Com. v. Saranchak

• Decision Date: 24 April 1996
• Citation: 675 A.2d 268,544 Pa. 158
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Daniel Michael SARANCHAK, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 268

675 A.2d 268

544 Pa. 158

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Daniel Michael SARANCHAK, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Oct. 25, 1995.

Decided April 24, 1996.

[544 Pa. 165] Kent D. Watkins, St. Clair, for Appellant.

Claude A.L. Shields, Pottsville, Robert A. Graci, Attorney General's Office, Harrisburg, for Appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CASTILLE, Justice.

Appellant pled guilty generally to two separate murders. Following a degree of guilt hearing, the trial court found appellant guilty of first degree murder in both charges. ¹ Following a non-jury trial on the other charges filed against appellant, appellant was convicted of burglary, ² robbery ³ and conspiracy. ^{4 4} At the penalty hearing, a jury was empaneled and it determined that two aggravating circumstances existed on each count of murder beyond a reasonable doubt: that the murders were committed during the perpetration of a felony (robbery) ⁵ and that appellant had been convicted of another murder, committed either before or at the time of the offenses at issue. ⁶ No mitigating circumstances were found. As required by statute in such circumstances, the jury set the penalty at death. ⁷ See, Commonwealth v. Basemore, 525 Pa. 512, 582 A.2d 861 (1990)(the jury found one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances and thus, was required to impose the death sentence). On September 15, 1994, the court imposed the jury's sentence of death for both first degree murder convictions and further sentenced appellant to serve consecutively the maximum allowable prison sentences on the three remaining felonies. This direct appeal followed.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Although appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his first degree murder convictions, we are required in all cases where the death penalty has been imposed, to independently undertake a review of the sufficiency of the evidence, even where a plea of guilty has been entered. ⁸ Commonwealth v, Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 26, 454 A.2d 937, 942 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983). When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, an appellate court, viewing all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to enable the fact finder to find that all of the elements of the offenses were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Burgos, 530 Pa. 473, 476, 610 A.2d 11, 13 (1992). Viewing the evidence presented in the trial court below in its proper light, we find that the evidence amply supports the convictions of first degree murder.

The following facts form the basis for appellant's convictions: on October 16, 1993, appellant's 78 year-old uncle, and 87 year-old grandmother were found dead in their residence located in the village of Cumbola, Pennsylvania. Their bodies were discovered after appellant's uncle had not shown up for work and his employer went to the home to see if anything was wrong. The employer entered the home through the basement door, discovered the uncle's dead body and summoned the police. When the police arrived at the home, they found appellant's grandmother with a single gunshot wound in the forehead in the upstairs bedroom. Appellant's uncle was found shot to death lying on a couch in the basement. During the subsequent investigation, the police spoke to appellant's mother who informed the police that all she knew was that the night before, appellant had taken his brother's firearm and had gone to the area in Cumbola village known as Five Points to go "shooting." ⁹ After obtaining this information, the police went to appellant's apartment and transported him to the police station for questioning.

At the police station, appellant was advised of his Miranda rights. ¹⁰ Appellant indicated that he understood his rights and that he waived those rights. He then gave a verbal statement to the police in which he indicated that on the night of the murders he was at a bar with another male, Roy Miles, and that after a few beers, he and Miles left the bar and traveled to his brother's house to pick up his brother's .22 caliber rifle. He and Miles then went to his grandmother's house where he shot his uncle. Appellant refused to give the police any information regarding the shooting of his grandmother. After his statement, the police arrested appellant for the murder of his grandmother and uncle.

Appellant's co-conspirator, Miles, testified at the degree of guilt hearing that while at a bar, he and appellant were drinking and they ran out of money. ¹¹ Appellant told Miles that he knew where they could obtain more money, but that they might have to kill someone to get it. Miles agreed to this proposition and both individuals left the bar and went to appellant's house and retrieved the rifle. The two men then drove to appellant's grandmother's house several miles away. Once they arrived at the house, Miles accompanied appellant, who was armed with the rifle, down into the basement of the house where appellant's uncle was sleeping. Appellant then fired a single shot into his uncle's head killing him instantly. He then told Miles to search his uncle's pockets and take his uncle's wallet which contained a sum of cash. Thereafter, the two men went upstairs to the grandmother's bedroom. As appellant's grandmother was speaking to him, he shot her in the forehead one time killing her instantly as well. The two men then left the house and returned to the bar in Pottsville. ¹²

A social worker who had interviewed appellant at prison testified at the degree of guilt hearing that appellant told her that he and Miles had gone to his grandmother's house to get money, that he had retrieved a rifle to take with him, that he shot his uncle and that they took money from his dead uncle's pockets. She further testified that although appellant refused to give any specific details regarding his grandmother's murder, appellant slipped more than once and stated that he killed "them" and not just "him."

Additional testimony at the degree of guilt hearing included that of a police lieutenant who testified that the shell casings found near both deceased's bodies had been fired from appellant's rifle. Autopsy reports were also admitted which corroborated that both victims died as a result of gunshot wounds to the head fired from the rifle possessed by appellant.

In first degree murder cases, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill, that a human being was unlawfully killed, that the person accused did the killing, and that the killing was done with deliberation. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 528 Pa. 546, 550, 599 A.2d 624, 626 (1991). ¹³ Appellant's statements to the police and the social worker, combined with the corroborating testimony of his co-conspirator, Miles, and other evidence clearly showed that appellant, with premeditation, planned to kill, and did kill, two human beings in order to steal money from them. As such, the evidence sufficiently demonstrates that the killings here were done with premeditation, deliberation and in cold blood. Therefore, the evidence sufficiently supports appellant's two first degree murder convictions.

II. Improper Exclusion of Prospective Jurors

Turning to the issues appellant expressly raises herein, his first claim is that the trial court erroneously excluded for cause six prospective jurors on the basis that each would be unable to impose the death penalty. Appellant claims that they should not have been excused for cause because they did not have sufficient reservations about their ability to impose the death penalty in order to warrant their exclusion. We do not agree.

It is well settled that a prospective juror may be excluded for cause when his views on capital punishment are such as would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath." Commonwealth v. Holland, 518 Pa. 405, 410, 543 A.2d 1068, 1073 (1988). Furthermore, absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause, based upon prospective juror's answers and demeanor during voir dire will not be disturbed on appeal. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 193, 555 A.2d 846, 851 (1989). Here, the voir dire transcript demonstrates that the six individuals in question took the following positions when asked about their ability to impose the death penalty:

Potential Jurors:

Juror # 1--Question: "So you are saying you would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty?" Answer: Yes.

Juror # 2--Question: "Do you have a fixed opinion against the death penalty?" Answer: "Yes, I think I do." Question: "Would you say then that you would vote automatically against the imposition of the death penalty?" Answer: "The way I feel right now, yes, I would. I'd be against the death penalty."

Juror # 3--Question: "Are you saying that you would listen to this and whatever you heard when you went back to that room you would automatically vote against the death penalty?" Answer: "Yes."

Juror # 4--Question: "You said it would be hard. Could you explain that?" Answer: "I guess I ....don't think I can make that decision." Question: "You don't believe that you could make the decision itself? Is that the problem?" Answer: "No, I think it would bother me."

Juror # 5--Question: "Have you as a result of anything that you read or anything that you have heard, formed an opinion concerning which punishment the defendant should receive?" Answer: "Not what I read; but of a matter of conscience, I would not be able to condemn a man to death."

Juror # 6--Question: "And, assume...