Com. v. Sheriff

• Decision Date: 11 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. SJC-05550,SJC-05550
• Citation: Com. v. Sheriff, 680 N.E.2d 75, 425 Mass. 186 (Mass. 1997)
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Jimmy J. SHERIFF.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 75

680 N.E.2d 75

425 Mass. 186

COMMONWEALTH v.Jimmy J.SHERIFF.

No. SJC-05550.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued Feb. 3, 1997.

Decided June 11, 1997.

Michael J. Traft, Boston (Leo McAuliffe, Wollaston, with him), for defendant.

Rosemary Daly Mellor, Assistant District Attorney, Cambridge (Adrienne C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, Newton, with her), for the Commonwealth.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and LYNCH, O'CONNOR, FRIED and MARSHALL, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree by reason of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty for the stabbing and bludgeoning death of his wife.On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the judge improperly instructed the jury regarding his commitment to Bridgewater State Hospital; (2) the judge neither ruled on the question of the voluntariness of certain statements made by the defendant nor submitted the issue to the jury; (3) his Miranda rights were violated; (4) certain statements were improperly introduced as prior inconsistent statements; (5) the jury were improperly instructed that evidence of the defendant's attempted suicide may be considered as consciousness of the defendant's guilt; (6) the judge's instructions on deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and malice were fatally flawed; and (7) the judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial without a hearing where the defendant was provided ineffective assistance of counsel.The defendant also asks that we exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial.Because we conclude that the judge's instruction regarding the defendant's commitment to Bridgewater State Hospital was misleading and because he failed to instruct the jury on the voluntariness of an admission of the defendant, we conclude that there must be a new trial.

Facts.We set forth the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for discussion in conjunction with certain issues raised.SeeCommonwealth v. Nichypor, 419 Mass. 209, 210, 643 N.E.2d 452(1994);Commonwealth v. Burnett, 417 Mass. 740, 741, 632 N.E.2d 1206(1994).In the months before the murder, the defendant began to suspect that his wife was being unfaithful and wanted her to return to India, their native country, with him.Several times the defendant visited his wife at Malden Hospital, where she was a medical resident.There he interrupted her at work and accused her of being unfaithful.Other hospital employees observed the defendant and his wife arguing; at least twice hospital security was called because of the couple's arguments.The defendant was warned that he could be cited for trespassing if he caused disruptions in the hospital.According to the Commonwealth, because of the defendant's behavior, his sister was to come from California to escort him back to India.

On February 14, 1987, the victim did not report to work at the hospital for her scheduled shift.When asked to check her residence, police officers found the victim's body in the bedroom.She had suffered fifty-three stab wounds in the chest, abdomen, leg, and groin area.In addition it appeared that the victim had been struck three times in the head.The wounds were consistent with having been inflicted by a knife and a wrench found at the scene.Wounds on her hands and forearms were characterized as defensive wounds.

The defendant was found lying unresponsive on the floor, apparently unconscious and foaming at the mouth.Inside the defendant's mouth were undigested pills.There was blood matching the victim's blood type on the defendant's shirt, pants, socks, and shoes.All doors to the apartment were locked from the inside.There were also numerous pills and prescription bottles strewn on the dining room table and on the floor around where the defendant had been lying.The bathroom sink faucet tested positive for the presence of occult blood and there was blood on the kitchen sink.The police immediately focused on the defendant as the primary suspect, and arrested him that evening at the hospital where he had been taken.

At trial the defense theory was that the defendant suffered from a major mental illness at the time of his wife's murder, and that if he committed the crime, he was not criminally responsible.The defendant testified that he had no memory of what happened in the apartment that day with respect to the killing; he was, however, able to recall the days leading up to the killing and denied that he would ever kill his wife, whom he considered to be his "goddess."The defendant further testified that his former employer had orchestrated a conspiracy against him, and evidence was presented that in the months prior to the killing the defendant had engaged in bizarre behavior as a result of his belief in this conspiracy.

