Com. v. Scott

• Decision Date: 28 August 1990
• Citation: 396 Pa.Super. 339,578 A.2d 933
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Keith Michael SCOTT. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Keith Michael SCOTT, Appellant.

Page 933

578 A.2d 933

396 Pa.Super. 339

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Keith Michael SCOTT.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Keith Michael SCOTT, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 20, 1990.

Filed July 19, 1990.

Reargument Denied Aug. 28, 1990.

Gregory Doyle Anthony, Asst. Dist. Atty., Warren, for Com. (at 2333).

George W. Westervelt, Jr., Stroudsburg, for appellant (at 2408) and appellee (at 2333).

David E. Christine, Jr., Dist. Atty., East Stroudsburg, for Com. (at 2408).

Before OLSZEWSKI, JOHNSON and HOFFMAN, JJ.

HOFFMAN, Judge:

A criminal complaint was filed in Monroe County charging defendant Keith Scott with criminal homicide, robbery, aggravated assault (two counts), theft, and attempted criminal homicide. These cross-appeals are from the order below that, inter alia, dismissed the first degree murder and attempted criminal homicide charges against Scott, and set a trial date for the remaining charges. In its appeal, the Commonwealth construes the court's order as having granted Scott habeas corpus relief, and contends that the court erred because a prima facie case was established on all charges. Conversely, Scott, in his cross-appeal, construes the court's order as one under the Mental Health Procedures Act, see 50 Pa.Stat.Ann. §§ 7101-7503, and argues that the court erred in failing to enter an acquittal on all charges. For the reasons that follow, we quash Scott's appeal but otherwise affirm the order below.

The criminal complaint in this case was filed on April 1, 1983. The complaint alleged that on March 31, 1983, Scott stabbed one man to death and seriously wounded another. On May 11, 1983, a preliminary hearing was held, and Scott was bound over on the charges. Thereafter, Scott's counsel filed a petition under the Mental Health Procedures Act for a hearing to determine competence, see 50 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 7403. Scott was arraigned on May 31, and a plea of not guilty was entered on his behalf. On June 1, the hearing court issued an opinion and order, finding Scott incompetent to stand trial, and committing him to Farview State Hospital for ninety (90) days. A defense motion for continuance of trial was granted on September 8, 1983. On November 9, the court granted Scott's motion to continue trial indefinitely, stating in its order that "Defendant shall be tried only when the Commonwealth has received notice from Farview State Hospital ... that the Defendant is mentally competent to stand trial." Between 1983 and 1989, the court received periodic reports concerning Scott's competency, which resulted in the entry of orders continuing his treatment at Farview.

In April and May of 1989, the Commonwealth filed applications for three separate competency examinations under § 7402(d) of the Act. ¹ In the applications, the Commonwealth sought to have Scott's condition reviewed by Bernard Willis, M.D., and Kenneth Weiss, M.D., both psychiatrists, and Gerry A. Stefanatos, Ph.D., a neuropsychologist. The court issued separate orders granting each application, and directing that Scott be examined by the doctors designated by the Commonwealth. The orders also directed the doctors to file reports detailing, inter alia, their respective opinions concerning (1) Scott's competence to stand trial; (2) whether, at the time of the offenses, Scott was legally insane; ² and (3) whether Scott had the mental capacity to form a specific intent to kill. ³ On July 5, 1989, the court scheduled a competency hearing for July 14. On July 11, however, Scott filed a notice of insanity defense, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 305, and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In the habeas petition, Scott alleged that the reports already filed by the Commonwealth's own experts were sufficient to establish his insanity. In response, the court rescheduled the competency hearing for July 24, 1989, and directed that evidence on the habeas petition would be heard at the same time.

At the July 24 hearing, the court heard testimony from the Commonwealth's three medical experts. ⁴ Doctors Willis, Weiss, and Stefanatos all opined that Scott was competent to stand trial. Scott's counsel also questioned Doctors Willis and Weiss in an attempt to prove that Scott was legally insane. ⁵ Both psychiatrists stated that their examinations led them to conclude that Scott had been legally insane at the time of the offenses. See N.T. July 24, 1989 at 7, 23-24 (R.R. at 51a, 67a-68a). The doctors' testimony in this regard was consistent with the findings contained in the reports they had filed with the court. See R.R. at 151a-52a (Dr. Willis), ⁶ 153a-54a (Dr. Weiss). In an attempt to rebut the doctors' conclusions on insanity, the Commonwealth introduced the testimony of Christine Metzler, Scott's girlfriend at the time of the offenses. Ms. Metzler testified concerning Scott's behavior shortly after the stabbings occurred. Her testimony suggested that Scott was aware that he had killed someone, that he knew it was wrong to do so, and that he was aware enough of the wrongfulness of his actions to attempt to destroy evidence, disguise his appearance, and flee. See N.T. July 24, 1989, at 44-49 (R.R. at 88a-93a). Finally, the Commonwealth introduced the notes of testimony from Scott's preliminary hearing.

