Com. v. Simms

Decision Date13 November 1985
Citation500 A.2d 801,509 Pa. 11
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Nathan SIMMS, Appellant. 16 W.D. 1985
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Kim William Riester, Scott & Vogrin, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Robert E. Colville, Dist. Atty., Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court which affirmed a judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Commonwealth v. Simms, 330 Pa.Super. 594, 478 A.2d 121 (1984). The appellant, Nathan Simms, was convicted of murder of the first degree, and a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. The conviction arose from an incident in which appellant stabbed and burned a woman with whom he had been living. On the day of the incident, September 26, 1980, a criminal complaint was filed charging appellant with having committed this aggravated assault. On November 7, 1980, however, the victim of the assault died, and, hence, on November 26, 1980, a complaint was filed charging appellant with criminal homicide.

The sole issue to be addressed 1 in the instant appeal is whether appellant was brought to trial within the 180 day period prescribed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100, which provides, "Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant ... shall commence no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date on which the complaint is filed." Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(2). The courts below held that the final permissible date for commencement of appellant's trial should be calculated from the filing of the second (i.e. criminal homicide) complaint, rather than from the filing of the first (i.e. aggravated assault) complaint. Appellant concedes that if the date of filing of the second complaint is regarded as controlling, trial commenced in a timely fashion. It is argued by appellant, however, that the date of filing of the first complaint marked the beginning of the 180 day period for trial.

The final permissible date for trial to begin, if computed from the date of filing of the initial complaint, was March 25, 1981. On that date, the Commonwealth filed a Petition to Extend the Time for Commencement of Trial, and this petition was granted by the Court of Common Pleas on March 27, 1981. Appellant contests the timeliness of this extension, as well as the basis for this extension, thus raising an issue as to whether trial commenced in a timely fashion if the period for trial is regarded as having commenced with the filing of the first complaint. We believe, however, that the courts below properly determined that the filing of the second complaint, charging appellant with criminal homicide, marked the beginning of the 180 day period for trial on that charge. Thus, a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 1100, which was filed by appellant prior to trial, was properly denied.

The keystone of judicial decisions applying Rule 1100 has been a recognition that an abuse of the spirit of that Rule would occur if the Commonwealth were permitted to delay trials by simply, at will, withdrawing or dismissing complaints and filing new ones, thereby beginning anew the 180 day period for commencement of trial. In response to this potential means of evading the intent of Rule 1100, a body of case law has developed which defines the limited circumstances under which the period for trial will be deemed to run anew when a complaint subsequent to the first complaint is filed. See Commonwealth v. Horner, 497 Pa. 565, 442 A.2d 682 (1982); Commonwealth v. Genovese, 493 Pa. 65, 425 A.2d 367 (1981).

In the case primarily relied upon by appellant, Commonwealth v. Ardolino, 304 Pa.Super. 268, 273-277, 450 A.2d 674, 677-679 (1982), the Superior Court reaffirmed its established rule that, when an initial complaint has been withdrawn or otherwise dismissed, the 180 day period begins to run anew with the filing of a subsequent complaint only if (1) the earlier complaint was properly dismissed by a competent magisterial or judicial authority, and (2) the record does not reveal evidence of a prosecution attempt to circumvent Rule 1100.

In the instant case, the record does not reveal what disposition was made of the complaint initially filed against appellant charging him with the offense of aggravated assault. It is not clear that the complaint was ever formally withdrawn or dismissed, and there is no evidence that any judicial review of the matter occurred. The only reference to the matter by the Commonwealth was its allegation, in its Petition to Extend the Time for Commencement of Trial, that the first complaint was rendered "moot."

Appellant contends, therefore, that the Ardolino requirement that there have been a proper dismissal of the first complaint was not satisfied, and, thus, that the 180 day period did not begin to run anew upon the filing of the criminal homicide complaint. We disagree. Unlike the present case, the Ardolino decision and the cases cited therein arose from factual scenarios where complaints filed subsequent to the first complaint repeated the charge of an offense that had been set forth in the first complaint. See also Commonwealth v. Sires, 284 Pa.Super. 50, 424 A.2d 1386 (1981) (first complaint summarily withdrawn without judicial review, then second complaint filed charging same offense). Such circumstances present an enhanced likelihood that the mechanism of repeatedly filing complaints, that are essentially the same, may be utilized by the Commonwealth as a means of evading the 180 day rule. The safeguard of there having been a proper dismissal of the first complaint is necessary in such cases to prevent evasions of Rule 1100. The instant case is not one, however, where the second complaint charged the same offense as was charged in the first complaint, and, hence, there is not the same possibility that the second complaint was filed for the purpose of evading the 180 day rule. Thus, a proper dismissal of the first complaint is not necessary to assure that the second complaint is not merely being used to extend the time for trial on the same charges as were previously filed.

Appellant argues that Commonwealth v. Earp, 476...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • Com. v. Trill
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 8 Julio 1988
    ...and (2) the protection of society." Commonwealth v. Brocklehurst, 491 Pa. 151, 153-154, 420 A.2d 385, 387 (1980); Commonwealth v. Simms, 509 Pa. 11, 500 A.2d 801 (1985). Bearing this in mind, our supreme court has offered the following standard for reviewing Rule 1100 So long as there has b......
  • Commonwealth of Pa. v. Peterson
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • 4 Mayo 2011
    ...began with the second complaint where there was no intent by the Commonwealth to evade the speedy-trial rule.5 Commonwealth v. Simms, 509 Pa. 11, 500 A.2d 801 (1985) and Commonwealth v. Whiting, 509 Pa. 20, 500 A.2d 806 (1985); see also Commonwealth v. Genovese, 493 Pa. 65, 425 A.2d 367 (19......
  • Commonwealth v. Harth, 13 EAP 2020
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • 22 Junio 2021
    ...prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it." Commonwealth v. Simms , 509 Pa. 11, 500 A.2d 801, 804 (1985) ; Crowley , 466 A.2d at 1012 ; Genovese , 425 A.2d at 370.The majority's holding will not further the interests of defenda......
  • State v. Lowther
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 17 Febrero 1989
    ... ... Stephans, 52 Ohio App.2d 361, 370 N.E.2d 759 (1977); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 509 Pa. 20, 500 A.2d 806 (1985); Commonwealth v. Simms, 509 Pa. 11, 500 A.2d 801 (1985). " '[P]roper dismissal' includes a dismissal for failure to make out a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing." ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT