Com. v. Roney

• Decision Date: 20 January 2005
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Christopher RONEY, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

866 A.2d 351

581 Pa. 587

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Christopher RONEY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 5, 2002.

Decided January 20, 2005.

Norris E. Gelman, Esq., Philadelphia, for Christopher Roney.

Hugh J. Burns, Esq., Frederick Pettit, Esq., Amy Zapp, Esq., Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NEWMAN, SAYLOR and EAKIN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice NEWMAN.

Christopher Roney (Appellant) brings this direct appeal¹ from the Judgment of Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) that sentenced him to death following his conviction for first-degree murder. After reviewing the record and the claims raised by Appellant, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

At approximately 8:20 a.m., on January 6, 1996, Appellant and Mark Canty (Canty) forced PNC Bank employees, Norma Winn, Loretta Johnson, and Ann Vicola, at gunpoint, into the PNC Bank building located at 4710 Rising Sun Avenue.² Once inside, Appellant and his accomplice ordered Norma Winn and Ann Vicola to open the bank vault.³ While Canty forced the two women to the vault area at gunpoint, Appellant kept watch over Loretta Johnson. While at the vault, Canty shouted to Appellant, who was at the front of the bank, "Here comes the heat." Appellant responded, "Don't worry, I'll take care of them."⁴

At this time, Police Officer Lauretha Vaird (Officer Vaird), who was the first police officer to respond to a report of a robbery at the PNC Bank, approached the front door of the bank building. As she entered the bank, Appellant fatally shot Officer Vaird in the abdomen and exited the building through the front door.⁵ Meanwhile, Canty fled from the bank through a side entrance, leaving his gun behind.⁶ Outside the bank, Appellant exchanged gunfire with Police Officer Donald Patterson (Officer Patterson), who arrived on the scene shortly after Officer Vaird.⁷ Able to escape the shootout, Appellant jumped into a waiting green minivan, driven by his cohort, Warren McGlone (McGlone), and the vehicle sped away on Rising Sun Avenue.⁸ Later that morning, McGlone, Canty, and Appellant met at McGlone's home to discuss the events at the PNC Bank.⁹

Thereafter, the police found: (1) the getaway green minivan abandoned at 4500 North 11th Street in Philadelphia; (2) various items of clothing worn as disguises by Appellant and Canty; (3) a loaded 9-millimeter automatic gun, which was lying on the sidewalk in front of the side entrance of the PNC Bank in question; and (4) a loaded .380-caliber silver Lorcin revolver on the sidewalk near the bank.¹⁰ Later, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) traced the .380-caliber silver Lorcin revolver to Anthony Brown, a relative of Canty.¹¹ Importantly, the gun was stolen and last seen in the possession of Canty.¹² The ATF also traced the 9-millimeter automatic gun to Richelle Parker, a friend of McGlone, who purchased the gun for McGlone.¹³ Subsequently, Canty and McGlone confessed to participating in the events that transpired at the PNC Bank on Rising Sun Avenue on the morning of January 6, 1996.

During the course of the trial, which began on October 15, 1996, three eyewitnesses identified Appellant as the man involved in the robbery of the PNC Bank in question.¹⁴ Two other witnesses noted that one of the robbers was a tall, African-American male over six feet in height.¹⁵ Ann Vicola testified that the tall man with a silver handgun remained closer to the front entrance of the bank, while the shorter man with the black handgun went to the rear of the building with her and Norma Winn.¹⁶

The Commonwealth presented Police Officer Carl Rone (Officer Rone) as an expert in identification, operation, and characterization of firearms. Officer Rone testified that the ballistic evidence established that the silver Lorcin . 380-caliber handgun found at the scene of the crime was fired inside the PNC bank building. Officer Rone also testified that the bullet recovered from the body of Officer Vaird was fired from the Lorcin .380-caliber handgun.¹⁷ Additionally, Dr. Gregory McDonald, Assistant Medical Examiner, testified that Officer Vaird died as a result of a fatal gunshot wound to the abdomen. Based on his examination of the wound track, the witness related that the bullet struck vital bodily organs. Dr. McDonald noted that the position and the path of travel of the bullet recovered from the body of Officer Vaird was consistent with having been fired by a six-foot five-inch tall person from a distance of more than two feet.¹⁸