After hearing argument, the court directed the parties to file briefs. A review of these briefs ⁷ indicates that, although appellant had raised the insanity issue in a habeas petition, both parties recognized that the court had the authority, under the Mental Health Procedures Act, see 50 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 7404(a), ⁸ to make a pre-trial determination concerning Scott's criminal responsibility. See "Commonwealth's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Application for Habeas Corpus Relief Under the Mental Health Procedures Act" at 2-3; "Defendant's Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" at 3-5. On September 1, 1989, the hearing court issued an order in which, inter alia, it found that Scott was competent to stand trial, ⁹ dismissed the charges of first degree murder and attempted criminal homicide, and denied Scott's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Commonwealth and Scott filed these timely cross-appeals from that order.

In its opinion accompanying the September 1 order, the court explained the reasons for its disposition as follows. The court noted that the Commonwealth's psychiatrists agreed that appellant was legally insane at the time of the offense. ¹⁰ The court also noted, however, that the experts agreed that Scott's mental incapacity resulted, in some part at least, from his "long time drug use." See Trial Court Opinion at 8. This finding is important because the Crimes Code specifically provides that "neither voluntary intoxication nor voluntary drugged condition is a defense to a criminal charge, nor may evidence of such conditions be introduced to negative the element of intent of the offense...." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 308. Instead, evidence of such a condition may be offered only "whenever it is relevant to reduce murder from a higher degree to a lower degree of murder." Id. In light of these limitations, the court reasoned that:

Our Supreme Court has held that an actor should not be insulated from criminal liability for acts which result from a mental state that is voluntarily self-induced. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa. 305, 311, 396 A.2d 1183, 1186 (1979). However, our Supreme Court has never reached the question[ ] of the applicability of the defense of insanity where the mental disease is traceable to long term abuse of drugs. In the Hicks case, supra, the Court was concerned with an acute episode. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa. 305, 311 n. 5, 396 A.2d 1183, 1186 n. 5 (1979).

We reject the proposition that in today's society a mental illness resulting from long term drug abuse can exonerate someone from criminal responsibility. On the other hand, we find it unconscionable to submit the issue of First Degree Murder in this case to the jury where all of the experts hired by the Commonwealth unequivocally agree that the defendant did not have the mental capacity to form a specific intent to kill. Such specific intent is a requisite for the capital offense of first degree murder. 18 Pa.C.S.A. [s] 2502.

Since we find that the Defendant lacked the specific intent to commit first degree murder, this conclusion also mandates that the charge of Criminal Attempt to Commit Criminal Homicide be dismissed.

Trial Court Opinion at 20-21.

Both Scott and the Commonwealth take issue with the court's decision below. The parties' arguments are based on differing characterizations of the nature of the hearing below. The Commonwealth suggests that the court was sitting as a habeas corpus court, and thus had power only to determine whether the Commonwealth had presented a prima facie case. The Commonwealth then argues that the evidence it presented clearly was sufficient to establish a prima facie case and notes that Scott does not contest this fact. Scott suggests, however, that the court was sitting under authority of the Mental Health Procedures Act and was empowered, in its discretion, to make a pre-trial determination of Scott's criminal responsibility. Scott contends that the court erred to the extent that it refused to acquit him on all charges on insanity grounds. ¹¹ Because our review of the propriety of the court's decision depends preliminarily on a determination whether the court was sitting as a habeas court or under the Mental Health Procedures Act, we shall first review the court's authority, and then discuss the merits of the claims.

I. PROCEDURES GOVERNING PRE-TRIAL

CHALLENGES TO SUFFICIENCY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

A. Habeas Corpus

The Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 101 et seq., provides that "[a]ny judge of a court of record may issue the writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of detention of any person or for any other lawful purpose." Id. § 6502(a). It is settled that...