Com. v. Russin

• Decision Date: 09 May 1995
• Citation: 420 Mass. 309,649 N.E.2d 750
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Ronald A. RUSSIN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 750

649 N.E.2d 750

420 Mass. 309

COMMONWEALTH v.Ronald A. RUSSIN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Worcester.

Argued Nov. 9, 1994.

Decided May 9, 1995.

Erica M. Foster, for defendant.

Matthew J. Mullaney, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

O'CONNOR, Justice.

On February 12, 1980, after five days of trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree and forcible rape of a child under sixteen years.The trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution (M.C.I.) at Walpole on the conviction of murder in the first degree and, after an examination pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, § 4, as amended bySt.1974, c. 324, § 1, to a period of from one day to life at the treatment center for the sexually dangerous at the M.C.I. at Bridgewater on the rape of a child conviction.

On March 21, 1992, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and for a new trial on both indictments.The same judge that had presided over the trial and accepted the pleas of guilty approximately twelve years earlier conducted a hearing on the motion.The defendant submitted three affidavits for the judge's consideration.There was no further evidence.After hearing counsel's arguments, the judge issued a memorandum of decision and denied the defendant's motion.This is the defendant's appeal from that ruling.

Shortly after the defendant was indicted in October, 1979, for these two crimes, and pleaded not guilty, he was committed to Bridgewater State Hospital for observation and a report pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15(b ), as amended bySt.1973, c. 569, § 6.The examining physician thereafter filed a report in the Superior Court as required by G.L. c. 123, § 15 (c ), as appearing in St.1971, c. 760, § 13.The report stated that the defendant was competent to stand trial.

Trial commenced on February 4, 1980.We summarize the relevant trial evidence.In 1979, the defendant lived with his girl friend and his girl friend's twelve year old daughter (victim).On October 3, 1979, at approximately 6:30 A.M., the defendant drove his girl friend to work.He returned to his home around 7:15 A.M. and a friend arrived shortly thereafter.While the victim was making breakfast, the defendant and his friend began "fooling around" with the victim.The defendant told the victim, "I'm going to get you," and he struck her with a knife inflicting two stab wounds in her neck plus a wound which the pathologist who conducted the autopsy described as a "wide slash wound."The defendant and his friend put the victim on a bed and the defendant had intercourse with her.The pathologist testified that the victim was alive when she was vaginally penetrated and that she died as a result of a severed carotid artery.

On February 11, after several days of trial, the judge learned that, in the early hours of that day, while the defendant was incarcerated at the Worcester County house of correction, he cut his forearms several times with a razor and claimed that he had swallowed between forty-five and fifty Tylenol pills in an alleged suicide attempt.The defendant was treated at Worcester City Hospital and was released.Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, asserting that the defendant was incompetent to proceed with the trial.The judge ordered a mental examination of the defendant pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15(a ), as amended bySt.1971, c. 760, § 12, and a prompt one-half hour examination was conducted by a board-certified psychiatrist.The psychiatrist reviewed the house of correction report regarding the defendant's alleged suicide attempt as well as earlier reports about the defendant from doctors at Bridgewater State Hospital.The psychiatrist then filed his report with the court.Subsequently, the judge held a competency hearing and the psychiatrist read his report into the record.In response to defense counsel's questions, the psychiatrist testified that the defendant was not suicidal, that the self-inflicted wounds were designed to attract the attention of the jail guard, and that the psychiatrist had no reservation about the quality of the defendant's judgment.

Worcester City Hospital medical and laboratory reports were placed in evidence.They indicated that the cuts on the defendant's arms were superficial and that, although the defendant was induced to vomit twice, there was no evidence of his having ingested pills as he claimed he had done.

Defense counsel argued to the judge that the defendant could not meaningfully assist with his defense because he was overcome with fear of facing "summary justice at the hands of fellow inmates" if he was sentenced to the M.C.I. at Walpole.At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial, finding that the defendant"ha[d] the present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding[,] ... [t]hat he[understood] the nature of the offenses alleged, and that he[was] competent to continue the trial."

On the following morning, February 12, 1980, counsel informed the judge that his client wished to plead guilty to the indictments.Lengthy colloquies between the judge and the defendant and between defense counsel and the defendant followed.At the outset, the judge inquired of counsel whether there were any material agreements between the Commonwealth and the defendant.Defense counsel replied that "obviously the defendant is aware that the court has no alternative on the sentence on the first-degree murder indictment.As to the indictment presenting rape, the Commonwealth and the defense have agreed that it is contingent upon your honor in the first instance committing the defendant without sentence to Bridgewater for a period of [sixty] days observation to determine whether he is a sexually dangerous person, and that the defendant will then be returned here for sentencing on the strength of that report.That is the only agreement."In response to the judge's inquiry, the prosecutor confirmed that the parties' agreement had been correctly described by defense counsel.

The judge then turned his attention to the defendant, explaining to him the elements of the crimes charged as well as informing him of the mandatory sentence of imprisonment for life without parole on the murder indictment and the maximum sentence for rape of a child under sixteen years.The judge explained that, following a commitment to the State Hospital at Bridgewater, in keeping with the aforesaid agreement, "a hearing may be held to determine whether ... you are or are not a sexually dangerous person.In the event the court determines after hearing that you are a sexually dangerous person, the court may then order that you be committed to the center for the sexually dangerous at Bridgewater for a period of from one day to life.In the event the court determines that you are not a sexually dangerous person, the court may impose any sentence provided by law for ... the offense of rape of a child.Now, the maximum sentence on that offense is life imprisonment at Walpole.And I tell you now that the court is empowered, it has the power to impose such a sentence consecutively upon the sentence that you would receive today, life imprisonment on the murder.You understand that?"The defendant answered that he understood.Also at numerous other junctures during the colloquy, the defendant told the judge that he understood what the judge was telling him.

In addition, defense counsel examined the defendant at length to establish that the defendant's pleas of guilty were knowingly and willingly offered.The defendant testified that he left school after the fifth grade, that, at the time of his testimony, he did not read, spell, or write well, but that he had no trouble in speaking or understanding English "the way that [counsel was] talking to [him]."The defendant testified that he had been hospitalized for alcoholism about a year and a half before the trial, that he used alcohol and drugs, but that he had not done so for about five months before giving his testimony, during which period he had been at the house of correction.We set forth a representative sample of the remaining colloquy as follows:

Q.: "And you know the things that the witnesses have been saying from the witness stand, including statements that you made to the police, indicate that you killed [the victim] with a knife?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "And that at or about the time that you killed her with the knife you had sex with her, and that that essentially was forced and against her will?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "You understand that?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "That's the proof?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "That's what you heard; am I right?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "Okay.And do you admit that those are the things that you did?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "Now, do you understand that you are pleading guilty to those things?"

A.: "Yes, I do."

Q.: "Is that something that you want to do?"

A.: "Yes."

"...

Q.: "Are you confused in any way by--do you not understand any of the questions that I have been asking you, ...?"

A.: "No."

Q.: "You understand what I am asking you?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "Okay.Do you feel that in the conduct of the trial, the preparing for the trial, that I have acted or that I am acting now in your best interest?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "Are you satisfied with what I have done in representing you as your lawyer?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "Now, has anyone, I include myself or anyone from the district attorney's office, any court personnel, has anyone threatened, promised you anything or made any offers to you in any way to plead guilty besides the recommendation that [the prosecutor] is going to make?"

A.: "No."

In response to further questioning by the judge, the defendant testified that he was not confused by the judge's or the attorney's questions.The judge then asked him, "May I then...