Although the experts did not agree on whether the defendant was criminally responsible, they did agree that he suffered from a mental disease or defect.Two experts for the defendant testified that the defendant suffered from a major mental illness and could neither appreciate the criminality of his conduct nor conform it to the requirements of the law.An expert for the Commonwealth testified that the defendant had a mental disease but it was a paranoid personality disorder, not schizophrenia, and the defendant was criminally responsible for his actions.The Commonwealth's expert also testified that the defendant did not suffer from any command hallucinations to kill his wife.In short, the Commonwealth agreed that the defendant suffered from a mental illness at the time of the crime, but questioned the severity of the illness.Moreover, the Commonwealth pointed out the defendant did not believe his wife was part of the conspiracy against him, and argued that the defendant's motive for the killing, his belief that his wife was having an affair, was unrelated to the defendant's delusions.

The judge's instructions to the jury regarding the defendant's commitment to Bridgewater State Hospital.On direct examination, Dr. William Rohde, an expert witness called by the defense, told the jury that he had visited the defendant at Bridgewater State Hospital to determine his competency to stand trial.Dr. Rohde also made a reference to a "recommitment note" dated December, 1988, at which time the defendant's "legal status [had] changed."Concerned about the mention of competency examinations and commitment to the hospital, the judge instructed the jury that they were to disregard these references.The judge further admonished the jury that the defendant was not committed to Bridgewater State Hospital because he was mentally ill but because he had chosen to remain at the hospital.¹Defense counsel objected to this characterization both before and after the instruction was given, and on appeal contends that the instruction was both contrary to fact and cannot be characterized as harmless.

As an initial matter, it is clear that the judge's statement to the jury was not accurate.While it is true that at the time of the trial, the defendant was at Bridgewater voluntarily, it is also true that at times relevant to the case, contrary to what the judge told the jury, the defendant had been involuntarily committed to Bridgewater.Indeed, at least for the first half of 1989, the defendant was committed to Bridgewater State Hospital involuntarily pursuant to a court order issued under G.L. c. 123, § 16.²Because the instruction was objected to, we must consider whether the error was not prejudicial or whether, as the defendant argues, the instruction inappropriately minimized the severity of the defendant's mental illness.

It is well settled that a defendant has a right to place before a jury any evidence which is probative of his mental condition.SeeCommonwealth v. Biancardi, 421 Mass. 251, 255, 656 N.E.2d 1234(1995);Commonwealth v. Mamay, 407 Mass. 412, 420, 553 N.E.2d 945(1990);Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 34, 453 N.E.2d 437(1983);Commonwealth v. Schulze, 389 Mass. 735, 740, 452 N.E.2d 216(1983).There was evidence before the jury that the defendant had been acting irrationally for an extended period before the crime.The jury could have believed that an involuntary commitment to Bridgewater after the crime was further evidence of his lack of criminal responsibility as they may have considered his voluntary commitment as an attempt to bolster his defense.Although the judge may have been properly concerned with the witness's reference to competency, Commonwealth v. DeWolfe, 389 Mass. 120, 123, 449 N.E.2d 344(1983), the judge's instructions did more than just inform the jury that any references to competency were to be ignored.Rather, the judge's instructions blurred the distinction between a voluntary and an involuntary commitment which could have undercut the defendant's evidence of his mental state during the postarrest period.We have consistently held that the jury are "the sole judges of the credibility and weight of all of the evidence on the issue of insanity."Commonwealth v. Louraine, supra at 35, 453 N.E.2d 437, quotingCommonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 536, 350 N.E.2d 444(1976).By misleading the jury on the state of the defendant's mental illness after the crime, the judge infringed the defendant's right to have the jury fully consider his mental state before, during, and after the crime.Commonwealth v. Callahan, 386 Mass. 784, 792, 438 N.E.2d 45(1982), citingCommonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486, 399 N.E.2d 482(1980).Thus, the impact of the judge's instruction cannot be underestimated in a trial where a key issue was the severity of the defendant's mental illness.³

Admission of statements made by the defendant in the hospital.After being found unconscious at the scene of the crime, the defendant was taken to a hospital where he was placed in the intensive care unit....