Com. v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 10 July 1997
• Citation: 425 Mass. 361,682 N.E.2d 591
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Eusebio RODRIGUEZ.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 591

682 N.E.2d 591

425 Mass. 361

COMMONWEALTH v. Eusebio RODRIGUEZ.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Essex.

Argued March 3, 1997.

Decided July 10, 1997.

Stanley W. Norkunas, Lowell, for defendant.

Robert J. Bender, Assistant District Attorney (D. Dunbar Livingston, Assistant District Attorney), for the Commonwealth.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and LYNCH, FRIED and MARSHALL, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The defendant appeals from his conviction of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. He contends that (1) he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights; (2) the judge impermissibly relied on extraneous evidence in concluding that his confession was voluntary; (3) the judge improperly instructed the jury on the Commonwealth's burden to prove that the confession was voluntary; and (4) the judge improperly admitted prior bad acts evidence. He also asks that we exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, and reduce the verdict to manslaughter. We affirm the conviction and decline to exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E.

We summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Cyr, 425 Mass. 89, 90, 679 N.E.2d 550 (1997). The defendant, who was born in the Dominican Republic, moved to the United States in the early 1980's, where he found employment as an automobile mechanic. In 1989, the defendant met the victim and, soon after, they started living together.

In early July, 1991, the defendant, the victim, and her son moved into the home of the victim's mother in Danvers. On the evening of July 20, 1991, at around 9:15 P.M., the victim returned to her mother's home where the defendant and her mother were watching television. Her son was sleeping on the couch. Although the victim and the defendant looked at each other, neither spoke. At this point, the victim turned to her mother and said, "Ma, I've had it. I can't keep living this kind of life he's putting me through. Did he tell you that he tried to choke me to death two days before we moved in with you and the baby was screaming because it hadn't been fed that night." The mother told the victim to go into the kitchen, prepare some food for her son, and that they would talk later.

After a few minutes, the defendant went into the kitchen with the victim's son. When he entered, the victim was peeling potatoes with a knife in her hand. They started to argue. The victim told the defendant that she had been to see her son's father, that she loved him, and that they were getting back together. The defendant stayed quiet for a moment and then said to go ahead and live with her son's father, indicating that he planned to return soon to the Dominican Republic. At this point, the defendant picked up the victim's son and started to leave the kitchen. The victim lunged at him with the knife, screaming, "I'll kill you, mother fucker." The defendant quickly placed the son on the counter and then struggled with the victim, taking the knife away from her. In the struggle, the defendant and the victim fell to the floor. Using the knife, blade down, the defendant stabbed the victim nine times in the left arm, neck, and chest. The knife punctured vital organs, including her heart, left lung, and left kidney.

On hearing the victim's screams her mother ran into the kitchen and discovered the defendant straddling the victim. The defendant tried to hide the knife blade under the victim. There was no apparent bleeding, however, the victim's eyes were "glossy" and her breathing was labored. The defendant ran from the house and drove away in his automobile. The mother called the police, and shortly thereafter the victim was taken to Salem Hospital, where she was later pronounced dead.

The defendant drove to New York City, where he contacted a friend who loaned him money to purchase an airline ticket. The next morning he took a commercial flight to the Dominican Republic. On September 21, 1991, the defendant returned to the United States. He turned himself in to immigration officials in Miami, Florida. The defendant was incarcerated in the Dade County Jail and two days later he confessed to stabbing the victim.

1. Voluntariness and waiver of Miranda rights. The judge held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress his confession and found the following facts. After learning that the defendant had been detained in Miami, the Massachusetts State police requested assistance from the local authorities. On September 23, 1991, Detective Victor Pidermann of the Metro-Dade County police department homicide bureau, a Spanish speaking officer, visited the defendant at the Dade County Jail. The defendant agreed to go to the police station to make a statement. The detective drove the ten miles to the police station with the defendant in the passenger seat. During the drive they did not discuss the events which took place on July 20, 1991.

Shortly after they arrived at the police station, the detective read Miranda warnings to the defendant in Spanish. At 5:25 P.M., the defendant signed the Miranda card, placing his initials after each warning to indicate that he had understood the right. Subsequently, Detective Pidermann conducted a preinterview session with the defendant that served as the foundation for the formal interview. At 7 P.M., a stenographer was summoned to record the formal interview. Detective Pidermann opened the interview by rereading Miranda warnings. Again, the defendant acknowledged that he understood the warnings. At that time, the defendant had been in custody for two days and had not ingested any drugs or alcohol.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge denied the defendant's motion. ¹ The judge observed that the defendant "appeared neat and alert at the hearing and consulted with his attorney on a number of occasions.... [H]e understood what was said in English. While giving a statement to the Metro-Dade County police ... [the defendant] was very cooperative and responsive. He maintained good eye contact with the detectives throughout the interview and did not appear tired." The judge found that "the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] made a knowing, willing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights and thereafter made a voluntary statement to the Metro-Dade County police detectives on September 23rd, 1991."

The defendant contends that the judge erred in admitting his confession. Specifically, he argues that the police failed to advise him of his Miranda rights in a timely manner and therefore his waiver was invalid. In addition, the defendant argues that the judge's findings with regard to the suppression motion impermissibly relied on trial testimony. We shall address each argument in turn.

a. Standard of review. "In reviewing a judge's determination regarding a knowing waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness, we 'grant substantial deference to the judge's ultimate conclusions and we will not reject a judge's subsidiary findings if they are warranted by the evidence.' " Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 412, 492 N.E.2d 74 (1986), quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 389 Mass. 411, 419, 451 N.E.2d 101 (1983). However, we conduct an independent review to ascertain whether the judge properly applied the law. See Commonwealth v. Magee, 423 Mass. 381, 384, 668 N.E.2d 339 (1996); Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 381 n. 8, 649 N.E.2d 1106 (1995).

b. Timeliness of Miranda warnings. The defendant argues that the confession should be excluded because Miranda warnings were not given for almost two and one-half hours after the detective contacted the defendant. We disagree.

Miranda warnings must only be given before custodial interrogation. Commonwealth v. Magee, supra at 385, 668 N.E.2d 339. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). "The procedural requirements of Miranda are required not where a suspect is merely in police custody, but rather where a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation." Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 792, 796, 678 N.E.2d 847 (1997). "Interrogation 'must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself,' and therefore Miranda warnings are only required when 'a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.' ... The term 'functional equivalent' includes 'any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.' " Id. at 796-797, 678 N.E.2d 847, quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). In this case the evidence warrants the judge's finding that the defendant was not interrogated until after the detective delivered Miranda warnings. Thus, we conclude there was no Miranda violation.

According to the detective's testimony, he contacted the defendant at approximately 2:50 P.M. on September 23, 1991. He met the defendant at the prison chapel, where the defendant had just completed a fugitive bond hearing via closed circuit television hookup with the local court. ² The defendant agreed to accompany him to the police station to make a statement; however they had to wait for a second officer to escort them to the station. During the ten-mile drive to the police station, they had a general conversation about the extradition process, but the judge found, "Neither discussed the killing during the drive." They arrived at the police station at approximately 5 P.M. and the Miranda warnings card was signed by the defendant at 5:25 P.M. There was no evidence of conduct tantamount to interrogation prior to the reading of Miranda warnings. There is no basis to disturb the judge's finding that Miranda warnings were given in a timely fashion.

c....