Com. v. Sanchez

• Decision Date: 22 April 2004
• Citation: 848 A.2d 977
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee, v. Albert SANCHEZ, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

848 A.2d 977

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee, v. Albert SANCHEZ, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted January 26, 2004.

Filed April 22, 2004.

Jeffrey C. Marshall, York, for appellant.

Jerome T. Foerster, Assistant District Attorney, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before: STEVENS, McCAFFERY, and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.

OLSZEWSKI, J.:

¶ 1 Albert Sanchez (appellant/defendant) appeals his judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of York County (Cassimatis, S.J.). A jury convicted appellant of insurance fraud (18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4117(a)(3)) and theft by deception (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a)(1)). Appellant raises four issues¹ for our review: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for insurance fraud and theft by deception; (2) whether the lower court properly excluded extrinsic evidence offered to impeach a Commonwealth witness; (3) whether the insurance fraud statute is unconstitutional as being impermissibly vague or overbroad; and (4) whether the lower court properly sentenced appellant. We affirm.

¶ 2 The facts² of this case begin with the purchase of a Chevrolet Cavalier by appellant. Appellant purchased the car for his friend Kathylin Goodwin because Goodwin was unable to obtain a car loan due to bad credit. While the title and loan for the Cavalier would be in appellant's name, it was understood that Goodwin would make all the car loan payments because the car was primarily for Goodwin's use. Goodwin subsequently moved to Maryland.

¶ 3 On January 21, 2000, Goodwin was driving back to Pennsylvania and, due to icy road conditions, lost control of the Cavalier and hit a tree. She called her parents and had the car towed to Diehl Autobody. Once the car arrived at Diehl, she told a Diehl employee that the car did not have insurance³ and, therefore, the car was not to be touched.

¶ 4 Soon after the accident, appellant and Goodwin moved into 1144 East Philadelphia Street in York, Pennsylvania. On January 28, Goodwin told appellant about the accident. Soon thereafter, appellant moved in with his mother to ease his commute to work. ¶ 5 Appellant testified that Goodwin asked him several times to reinsure the Cavalier in order for a claim to be made on the car "so that it would get paid off." N.T., 1/16/2003, at 119. He testified that he refused Goodwin's requests.

¶ 6 On February 25, appellant returned to the York residence. Appellant received a tax return check, and appellant and Goodwin decided to purchase another car with the money. They chose to purchase a Dodge Raider (generally referred to by the parties as a jeep). Before the transaction could be completed, insurance needed to be secured for the car. Therefore, insurance was obtained through AIG Specialty Auto. Originally, only Goodwin's name appeared on the insurance policy. Goodwin's name also appeared as the sole owner on the title for the Dodge.

¶ 7 A few days later, appellant's name was added to the insurance policy as an additional driver. It is unclear whether appellant called AIG personally or whether Goodwin called AIG to add appellant's name to the policy.

¶ 8 Around the same time, the Cavalier was also placed on the AIG policy. Once again, it is unclear who placed the Cavalier on the policy. Both appellant and Goodwin deny having added appellant's name or the Cavalier to the AIG policy.

¶ 9 The Cavalier was eventually towed to Goodwin's mother's house (next door to the appellant/Goodwin residence). After being parked in the mother's backyard, the car was towed to Automotive Services Body Shop, supposedly for a damage estimate. Appellant handed Karen Randolph, the tow truck owner, the keys to the Cavalier immediately prior to the tow. Appellant, Goodwin, and Ken Stambaugh (Goodwin's ex-boyfriend and housemate of Goodwin and appellant) then went to Automotive Services for the estimate, and Automotive Services requested the insurance card. After the card was given to Automotive Services, Stambaugh became angry, presumably at the fact that the Cavalier, which had been wrecked, was once again insured.

¶ 10 On March 23, 2000, an insurance claim was filed with AIG on the Cavalier. The claim form indicated that the damage was the result of an accident on March 17, 2000, where Goodwin "cut [a] corner short and hit [a] pole." N.T., 1/15/2003, at 92-93, 94. After AIG determined that the car was "totaled", it required that appellant (the registered owner of the car) sign a power of attorney and an odometer statement in order to finalize the claim and to permit Consumer Finance Company (through which appellant secured the auto loan) to release the car to AIG.

¶ 11 The phone call with AIG regarding these forms is severely in dispute. The call occurred via a TTY telephone and a relay service due to Goodwin's and appellant's hearing impairments.⁴ It is clear that AIG called Goodwin to obtain the power or attorney and odometer statement. What is unclear is whether appellant ever spoke with AIG. Appellant testified that he never spoke with a representative of AIG regarding a claim on the Cavalier, and that it was Goodwin who told him that the forms were needed "so that we could throw away the car." N.T., 1/16/2003, at 93. Conversely, Goodwin testified that appellant returned home while she was on the TTY telephone with AIG, and that appellant took over talking to the AIG representative on the TTY telephone. Regardless of who actually conversed with the AIG representative, AIG communicated to appellant or Goodwin that forms needed to be signed regarding the Cavalier, and appellant ultimately completed and signed the appropriate forms.

¶ 12 After appellant signed and completed the odometer statement and the power of attorney form, Consumer Finance released the car to AIG upon receipt of $7,730.90 (the amount of debt outstanding on the loan).

¶ 13 Soon after the claim had been completed, Ken Stambaugh reported the deception to the AIG insurance agent. He essentially told the agent that the accident occurred in January, before the AIG policy became effective.

¶ 14 As a result of this conversation, AIG initiated an investigation into the claim in June 2000. Pierre Khoury, the AIG investigator, testified that neither Goodwin nor appellant would give statements regarding the accident. AIG ultimately concluded that the accident occurred before their coverage of the Cavalier began and, therefore, took steps to recover its money. It did obtain most of the $7,730.90 from Consumer Finance, but it has not obtained any costs associated with the investigation of the claim.

¶ 15 Appellant first argues that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof or proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all the evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Lehman, 820 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa.Super.2003) (citations omitted). While there is a great deal of contradictory testimony in this case, we are constrained to resolve all conflicts in favor of the Commonwealth. In so doing, we are compelled to find that appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence.

¶ 16 For a defendant to be convicted of insurance fraud, he must

Knowingly and with the intent to defraud any insurer... assist[ ], abet[ ], solicit[ ] or conspire[ ] with another to prepare or make any statement that is intended to be presented to any insurer ... in connection with, or in support of, a claim that contains any false, incomplete or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim, including information which documents or supports an amount claimed in excess of the actual loss sustained by the claimant.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4117(a)(3). In the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, appellant knew that Goodwin wanted to make an insurance claim on the Cavalier, and at the time of the accident the car was not insured. He admitted that he knew of the scheme when he testified that Goodwin asked appellant in February to obtain insurance on the Cavalier to pay off the car loan. Further, appellant spoke with the AIG representative about the Cavalier and, therefore, knew that a claim was made on the Cavalier. Finally, appellant prepared and signed the odometer statement and power of attorney form in support of the claim. These facts are sufficient to establish that appellant committed the crime of insurance fraud.

¶ 17 For a defendant to be convicted of theft by deception, he must "intentionally obtain[ ] or withhold[ ] property of another by deception." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a). Deception is defined as intentionally creating or reinforcing a false impression. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a)(1). The Commonwealth must also show that the victim relied on the false impression created or reinforced by the defendant. Commonwealth v....