Com. v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 22 June 1984
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Felix RODRIGUEZ, Jr. a/k/a Felix Rodriquez, Jr.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 558

479 A.2d 558

330 Pa.Super. 295

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Felix RODRIGUEZ, Jr. a/k/a Felix Rodriquez, Jr.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Feb. 22, 1984.

Filed June 22, 1984.

[330 Pa.Super. 297] Steven J. Cooperstein, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellant.

Dennis J. Cogan, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before CAVANAUGH, MONTEMURO and MONTGOMERY, JJ.

MONTEMURO, Judge:

This is a Commonwealth appeal from an order granting appellee's motion to suppress his inculpatory statement of March 14, 1981. The lower court suppressed the evidence on the grounds that it was the fruit of an illegal arrest. We disagree, and therefore, reverse.

Recently in Commonwealth v. Lapia, 311 Pa.Super. 264, ---, 457 A.2d 877, 880 (1983), our court concluded "that an order suppressing evidence is appealable when it is apparent from the record that the order terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution." Applying this standard to the instant case, we are satisfied that the lower court's suppression order is appealable. Appellee is charged with murder, ¹ involuntary manslaughter, ² robbery, ³ theft, ⁴ possessing an instrument of crime, ⁵ and criminal conspiracy. ⁶ The record reveals that the appellee's statement is the only evidence the Commonwealth has to support the charges against the appellee. Consequently, suppression of this statement would substantially handicap the prosecution.

The scope of review from an order suppressing evidence has recently been defined by this court as follows [W]e must determine whether the evidence supports the court's factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those findings were legitimate. This determination is made considering only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and so much of the defense evidence as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 361 A.2d 282 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 280 Pa.Super. 205, 421 A.2d 684 (1980). Findings supported by the record and legitimate legal conclusions drawn therefrom will not be disturbed. Commonwealth v. Sparrow, 471 Pa. 490, 370 A.2d 712 (1977).

Commonwealth v. Williams, --- Pa.Super. ---, ---, 464 A.2d 411, 414 (1983). See also, Commonwealth v. Webb, 491 Pa. 329, 332, 421 A.2d 161, 163 (1980); Commonwealth v. Lapia, supra.

The testimony at the suppression hearing indicated the following: On March 14, 1981, at 9:46 A.M., Detectives Suminski and Lagera located the appellee outside a junk shop at Front and Cumberland Streets. They informed the appellee that they were investigating the murder of a doctor in January. They asked the appellee if he knew of the murder and they asked if he knew Russell Weinberger. When the appellee responded that he knew Weinberger, the officers asked him if he would mind going to the Police Administration Building (PAB) to talk about Weinberger. Appellee readily agreed. Detective Suminski told the appellee that he was not under arrest nor was he a suspect and that if he wanted to go to the PAB at some other time, that could be arranged.

The appellee was transported to the PAB in the detectives' unmarked police car. He sat in the back seat while the two detectives rode in the front. The back door of the car was not capable of being locked from the outside. The appellee was not handcuffed or restrained.

On the way to the PAB, the detectives stopped at three (3) hardware stores to look for an item. Each time, the detectives went into a store together while appellee sat alone in the back seat of the unlocked car. The three men arrived at the PAB at 10:10 A.M. They entered the PAB through a door open to the general public and the appellee entered his name into a "Witness Control Book" as a witness. They proceeded to Room 104 in the PAB and then directly to an interview room in Room 104. The appellee was left alone in the room for about one-half hour before Detective Suminski entered to interview him.

The lower court, after hearing the testimony made findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(i) and submitted an opinion in support of its order granting appellee's motion to suppress. The court's findings and conclusion were as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On January 15, 1982, Dr. Clarence Langley was found [beaten and strangled] to death in his office at [2520 Kensington Avenue], Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

2. (a) [On February 9, 1981], as a result of an investigation, Homicide Detective Suminski, in company with Detective Lagera, went to the place where the defendant, Russell Weinberger, was staying; advised him that he was investigating the above crime and asked Weinberger to accompany him to police headquarters. Weinberger was transported in an unmarked police vehicle, was placed in the back thereof without handcuffs, and the rear doors of the vehicle could be opened by the passenger. The detectives were in civilian clothes;

(b) Weinberger was escorted into Homicide Detective Headquarters, first floor, Police Administration Building, and then into a small interrogation room. This room contained no windows, contained a desk and two chairs. There was (c) Weinberger was given no Fifth Amendment constitutional Miranda warnings. He gave a statement denying any involvement in the above-mentioned crime. Subsequently, he consented to take a polygraph test, which was given. He was released and returned to his residence by the aforesaid detectives.

a door with a small window separating it from the large Administration Room;

3. (a) On March 14, 198, as a result of information supplied by informants discovered during neighborhood surveys and information derived from Weinberger that Felix Rodriguez "hung with" Weinberger, Det. Suminski, with Det. Lagera, sought and found Felix Rodriguez on the street at Front and Cumberland Streets, Philadelphia. They asked Rodriguez to come to police headquarters to answer questions about the death of Dr. Langley on January 15, 1981. Rodriguez agreed. He was transported, sitting in the rear seat of an unmarked police vehicle, the door of which could be opened by the passenger. He was not handcuffed. The detectives were in civilian clothes;

(b) Inside the Police Administration Building, Rodriguez was taken to Homicide Headquarters on the first floor and placed in a small interrogation room without windows. The door was closed to the main administration area. Defendant was not handcuffed. Rodriguez was advised of his constitutional Fifth Amendment rights and given Miranda warnings, in both Spanish and English, and indicated his understanding and willingness to waive his rights against self-incrimination by signing and/or initialing his answers in his own hand. He was warned prior to making any statement whatsoever. Rodriguez gave a statement involving himself and Weinberger in the killing of Dr. Langley on January 15, 1981. Det. Suminski, contemporaneous[ly] with Rodriguez' arrival at Homicide Headquarters, prepared a chronology in which he indicated that Rodriguez had been "apprehended" at Front and Cumberland Streets at 9:46 a.m. on March 14, 1981;

(c) Rodriguez was not subjected to any threats or promises or coercion, psychological or physical. He was alert and responsive during questioning. He made no requests which were denied. He was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or suffering from any mental disability at all relevant times;

(d) Rodriguez was arraigned at 3:08 p.m. on March 14, 1981;

(e) [Rodriguez was not told, at any time relevant to this Motion to Suppress, that he was free to leave the Police Headquarters, or the presence of the Homicide Detectives.] 1

4. (a) On March 17, 198, Detectives Suminski and Lagera arrested defendant Weinberger, pursuant to an arrest warrant issued on March 15, 1981, stating probable cause information derived from defendant Rodriguez' statement;

(b) Weinberger was given constitutional warnings against self-incrimination and knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his rights against self-incrimination. He thereupon gave a statement indicating his involvement in the slaying of Dr. Langley on January 15, 1981, together with that of Felix Rodriguez;

(c) No threats, promises or coercion was exerted in order to induce Weinberger to give a statement. He was alert and responsive at all relevant times. He was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. He was not suffering from any mental disability which would prevent him from giving a knowing, intelligent and voluntary statement;

(d) Weinberger was arraigned at 10:57 a.m. on March 17, 1981.

(Lower Court Opinion, at 2-5).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Defendant Weinberger's statement of February 9, 1981 was the product of custodial interrogation and was given without required Miranda warnings. Weinberger was not under arrest at the time.

1. The bracketed finding was added on August 3, 1982, over the objection of the Assistant District Attorney. See N.T. August 3, 1982, pp. 6-3 to 6-13.

2. (a) The police did not have probable cause to arrest defendant Rodriguez on March 14, 1981;

(b) Defendant Rodriguez was arrested on that date and subjected to custodial interrogation;

(c) The statement given by him on that date was the product of said custodial interrogation, and the taint thereof was not purged by any factors independent of that unlawful arrest.

3. (a) The statement of defendant Weinberger on March 17, 1981, was made pursuant to a valid arrest warrant issued upon probable cause, and was given pursuant to a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of constitutional rights against self-incrimination and was given knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.

(Lower Court Opinion, at 8-9).

The appellee claims that he was placed under arrest at 9:46 A.M. and that there was not probable cause to arrest him until after he confessed to Detective Suminski at 10:49 A.M. that day. Therefore, the...