marihuana. Nelson Vasquez, Larson's alleged supplier recited, over the defendant's objection, that he and the defendant had sold marihuana together in the Flats.

An autopsy of Larson's body revealed the cause of death as two gunshot wounds, one to the neck and one to the right chest. Both wounds were inflicted at close range by bullets from a .38 caliber revolver. The weapon that fired the fatal shots was later recovered from the apartment of the defendant's sister, Marisela Robles. 2 The weapon was linked to the defendant through the testimony of a witness, Raymond LeBlanc. LeBlanc said that he had seen the defendant near the scene of the murder, two weeks earlier, carrying a weapon that looked like the murder weapon. 3

Another witness, Jose Garcia, said that he had seen the defendant at approximately 9:30 P.M. on the night of the murder in the vicinity of the murder scene and that the defendant volunteered that he was looking for someone to rob.

Both LeBlanc and Garcia stated that when they saw the defendant he was wearing a blue, three-quarter length coat. A third witness, Maria Maldonado, said that the defendant was wearing the blue coat in the early morning hours of February 10, 1991, immediately after the murder. 4 Marisela Robles, the defendant's sister, said that the defendant owned the blue coat but that he was not wearing it on the night of the murder. 5 The defendant stated that he was wearing a brown or brown-like coat on the night of the murder. 6 No such coat was recovered by the police.

The defendant was arrested at 1:05 P.M. on February 10, 1991. He was wearing a blue, three-quarter length coat. Captain Page of the Holyoke police department stated that at the time of the defendant's arrest, he observed blood stains on the blue coat. He then obtained a search warrant and sent the coat to the State crime laboratory for analysis. At trial, State crime laboratory forensic chemists opined that the stains on the blue coat were human blood and that the blood was consistent with having come from Daniel Larson and could not have come from Raul Robles.

The defendant; his half-brother, Reynaldo Lorenzi; and Edward Mora were indicted for the murder of Daniel Larson, for armed robbery and for unlawful carrying of a firearm. 7 The Commonwealth alleged that the codefendants participated in a joint venture to rob Daniel Larson and that the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree by virtue of felony-murder.

1. Seizure of blue coat. The defendant moved to suppress the blue coat seized at the time of his arrest and the chemical analysis of its stains, arguing that the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not establish probable cause to seize the coat. 8 His motion was denied orally on January 8, 1992 (two days after the hearing). A written memorandum of findings and ruling was filed on April 29, 1992. The judge concluded, in his written findings, that the affidavit established probable cause because it sufficiently tied the defendant to the gun used in the murder and it was reasonable, given the circumstances of the murder, for the magistrate to infer that clothing worn by the perpetrator could contain evidence. The judge rejected the defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence, given the defendant's statement that he was wearing a brown jacket that night, to connect the blue coat with the murder. The defendant contends that this was error. We agree. Although the judge correctly found that the affidavit sufficiently connected the defendant and, by inference, the clothing he wore the night of the crime, with the crime, the affidavit failed to establish probable cause that the defendant was wearing the blue coat on that night.

To justify seizure of the defendant's personal belongings, the police must establish that the item(s) sought to be seized are connected to criminal activity and that they are in the location sought to be searched. 9 See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370-371, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, 449 N.E.2d 1207, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860, 104 S.Ct. 186, 78 L.Ed.2d 165 (1983); Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 409 N.E.2d 719 (1980). Probable cause to believe that the coat contained evidence of the murder must be established on the face of the affidavit supporting the search warrant. See Commonwealth v. Monosson, 351 Mass. 327, 330, 221 N.E.2d 220 (1966) (judge may not give consideration to testimony presented to magistrate if facts, information, and circumstances contained in affidavit were inadequate to show probable cause); Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 394 Mass. 381, 388, 476 N.E.2d 541 (1985); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 472, 473 n. 1, 657 N.E.2d 1278 (1995). The affidavit before the magistrate requested and described the clothing the defendant was wearing at the time of his arrest. It did not state a belief that the clothing contained evidence of the crime or state probable cause for such a belief. The warrant was, therefore, invalid.