On October 30, 1996, the jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder,¹⁹ three counts of robbery,²⁰ conspiracy,²¹ aggravated assault,²² burglary,²³ and possession of an instrument of crime (PIC).²⁴ Following a penalty hearing on November 1, 1996, the jury sentenced Appellant to death, finding three aggravating circumstances: (1) the victim was a peace officer or law enforcement official killed in the performance of her duties;²⁵ (2) the killing was committed during the perpetration of a felony;²⁶ and (3) Appellant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person during the killing.²⁷ The jury also found two mitigating circumstances: (1) Appellant had no significant criminal history;²⁸ and (2) other mitigating character evidence.²⁹

On March 3, 1997, the trial court formally imposed the sentence of death and additionally sentenced Appellant to consecutive sentences of 60 to 120 months incarceration for each robbery conviction, the conspiracy conviction, the aggravated assault conviction, and the burglary conviction. The trial court also sentenced Appellant to a consecutive sentence of 30 to 60 months incarceration for his PIC conviction. In total, Appellant was to serve 32 1/2 to 65 years of incarceration, in addition to his sentence of death.

II. Discussion

"This Court is required to review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction of first-degree murder in every case where the death penalty has been imposed." Commonwealth v. Koehler, 558 Pa. 334, 737 A.2d 225, 233 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (citing Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982),cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327, rehearing denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983)). We perform this assessment regardless of whether the appellant explicitly raises a claim of insufficiency of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Burgos, 530 Pa. 473, 610 A.2d 11, 13 (1992); Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d at 942 n. 3.

We have previously stated that:

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, an appellate court must view all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner in order to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to enable the fact finder to find that all of the elements of the offenses were established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Hall, 549 Pa. 269, 701 A.2d 190, 195 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082, 118 S.Ct. 1534, 140 L.Ed.2d 684 (1998). "This standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Burgos, 610 A.2d at 13. In turn, to sustain a conviction of first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove that: (1) the appellant acted with a specific intent to kill; (2) a human being was unlawfully killed; (3) the appellant did the killing; and (4) the killing was done with deliberation. See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 577 Pa. 194, 843 A.2d 1203 (2003),

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 450, 160 L.Ed.2d 324 (2004); Koehler, 737 A.2d at 233.

The above-recited evidence presented at Appellant's trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, clearly establishes the sufficiency of the first-degree murder conviction.³⁰ The testimony of the witnesses, who identified Appellant as the tall individual in the vicinity of the PNC Bank building immediately before and after the crime took place, as well as the testimony that, while inside the building, Appellant stayed at the front entrance and brandished a silver handgun, coupled with ballistic and forensic evidence, was abundantly sufficient for the jury to conclude that Appellant, possessing the requisite specific intent and with deliberation, unlawfully killed Officer Vaird.

Many of the arguments raised by Appellant, including all issues relating to the guilt phase of the proceedings, involve allegations of the ineffectiveness of counsel.³¹ In Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002), this Court announced, as a general rule, that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised for the first time in a collateral proceeding. Id. at 738. The holding of Grant was applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct appeal where a claim of ineffectiveness had been "properly raised and preserved." Id. Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Freeman, 573 Pa. 532, 827 A.2d 385 (2003),cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 30, 160 L.Ed.2d 31 (2004), the "Grant rule" was applied to capital cases.

On the same day as Freeman, this Court decided Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1115, 124 S.Ct. 1053, 157 L.Ed.2d 906 (2004). Although Bomar was on direct (capital) appeal at the time we decided Grant, this Court ruled that Grant would not apply to Bomar, where claims of counsel ineffectiveness "were properly raised and preserved in the trial court." 826 A.2d at 853. We reached this conclusion because, in Bomar, appellant raised ineffectiveness claims in post-sentence motions, the trial court conducted a series of evidentiary hearings on the claims raised, and, ultimately, addressed them in its opinion. Id. at 839, 853-54. Thus, the concerns we...