Com. v. Rollins

• Citation: 525 Pa. 335,580 A.2d 744
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Saharris ROLLINS, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 15 November 1990
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Page 744

580 A.2d 744

525 Pa. 335

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Saharris ROLLINS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Jan. 22, 1990.

Decided Sept. 13, 1990.

Reargument Denied Nov. 15, 1990.

[525 Pa. 338] Thomas R. Quinn, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Deputy Dist. Atty., Ronald Eisenberg, Chief, Appeals Div., Hugh Burns and Robert A. Graci, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CAPPY, Justice.

This is an automatic direct appeal ¹ from a death sentence imposed upon appellant by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following his conviction of first degree murder. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of sentence of death.

Following a trial by jury, appellant was found guilty of murder in the first degree, robbery and possession of an instrument of crime. A separate penalty hearing was held, after which the jury found two aggravating circumstances which it determined outweighed the one mitigating circumstance, thus, fixing the penalty on appellant's first degree murder conviction at death. Thereafter, the trial court heard and denied appellant's post-trial motions and imposed the sentence as decided by the jury. Additionally, the trial court sentenced appellant to a consecutive term of ten to twenty years imprisonment on the robbery conviction and a consecutive term of two and one-half to five years on the possession of an instrument of crime conviction. An appeal was then docketed in this Court.

Subsequently, appellant asserted claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel, who then petitioned to withdraw. On January 15, 1988, this Court granted counsel's petition to withdraw, remanded the record to the trial court for the appointment of new counsel, and permitted new counsel to file a petition asserting claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Present counsel then filed a petition raising several claims of ineffectiveness, which petition the trial court denied. This direct appeal followed.

In each case in which the death penalty is imposed, this Court is required to conduct an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence, even where the defendant has not challenged the conviction on that ground. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner are sufficient to establish all the elements of the offense(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Syre, 507 Pa. 299, 489 A.2d 1340 (1985), reversed on other grounds. So viewed, the evidence establishes the following.

On January 22, 1986, at approximately one o'clock in the morning, appellant and a companion appeared at the home of Violeta Cintron at 2859 North Orkney Street in Philadelphia. Appellant knocked on the door and asked for "Cat", referring to Violeta's husband, Jose Carrasquillo, who was not at home at that time. Violeta's one-year-old son and her brother, Raymond Cintron, the victim, were at home with her. Violeta knew appellant as an associate of her husband, and, therefore, permitted him into her home while appellant's companion remained outside. ² Upon entering, appellant announced that he wanted a "sixteen" or a gram and a half of cocaine. After Violeta had measured the requested quantity of cocaine, appellant announced that he wished to trade "meth" (methamphetamine) for the cocaine rather than pay cash. Violeta refused and appellant left, apparently to obtain more money in order to purchase the cocaine. He returned a few minutes later, pointed a forty-five automatic handgun at Violeta and demanded the cocaine. Her brother dropped Violeta's son, whom he had been holding, and began wrestling with appellant in an attempt to seize appellant's gun. Several shots were fired and Raymond fell to the floor. Appellant then picked up the victim and fired at least two more shots into his body. Violeta threw some cocaine at appellant and he left. During the entire incident, Violeta's son was present.

Appellant was seen entering and leaving the residence by Violeta's sister, Dalia Cintron. Dalia, who lived several houses away from her sister, saw appellant and several other men arrive in a burgundy car and watched appellant and a second man exit the vehicle and begin walking toward Violeta's house. Dalia saw appellant enter her sister's house and return approximately five minutes later to where the second man was standing and witnessed the second man hand appellant the gun. She saw appellant re-enter Violeta's house after which she heard the shots. Dalia then ran into the street and came face-to-face with appellant as he was leaving her sister's house. Appellant pointed the gun at Dalia and began running down the block and jumped into the burgundy car.

Similarly, the victim's other sister, Nilda Cintron and her common law husband Angel Rivera, encountered appellant and the second man leaving Violeta's house. Nilda and her husband, who also resided in the same neighborhood, heard several shots and had run outside to see what was happening.

Appellant was apprehended three days later as a result of his involvement in another shooting incident. On January 25, 1986, at approximately 8:30 in the evening, appellant and a companion appeared at the home of Richard Campbell. Mr. Richard Campbell's younger brother, Dennis Dantzler, answered the door and called to Richard, who at that time was upstairs. Immediately thereafter, Dennis again called to Richard to tell him that appellant had a gun whereupon Richard grabbed a loaded shotgun out of his bedroom closet. When Richard reached the top of the stairs, appellant, who was standing at the bottom of the stairs, pointed a forty-five automatic at him. The two men exchanged fire after which appellant and his companion fled. Appellant, who was injured, was then observed standing along the sidewalk by a pedestrian. The police arrived and transported appellant to Einstein Hospital. Richard Campbell, his girlfriend Sharon Williams and Dennis Dantzler later identified appellant as the person involved in the incident. Spent cartridges and fired projectiles from both incidents were examined by ballistics and determined to be from the same gun. Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with the murder of Raymond Cintron and the related offenses.

Jose Carrasquillo, Violeta Cintron's common-law husband, testified that he and appellant had engaged in similar drug deals on at least two or three prior occasions. At each such sale, appellant traded methamphetamine for cocaine and, in some instances, for cocaine and cash when Jose did not have enough cocaine. He also testified that he did not exchange cocaine for methamphetamine with anyone other than appellant.

After reviewing all the evidence presented, it is clear that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's conviction for murder in the first degree for killing Raymond Cintron, robbery as a result of his taking the cocaine, and possession of an instrument of crime based upon his use of a gun during the course of the robbery and murder.

Having concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, we shall now address appellant's particular claims of error.

Appellant first contends that it was error to permit the introduction of evidence of other crimes. Specifically, appellant argues that evidence of the alleged shooting three days after the murder and evidence of his prior dealings with Jose Carrasquillo should not have been admitted because of the highly prejudicial nature of this evidence. We do not agree.

Generally, evidence of a distinct crime is inadmissible against a defendant who is being tried for another crime solely to establish his or her bad character or a propensity for committing criminal acts. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 555 A.2d 1264 (1989). Evidence of other distinct crimes may, however, be admitted in certain circumstances where the evidence is relevant for some other legitimate purpose and not merely to prejudice the defendant by showing him or her to be a person of bad character. Hughes, Id. For example, a defendant's other criminal acts may be admitted to prove, inter alia: (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake; (4) common scheme or plan; (5) identity of the person charged with the crime; and (6) to impeach the credibility of a defendant who testifies in his or her trial. See, Commonwealth v. Billa, 521 Pa. 168, 555 A.2d 835 (1989).

The admission of evidence is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision thereon can only be reversed by this Court upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Claypool, 508 Pa. 198, 495 A.2d 176 (1985). In determining whether certain evidence should be admitted, the trial court must weigh the relevance and probative value of such evidence against the prejudicial impact of that evidence. Commonwealth v. Lark, 518 Pa. 290, 543 A.2d 491 (1988).

The Commonwealth introduced the challenged evidence of the shooting incident three days after the murder for the purpose of establishing the identity of the person who committed the murder. This evidence was properly permitted by the trial court. See, Commonwealth v. Evans, 488 Pa. 38, 410 A.2d 1213 (1980).

In Evans, Id., we found that the trial court properly permitted the introduction of evidence of the defendant's participation in a prior bank robbery because the weapon found several hours after the murder therein and which was determined to be the murder weapon, was the same weapon the defendant had stolen from a guard during the bank...