However, if the search warrant is invalid, a search still may be justified as a warrantless search if it fits into one of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Upton, supra at 368, 476 N.E.2d 548. The Commonwealth has argued, both to the motion judge below and to this court, that the seizure was valid incident to the defendant's arrest. See G.L. c. 276, § 1 (1994 ed.) ("A search conducted incident to an arrest may be made only for the purposes of seizing fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and other evidence of the crime for which the arrest has been made, in order to prevent its destruction or concealment ..."); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (reasonable for arresting officer to search for and seize evidence on arrestee's person at time of arrest); Commonwealth v. Blackburn, 354 Mass. 200, 237 N.E.2d 35 (1968). To seize the coat incident to the arrest, the police must have had probable cause to believe that the coat was connected to the crime. See Commonwealth v. Marsh, 354 Mass. 713, 720, 242 N.E.2d 545 (1968) (clothing worn by defendant at time of arrest properly seized; appeared relevant and admissible).

Ordinarily, we would remand for a hearing to determine whether the police had probable cause to seize the coat incident to the defendant's arrest. However, in the unique circumstances of this case, where the Commonwealth attempted to present testimony and argument at the motion hearing in support of its contention that the police had probable cause to seize the coat incident to arrest and where such testimony was elicited at trial and subject to cross-examination by the defendant, we conclude that remand is unnecessary.

At trial, Captain Page stated that, at the time of the defendant's arrest, he noticed blood stains on the sleeve of the coat. He said that this provided him with probable cause to seize the coat. Captain Page's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of two forensic chemists. State crime laboratory chemist Paul J. Zambella testified that fairly large stains on the right sleeve area of the blue coat were visible to the naked eye. He further testified to his initial impression, before testing, that the stain material in fact was blood. State crime laboratory chemist Karolyn LeClaire further corroborated Captain Page's testimony with her observation that the larger stain on the sleeve of the blue coat was approximately the size of an orange and was consistent in appearance with blood. Both chemists were subject to cross-examination by the defendant. The size and appearance of the blood stains on the coat are not in dispute, even after cross-examination at trial by the defendant.

Additionally, the defendant's statement at arrest that he was wearing the same hat and sneakers he wore on the night of the murder gave the police probable cause to believe that the defendant had not disposed of the clothing worn on the night of the murder. We conclude that, on the basis of this undisputed evidence, the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant was wearing the blue coat at the time of the murder and that the coat could contain evidence. Seizure of the coat incident to arrest was proper. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974) (police may seize clothing worn at time of arrest when it becomes apparent that it may contain evidence); Commonwealth v. Williams, 422 Mass. 111, 661 N.E.2d 617 (1996) (proper to seize as evidence clothing and shoes worn by defendant at time of arrest); Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678,...

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  • Commonwealth v. Tremblay
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • October 3, 2018
    ...incident to arrest if they have "probable cause to believe that the [clothing] was connected to the crime." Commonwealth v. Robles, 423 Mass. 62, 66, 666 N.E.2d 497 (1996). "[P]robable cause requires a substantial basis for concluding that the items sought are related to the criminal activi......
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    ...deoxynbonucleic acid, or gunshot residue, and a determination whether a weapon is a working firearm. See Commonwealth v. Robles, 423 Mass. 62, 65 n. 8, 666 N.E.2d 497 (1996); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 352 Mass. 387, 402, 226 N.E.2d 211 (1967); Commonwealth v. Aviles, 58 Mass.App.Ct. 459, 46......
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    ...the police could have seized and tested the defendant's clothing pursuant to a search incident to a valid arrest. See Commonwealth v. Robles, 423 Mass. 62, 65-66, 666 (N.E.2d 497 1996). See also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 806, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974) (police may se......
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